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THE WORLD AS AN ORGANIC WHOLE

By N. O. LOSSKY

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PRAGUE

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RUSSIAN BY
NATALIE A. DUDDINGTON, M.A.

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INTRODUCTION

BY the mighty efforts of the great minds of the ancient and modern world many of the fundamental problems of existence have long ago been solved. The only reason that we have not a final system of metaphysics is that every great discovery, however brilliant it may be, contains besides truth a certain amount of falsity, which condemns it to be one-sided and partial and prevents it from being linked up with other discoveries into a complete and consistent system of philosophy.

The task, then, that lies before our generation is not to construct everything anew, but, by solving certain special problems, to find new points of view that introduce order and harmony into the precious heritage bequeathed to us.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the chief obstacle to building a complete and harmonious system of metaphysics was the young science of epistemology. Unconsciously starting from false pre-suppositions, furnished by a mechanistic (inorganic) philosophy, it has yielded a narrow solution of the problem of truth, through either completely denying the very possibility of metaphysics as a science or arriving at some form of subjective idealism or defending the purely mechanical interpretation of the world adopted by natural science.

The theory of knowledge worked out in my books *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, *the Handbuch der Logik* and elsewhere, aims at vindicating the validity of metaphysics. Moreover, the Intuitionist theory renders possible the combination of the most diverse metaphysical doctrines concerning realms of being and aspects of the world that profoundly differ from one another. Thus, for instance, it shows in what way the eternal (i.e. the ideal principles) and the temporal (events, &c.) can both be equally trans-subjective, so that we are not compelled to interpret either of these aspects of reality as the subjective product of thought.

It is on the basis of this epistemological theory that I propose to consider the problem of the world as an organic whole.

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I

THE ORGANIC CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD

THE organic and the inorganic conception of the world are the two main opposites which divide the representatives of the various systems of philosophy. The essence of these two conceptions may be described as follows. Those who take the inorganic view conceive of a complex whole with distinguishable parts *A, B, C, D*, as made up of elements *A, B, C, D*, capable of existing on their own account independently both of each other and of the whole in which they are found. The elements are taken to be self-subsistent to such an extent that if *B, C, D* completely disappeared *A* would go on existing as before. Coming together in space, these elements may form a group and thus give rise to a complex whole. According to this view, the elements are absolute, primordial, and exist unconditionally. The whole is, on the contrary, relative, derivative, and entirely determined by its parts. In other words, plurality is regarded as primary and unity as secondary and as conditioned by the plurality.

The most definite expression of this view is to be found in the early systems of materialistic atomism. It is so familiar to every one that there is no need to give concrete examples. To bring out the uncon-

ditional character which in the crudest forms of atomism is ascribed to the elements, it is sufficient to point out that, according to the theories in question, if all atoms with the exception of atom *A* disappeared, that atom would still go on existing, and would, indeed, be better off than before : no longer submitted to any push or pressure, it would continue moving evenly and in a straight line in empty space.

Those who take the organic view understand plurality and wholeness in a diametrically opposite way. It is the whole that exists primarily, and the elements can exist and come into being only within the system of the whole. The world cannot be explained as the result of adding *A* to *B*, then to *C*, and so on : plurality cannot give rise to wholeness, but is, on the contrary, generated by it. In other words, the whole is prior to its parts ; the absolute must be sought in the domain of wholeness or, rather, beyond it, and certainly not among the elements ; the elements are in any case derivative and relative, i.e. they can only exist in relation to the system of which they are members.¹

Most people dismiss such a doctrine as a mere philosophical abstraction or as an absurdity that finds no confirmation in experience and cannot be even imagined, while the inorganic view seems to them clear, natural, and obviously true. To show how

¹ By the word 'element' is meant any component part of a system, and therefore that which is *relatively* simple, i.e. that which is simpler and in this sense more elementary than the system.

mistaken such an attitude is, it is necessary to produce a concrete instance of some whole which every one would be bound to interpret in the spirit of the organic theory. The most convincing examples are to be found among spatial relations, such for instance as the relation between a line and its points, or a surface and the lines upon it. Every line, however short it may be, is inexhaustibly complex, since an infinite number of points can be distinguished in it by analysis ; and yet a line is not the sum of its points. The addition of point to point could not produce a line, not on account of any external obstacle such as the length of time required for the operation, but because of the logical impossibility. No summation of points that have no extension could give rise to the extended continuity of the line. We have, then, here a whole (a line) which can be the *ground* of an infinite multiplicity (of points), but cannot arise out of it.¹

It would be no argument to the contrary to say that a line is formed by the movement of a point, a surface by the movement of a line, &c. The *movement* of a point is more than the sum of successive positions occupied by it ; movement is a whole, one of the aspects of which is its *direction*—namely a line, a surface, a body, and so on. One of the great merits of Bergson is the brilliant way in which he has demonstrated the organic nature of movement and has

¹ The same instance is given in Vladimir Solovyov's article (in Russian), 'The Idea of Humanity in Auguste Comte' (*Coll. Works*, vol. viii, p. 232).

shown that, although by analysis we can discover in it an infinite number of positions of the moving body, it is a whole that is not formed by the mere summation of its elements.¹⁸ The same relation that obtains between a point and a line obtains between a line and a surface, a surface and a solid, a three-dimensional solid and a four-dimensional body, &c.

I will give a few more instances in order to show that the principles underlying an organic conception of the world are necessary both to philosophy and to special sciences such as physics.

Let us imagine two intercommunicating cylinders, one of which is filled with oil and the other with water ; it will be remembered that the height of two different liquids of the same weight is in inverse ratio to their density. The height, say, of the column of oil is due, in the first place, to the properties of that column itself which condition the amount of pressure at its base ; further, it is due to the properties of the column of water in the other cylinder which condition the amount of counter-pressure ; and, finally, to the nature of the intermediary layer of oil or water which transmits these pressures ; in other words, the height of the column of oil is conditioned by the whole system within which it is contained. The same must be said about the column of water.

In his book *Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und in stationärem Zustand*, Köhler adduces ample evidence to show that many physical processes have

¹ See also the above-mentioned article by Solovyov.

undoubtedly an organic structure, e.g. electro-motive forces produced by two electrolytes connected by a process of osmosis; or, again, a charge on the surface of an electrified body, an electro-magnetic field, a stationary electric current, &c. In line with Ehrenfels's theory of *Gestaltqualitäten*, Köhler describes such structures by the term *physische Gestalten*, but it is clear from his explanation that he thereby means the same as I do by the words 'organic whole'.¹ Thus, in dealing with the structure of a surface-charge of electricity, he reasons as follows:

'Mention is not infrequently made in books on natural philosophy of a "Law of Resultants" as being of importance to all branches of physics in the sense that every physical structure (*Gebilde*) can be completely expressed as the sum of its parts. As against this view I must insist that it is impossible to regard the specific structure of a charge on a conductor as any summation of localized charges, for not a single fraction of the charge would have stayed for a moment in its place, unless the other fractions were already there and unchangeably fixed. Only if the conductor could be given the various local charges at one and the same moment, could this displacement of charges be ruled out. But this implies that the structure was created at once as a whole, and that any summation of parts leaves the problem unsolved.'

Not only a complex system, but even the simplest case of interaction between two things, requires for its interpretation the organic principle which is truly universal in its import. Interaction is far from being

¹ Köhler's book appeared after the first edition of the present work.

the mere sum of two actions of which the first follows the second as a response (like dealing a blow and striking back in a fight) ; strictly speaking, the term 'interaction' means such *simultaneous* determination of the thing *A* by the thing *B* and vice versa that there is no meaning in drawing a distinction between the agent and the patient : paradoxical as it may sound, in the case of interaction, the event x (in *A*) is conditioned by the event y (in *B*), but the event y is in its turn conditioned by the event x . Such a relation between the things *A* and *B* can only become intelligible on the supposition that they are not two completely independent entities but aspects of a single whole, and that their qualities exist not on their own account, but only as forming part of a system. It is noteworthy that the best instances of interaction are to be found in the domain of mechanical processes, e. g. in the facts of gravitation. The most striking instance of interaction is afforded by the fact of push or pressure—the very fact by means of which those who take an inorganic view of the world seek to explain the whole cosmic process. Since action and reaction are complementary, it must be admitted that pressure is only possible where there is resistance, and resistance only possible where there is pressure. This circumstance clearly shows that the attributes of impenetrability do not belong to physical bodies as such, but only in so far as they form part of a comprehensive system. When this is clearly realized, the attempt to split up the material world into separate particles and to imagine that

they are capable of independent existence must be given up once and for all. We have seen from the instances given that the mechanical elements of a system—the height of the column of liquid, the movement of material particles, &c.—are conditioned by that system as a whole. The same thing is true with regard to all other states and attributes, such as the chemical properties of water and oil : they exist only in relation to a system and are dependent upon it. The system upon which the physical and chemical properties of water depend is not, of course, the strictly limited system of the two intercommunicating vessels, but the whole complex environment as determined by gravitation, electro-magnetic currents, temperature, &c. Modern chemistry has reached such a high degree of development that it has become a commonplace to say that oxygen, hydrogen, haemoglobin, &c., have no independent existence, but that the chemical no less than the physical properties of each of these substances are relative to the environment. The data of physical chemistry, the facts of catalysis, &c., amply prove that this really is the case.

II

THE ORGANIC STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD

IN the preceding chapter I have indicated the main principle of an organic world-conception. In an article published some years ago,¹ I maintained that no philosophical theory can dispense with the idea of a whole which is prior to its parts, and that this idea can be easily detected either at the initial or at the final stage of every system of metaphysics. Now I propose to go farther and to show that the idea of such a whole lies at the root of every judgement we make concerning any object whatsoever ; it is the condition of the world being knowable. We are left, then, with two alternatives : either the world in all its manifestations has an aspect that may be described as organic, and is knowable, or it has no such aspect and is unknowable.

Knowledge consists of judgements, but an assertion deserves the name of judgement and may be said to contain truth only if it expresses a necessary relation between some one aspect of an object and its other aspects ; in other words, a judgement implies a necessary relation between the subject and the predicate. The whole meaning of judgement is that the

¹ ' Organic and Inorganic World-conceptions ', published in 1912 in the *Filosofsky Sbornik v tchest L. M. Lopatina*.

given subject requires that the predicate should be ascribed to it. This is true not only of scientific judgements expressing the laws of nature, but also of singular descriptive judgements ; thus, for instance, in making the judgement, ' This cloud is purple ', I submit to necessity : if I am confronted with *this* cloud (i. e. at the present moment, in a certain part of the sky, in a certain light, &c.) its purple colour is inevitably present. Such a relation between the subject and the predicate of a judgement is no other than the relation of ground and consequent. How, then, does this necessary relation come to form part of the judgement, and why do we ascribe an *objective* value to it, i. e. why do we regard it as expressive of the truth about the object ? No answer to this question can be given by those who hold that knowledge consists in things being mirrored or copied in our minds through an accumulation of impressions ; nor can a satisfactory solution be found in the view that nature as a system of phenomena is constructed by our understanding, which pieces together disconnected sense data in accordance with the categories (Kant's theory).¹

The Intuitional theory provides a solution of the difficulty in the very account that it gives of knowledge. In order to know an object we must have it in consciousness : the object must, i. e., enter the

¹ See my *Vvedenie v filosofiu* (*Introduction to Philosophy*, Part I, *Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*), and also my article, 'The Concept of Consciousness in Modern Epistemology' in *Voprosi Filosofii*, January-February 1913.

field of the knowing subject's consciousness and become immanent in it. Such consciousness of the object is not due to the causal action of the object upon the subject's body and upon his mental life, for if it were, the subject could know only his own mental states produced in him by the object. Consciousness of the object is the result of a peculiar non-causal relation between the conscious subject and the object of which he is conscious : given this relation, the subject contemplates the object immediately, has it actually 'in view'. There is no subordination either of subject to object, or of object to subject ; both sides, so far as their existence is concerned, remain independent of one another ; the relation between them may be described as epistemological co-ordination. It is essential to draw a distinction between being 'immanent in consciousness' and being 'immanent in the subject of consciousness' : the contemplated object must be immanent in consciousness, but it may transcend the subject of consciousness and form part of the trans-subjective world (e. g. the swinging of the pendulum watched by me). That of which I am conscious need not be a state of my mind ; it need not be a mental process at all, but may belong to any realm of being : it may be a material process or an ideal entity (in Plato's sense of the term 'ideal').

Mere contemplation of an object, however, is not as yet a knowledge of it. We have knowledge, as well as consciousness, of an object when that object is distinguished from other objects by means of comparison and singled out from its environment as some-

thing distinct and definite. Since to distinguish is not to create distinctions, but to detect such peculiarities as already exist, knowledge in no way alters the real character of the contemplated object : it involves only a mental analysis of things. What, then, do we discover by means of such analysis and comparison ? If comparison were the *purpose* of knowledge, knowledge would entirely consist of such assertions as ' A_1 and A_2 are similar', ' A and B differ', &c. In truth, however, this is not so : in the vast majority of cases comparison is merely a means for making the analysis which differentiates out of the complex reality before us some one *aspect* of the object, i. e. something which is necessarily connected with the object and, if the object exists, follows *from* it.

In some cases, knowledge may have for its purpose solely the immediate result of comparison : the detection, namely, of difference or similarity between some two elements A and B . But in these cases, too, knowledge is of the nature of analysis which brings to light a necessary aspect of the object. The subject of the judgement ' A and B are different from each other' is the compresence of A and B , and the predicate is the quality of 'difference' as the necessary characteristic of that pair.

All knowledge, then, consists, in the first place, in my *contemplating* the object, without affecting thereby its reality, and secondly, in my *analysing* the contemplated world and discovering those features of it that are necessarily connected with the object. Hence

it follows that the reality contemplated by me and cognized by means of analysis is always complex in character (otherwise no analysis of it would be possible), and that not a single knowable element of it exists on its own account, apart from a necessary relation to other elements. In other words, every object of knowledge is a whole (or a phase of the whole) with distinguishable aspects, and not a pure plurality of independent elements.

The objection may be raised that the task of proving the universal significance of the organic principle is rendered unduly easy by treating every necessary connexion as organic and regarding a single causal series as an organic *whole* ; it follows, in that case, that every philosopher who admits the presence of the causal tie between phenomena must take an organic view of the world. But such an argument in no way contradicts my contention. It is quite true that every philosopher who admits the presence of a real causal connexion between events (and does not, like Hume, reduce causality to a mere habitual association) is, in the long run, bound to arrive at an organic world-conception : the causal series *a, b, c*, consists not in *b* being added to *a* from outside, and in *c* being added to *b*, but in each new link being generated by the preceding ones, in its growing out of them through their self-transformation ; in other words, the new element arises as a new aspect of a whole that precedes it.

It is not only intuitionists, such as Bergson, who maintain that reality is a whole in that sense ; the

modern school of transcendental idealism takes up a similar attitude. Thus, for instance, one of the valuable contributions to philosophy made by Cohen and his followers is their insistence upon the object of knowledge being all of a piece, on its being engendered by thought as a single whole and not synthetically put together from disconnected elements *A, B, C*. Such an interpretation of the object of knowledge inevitably leads to the conception of an object as a *system* in accordance with the principles of an organic philosophy.

What has been said so far may lead to the following difficulty : a certain disconnectedness, a lack of wholeness, undoubtedly exists in the world and is known to us, and yet, according to the argument before us, it could never become an object of knowledge. It is certainly true that disconnectedness is a fact, and that it can be known ; but it is never a complete disconnectedness. We invariably find that *A, B, C* are separated from one another in some one definite respect only, while in another respect they have the same basis and belong to the same whole. Their very separateness necessarily demands that in some other respect they should be united and interdependent. Take, for instance, the view of some extreme materialist who believes atoms to be the only reality, and imagines them to be completely independent of one another so far as their existence is concerned. Even in this crude conception, atoms have one common basis in virtue of which they belong to the same universe and are capable of interaction :

that one all-embracing basis is the single whole of space, common to them all. If the atomist would further analyse this common basis and realize that all the positions and movements of an atom are *relative*, i. e. that they exist not independently, but only within a system of atoms, he would become aware of the wholeness of the world and cease to conceive of it as inorganic. He would realize that even while he was verbally denying the organic structure of the world, an intuitive perception of the wholeness of the universe, at any rate in the form of its spatial unity, lay at the back of every judgement he made.

If knowledge always and everywhere springs from the contemplation of a whole, and if awareness of this whole guides us in the work of analysis, how is it that the enormous majority of mankind fails to observe wholeness? How is it possible for the main guiding factor in knowledge to remain unrecognized? That this is possible, and, indeed, happens constantly, will be seen from the following example. Such judgements as 'the top of the tree is shaking with the wind', 'the sun is warming the soil', are primarily concerned with the causal relations, and yet many people who make such judgements never come to recognize causality in its abstract form. The same thing happens with reference to the idea of the whole; every one is familiar with concrete instances of wholes which are not mechanically built up of parts, but people do not, as a rule, work out the abstract idea of a whole as such, or, even if they do, they fail to recognize its universal significance.

And indeed there is a very good reason why the human mind should give preference to an *inorganic* interpretation of the world. Knowledge requires comparison, which leads to differentiation or analysis. A being with limited powers, such as man, is, at any given moment, capable of concentrating attention only upon some one part of the world, and of differentiating it by means of comparison in some particular respect only—e. g. he can discriminate the colour, shape, &c., of some object. Thus our knowledge of an object is obtained by adding to the aspect *A*, which has been cognized already, other aspects, *B*, *C*, *D*, &c., as they become known to us. We fail to notice that such addition is determined by the wholeness of the object, and imagine that knowledge consists in *constructing* in our minds a complex whole out of *independent* elements—that it is, as Kant thinks, a synthesis of the manifold, made by our understanding. Further, we fail to distinguish clearly our acts of knowing from that which is known, and ascribe the characteristic of fragmentariness to the objects of knowledge and to the whole knowable world.¹ It is, then, quite possible that a man whose learning embraced every small detail of the world might yet fail to observe the most important feature of it—its wholeness.

The cause of this error lies not in the fact that

¹ Our tendency to transfer the characteristics of the act of knowing to the object of knowledge is discussed in my *Vvedenie v filosofiu* (*Introduction to Philosophy*, Part I, *Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 249–52).

knowledge is analytic in character, but in the fact that analysis performed by the human mind is partial and incomplete. A being whose powers of attention and discrimination were infinite would be capable of contemplating everything at the same time, both as connected with and as distinguished from everything. Such infinite analysis could not lead to error, for by means of it the world-whole would be seen in its differentiated aspect at once, without being broken up in time.

III

REAL BEING AND IDEAL BEING

TO understand a system of philosophy that gives expression to an organic world-conception, it is necessary in the first place to work out the idea of an organic whole—of a whole, namely, which is not constructed out of its elements in an external manner. But this is not enough ; in order to give this idea a living character and to see its universal applicability we must learn to recognize it in every concrete case with the same clearness with which we know, e.g., that the rule ' $4 \times 7 = 28$ ' is exemplified in the judgement 'four weeks contain twenty-eight days'. Such intimate knowledge can only be acquired by the help of many instances. None of the instances that we have taken in the preceding chapters are sufficiently illuminating. It is essential to select something that is very familiar and that obviously cannot be interpreted otherwise than in the spirit of organic philosophy. Take a musical note. In apprehending a tone we may distinguish its quality from its intensity. But it would never occur to any one that the quality and the intensity had first existed on their own account, separately from and independently of one another, and had then come together, forming a more complex whole—a musical note. Clearly, just the reverse is the case : what exists from

the first is a whole—the tone—in which we may, by means of analysis, distinguish various aspects, but which cannot possibly be constructed out of parts that had existed before. Those who take an organic view of the world conceive of the whole universe after this fashion : they regard every element of the world—be it an atom, or a soul, or an event such as movement—as an *aspect* of the world discoverable by means of analysis and existing, not independently, but only on the basis of a world-whole, only within a universal system. All our usual ideas about the world, suggested by the atomistic and mechanical way of looking at it, are then reversed, everything begins to appear in a new light, and many characteristics of the universe that had seemed enigmatic become perfectly clear, standing in no need of any special explanation.

But neither an abstract idea of an organic whole nor a general picture of the world conceived of as an organism can give us a complete understanding of its nature. A detailed analysis is necessary to bring out the particular kinds of being, and the characteristic principles in virtue of which the multiplicity of the world has the character of a system and preserves the aspect of wholeness.

It is obvious that a system necessarily implies *relations* between elements. Now, every part of the world is connected by an infinite number of relations with all the other parts, or at any rate with some of them. Thus, every aspect of the world stands in the relations of difference and similarity to every other aspect of it. Further, all the aspects of the world

to which the conception of magnitude is applicable contain infinite quantitative relations. If we add temporal and spatial relations, relations of causality, of interaction, of possession, of end and means, &c., it will at once be evident that the network of relations is all-embracing and all-pervading.

But as soon as we begin to consider the peculiar nature of relations we are brought up against serious difficulties. Relations are possible if there are members to be related. But how is the relation itself related to those members? Take a concrete case. Suppose that *A* (a black square on the chess board) and *B* (a white square) are members of the same relation of spatial externality. Such a relation cannot, of course, subsist by itself *apart from* its members, nor can it subsist in *one* of its members or be conceived of as *between* them, as though *A* and *B* were held together by the relation as by a kind of string. It is also impossible that the relation of being external to one another should be added to *A* and *B* subsequently to their existing unrelated. The only alternative left is to imagine *A*, *B*, and their relation to each other as one whole, each aspect of which subsists together with the others, on the basis of the whole.

How is such wholeness, such unification of the manifold, possible?

We instinctively feel that such a unity cannot exist on its own account, but must be conditioned by some higher principle. That principle is most frequently said to be consciousness, the knowing mind, the re-

lating activity of thought, &c. This assertion contains a certain amount of truth, but the truth is so wrapped in error that a careful analysis is needed in order to disentangle it. In the first place, let us divide all theories on the subject into those that do and those that do not ascribe a subjective character to relations.

All the theories of the first type suppose that relations are the product of the conscious subject's *psychical* activity. According to some of them, relations are mental phenomena, of the same nature as other facts of the mental life, such as feelings, for instance ; according to others, on the contrary, relations are a unique kind of mental fact, irreducible to anything else—a non-sensuous, theoretical expression of reason, thought, &c. The first may well be called *nihilistic* theories, so completely do they fail to take account of the true nature of relations, replacing them by something entirely different ; the second I propose to call *intellectualistic* theories. Mill's explanation of similarity and difference may be taken as an instance of the first. ' Similarity ', writes Mill, ' is nothing else than a feeling of similarity ; succession is simply our feeling of succession.' ¹ Even this view contains an element of truth. In observing relations and in thinking about them we often experience feelings, transitory and hardly perceptible as a rule, but at times clearly defined—for instance, a feeling of strain when observing striking differences, the feeling of ease in the transition from A_1 to

¹ *The System of Logic*, Bk. I, chapter 3, paragraph 13.

A_2 if they resemble one another, and so on. Needless to say, however, these feelings are not relations : their only connexion with relations is that they arise *on the occasion* of the latter and, as Brunswig rightly observes, ' they coincide with the *intensional* experiences in and through which we perceive the relation of similarity or difference between objects '.¹

These feelings can be mistaken for relations by those thinkers only who are incapable of separating out of a concrete whole its abstract elements and of considering them as such, and are therefore inclined to regard concrete things or events alone as real. When they detect in a concrete whole some relation, they immediately replace it by a new concrete whole, e.g. a psychical process such as a feeling. It is obvious that this interpretation of relations fails to account for the systematic character of any whole, and indeed creates fresh difficulties : instead of a relation we have a feeling which is *added* to the preceding elements of the whole *and must itself be connected with them by means of relations* in order to form a system. These theories have in the end simply to deny the reality of relations, and the impasse to which they thus lead has been so fully and clearly brought out by G. Gomperz in his *Weltanschauungslehre*, that there is no need to go into the matter here. Unfortunately, however, Gomperz himself, when he passes from the critical to the constructive part of his work, interprets relations as feelings, though he

¹ A. Brunswig, *Das Vergleichen und die Relationserkenntniss*, p. 56.

ascribes such characteristics to them that one wonders why he should so regard them. And since he does not make it clear whether he is concerned with the subjective or the trans-subjective content of consciousness, I do not propose to give a critical account of his view, but will go on to the intellectualistic subjectivist theories.

As an instance of such theories we may take the critical philosophy of Kant, taken not in its modernized aspect but in the form of *psychological phenomenalism* developed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. According to Kant, the whole content of knowledge consists of sense-data, of *sensations* which arise in our consciousness through the affection of our sensibility by things-in-themselves ; owing to their very origin, the sense-data are incoherent, unsystematic, a disconnected manifold. Kant saw that without system, without connexions and relations, knowledge was impossible, and that the world observed by us was certainly a systematic unity ; accordingly he sought in the domain of consciousness for an *agent* capable of transforming the chaotic multitude of sense-data into the ordered whole of nature, and came to the conclusion that such an agent could be found only in thought, namely, in the understanding which brings about the categorical syntheses of unity, plurality, causality, &c. It is the great merit of Kant's critical philosophy that he does recognize the peculiar nature of relations, their intelligible, non-sensuous character, and does not attempt to reduce them to feeling or to any other psychical process ;

but in spite of this his theory suffers from several grave defects. According to Kant, relations are additions made by the subject to the sense-data ; the subject's understanding *builds up* the system of nature out of the manifold of sense somewhat after the fashion of an architect who erects a harmonious building out of the chaos of building materials, or of the curator of a museum who arranges a number of things in systematic order, placing some in a glass case, hanging others in a row on the wall, &c. For, indeed, in Kant's view, the elements that form the content of nature (the given manifold, the sense-data) do not as such in any way gravitate towards each other ; they do not generate, or become transformed into, one another, do not act or interact in any way whatever. They are united into a systematic whole solely by means of the understanding which uses them as building material and, joining one datum to another in various ways (in accordance with the categories of causality, unity, substance, and attribute, &c.), makes the totality of things and processes of nature. Nature as a system, then, owes its origin to an ordering or regulative activity, and not to an organically creative one.

There is something lifeless about such a system, and it is impossible to regard it as being true of the world as a whole. We cannot conceive a world from which all living, organically whole, self-active being is totally absent, and in which everything is regulated merely from outside. In a world of truly organic being, relations cannot be mere *additions* to

elements which as such are unrelated. Kant does leave room for such organic being in so far as he admits the possibility of things in themselves, and this is the reason why the conception of nature worked out in the *Critique of Pure Reason* does not startle us at once by its death-like character : we take refuge in the thought that nature as represented in it is only a phenomenon, a superstructure over the world of true being. A vague reference to the realm of things in themselves is not, however, sufficient. Relations that introduce order necessarily presuppose relations that obtain within organic being ; we have a conception of such being, and can even find a concrete instance of it in our own creative activity. And when in his theory of knowledge Kant declares that the study of the higher kinds of being belongs to the province of metaphysics, and is therefore impossible, one cannot help doubting the truth of his theory. Critical examination of it easily shows, indeed, that the inadmissibly narrow limits it sets to human knowledge are the result of false presuppositions which lie at its base.¹ As soon as these presuppositions are done away with, it at once becomes clear that nature as experienced by us, so far from being a dead product of the regulating activity of the understanding, manifests itself at every step as living, creatively active, and organic ; its systematic charac-

¹ See my *Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, chap. iv, 'The dogmatic assumptions of Kant's theory of knowledge', and *Vvedenie v filosofiu*, pp. 159-214 (*Introduction to Philosophy*, Part I) and *Handbuch der Logik*.

ter is inherent in it and is not a merely subjective addition made by the human mind. Yet even thinkers who are inclined to grant this do not as a rule admit that relations are wholly trans-subjective. Thus, for instance, the most that Lipps ventures to affirm is that the object 'requires' us to think of it as standing in relations, but in order to carry out this requirement we must *create the relations* by our own thought.

In his treatise, *Einheiten und Relationen*, Lipps says :

' Relations are not objective experiences, i. e. they are not qualities, properties, marks or determinations of that which is perceived, represented or thought of, of which we say that it stands in relations or that relations are involved in it. Relations are experiences of apperception, i. e. ways or modes in which my apperceptions are related to objects and objects are related to me, or they are ways in which objects appear related to one another in and through my apperception.'¹

' We do not find them like bridges built between objects so that all we have to do is to get hold of them ; they are ways of binding things together in the unity of apperception. They are not clasps attached to objects as such, not arms and hands that objects stretch out in order to grasp one another, but they are my acts of bracketing objects together, of grasping them simultaneously and holding them together with the hand which I stretch out towards them as I join them to one another. No relations obtain between objects apart from my relating them. Nothing can be related except through me, i. e. through my apperceiving self.'²

¹ M. Lipps, *Einheiten und Relationen*, 1902, p. 1.

² Ibid., p. 102.

Some instances of relation, for instance, the unity of the continuous, afford a particularly vivid illustration of Lipps's view.

'The assertion that the continuous is a unity', says Lipps, 'can only mean that the continuous by its very nature *requires* of me *unity of apperception*. In reality, however, the parts of the continuous are not correlated at all. They are simply there. They are what they are and as they are. And they are not interconnected. But I am connected with them and relate myself to them and thus relate them to one another, take them together, and, in this way, relations are introduced into the continuous. On the other hand, my consciousness of the interrelatedness and of the unity disappears as soon as I cease to hold the parts together in a single act of apperception.'¹

Lipps has the same considerations to offer with regard to the idea of the *contiguity* of the parts of a continuous whole.

'Two parts of a continuum cannot be contiguous for me unless I refer the boundary in a single act of apperception both to one and the other at once. There is no such thing as a boundary in itself. Every boundary is, in itself, simply this or that line, or this or that place. It becomes a boundary for me when I mentally relate it to, or take it together with, that of which it is, or ought to be, a boundary for me.'²

All these arguments are based upon a consideration which appears to afford conclusive proof of the subjectivity of relations : the consideration, namely, that in most cases relations are not an originally given but a secondary element in knowledge, superimposed,

¹ M. Lipps, *Einheiten und Relationen*, 1902, pp. 57, 58.

² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

as it were, upon the primary data after their apperception by the knowing subject. In that sense they may be said to be 'objects of a higher order' (*Gegenstände höherer Ordnung*), 'well-grounded contents' (*fundierte Inhalte*).¹ Thus, in order to observe the likeness between two members of a family or the difference between the faces of twins, it is necessary sometimes to make several comparisons between them before obtaining a definite result. This circumstance at once suggests that the comparing mind adds something to the images ; further, it is significant that one and the same content may be regarded as standing now in one and now in another set of relations. This variability of relations seems to depend upon the observing mind, which combines objects in a number of different ways.

' Suppose, for instance ', says Lipps, ' that I see a number of stars before me, and I arbitrarily select three or four, or as many as I like, and combine them or regard them as belonging together. In doing so I make them into a unity. They are for me now a figure or a constellation. In any case, they form a unity not in themselves, but for me. And all that is needed to bring about such a unity is that I should thus combine or hold them together in one act of apperception.' ²

Problems involved in the idea of number seem to be particularly easy to solve with the help of such a theory. According to Lipps, counting refers not to

¹ It should be observed, however, that Lipps himself does not make use of these expressions.

² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

numbers but to distinct acts of apperception directed upon objects.

‘ When I count “ one tree, one more tree, one more tree ”, I am concerned not with definite objects called trees, but with numerical elements. And these are not trees but “ one ” and “ one ” and “ one ”. And for the purposes of my counting, adding, or summing up, in short, of my combining things numerically, the fact that “ one and one and one ” are “ one tree and one tree and one tree ” is entirely accidental and makes no difference. What is numerically combined are, we may say, the inner beats of time, no matter on what they fall. This alone explains the significance and the use of the idea of number.¹ Only on this ground is it possible that one tree and one tree and one tree should be three, just as one wood and one wood and one wood are three, so that the result of the apperception which does the summing up is the same, whatever the nature of the units to be summed up may be. It can be the same only because the summing up has nothing to do with the character of the contents ; it is only the units, i.e. the particular apperceptions, that are summed up.’²

Or take another instance to bear out the arguments of Lipps : a certain height—say the height of the Finsteraarhorn above sea level—is expressed by the number 4,275, if a metre be taken as a unit, by 14,062 if the unit be a foot, by $2\frac{1}{2}$ if the unit be a mile, and so on. It seems as though the extreme multiplicity of relations, their infinite diversity and changeability at the least alteration in the point of view, could not possibly form part of the objects

¹ M. Lipps, *Einheiten und Relationen*, p. 41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

themselves, and that relations must inevitably be the subjective product of the apprehending mind.

Finally, if it be admitted that relations are objectively real, it will at the same time have to be granted that the wholeness and the interconnectedness of the world are so far-reaching as to seem contrary to fact. Thus, a likeness between a person *A* who lives in Europe and a person *B* who lives in America would, on this view, imply that there were an *identical element* in these two beings in spite of their being separated from one another in space. It would also have to be supposed, for instance, that the moments of aphelion, thought of by me as a unity, really are a unity apart from my thinking of them, although they are distinct from one another in time, the period of a year intervening between them.

The case is different if relations be regarded as the product of the knowing mind ; there is no need then to make suppositions about the interconnectedness of the world that appear monstrous to ordinary common sense. For indeed, as Lipps puts it,

‘ the objective contents of consciousness remain the same whether they be apperceived or observed, or not. The contents do not change either spatially or temporally or qualitatively, however I may treat them in apperception, and whether I unite or separate them. They remain as far removed from one another as they are, whether I bring them into the closest unity or separate them as widely as possible in my apperception.’¹

Let us grant Lipps’s contention that the subject

¹ Ibid., p. 86.

creates relations by variously combining in his apperceptions the given objective contents. Does he create them quite independently, without being in the least affected by these contents? Lipps does not go so far as to affirm this; he does admit that in a certain sense relations are objective: 'Relations and unities', says he, 'have an objective character in so far as the objective experience requires or conditions the particular way in which they shall be combined in the unity of apperception.'¹ Such, for instance, is the relation of similarity between red and violet, the unity of a continuous line, &c. Such 'objectively conditioned apperception, in this case as always, is not my doing but the result of interaction between myself and the object'.²

A closer examination will at once bring to light the grave defects of Lipps's theory. Suppose we have in our mind an objective content, such as the fall of a stone. According to Lipps, in this content of consciousness taken as such there is neither unity nor successiveness. There is no relation of 'before' and 'after' between the different moments of the process; the movement does not belong to the stone; in short, the process has no structure whatever. If we add that it cannot be multiple, cannot be distinct from anything, and so on (since multiplicity and difference are also relations), it will be obvious that such an objective content is a strange and absolutely unimaginable fiction. And yet it has somehow to be

¹ M. Lipps, *Einheiten und Relationen*, p. 102.

² *Ibid.*, p. 87.

a content of my consciousness, and, in spite of its structureless character, to 'demand' that I should apperceive it as a 'unity', as containing 'sequence', &c.

To make such demands, an objective content must possess certain characteristics upon which the demand can be based. But what characteristic of the 'falling stone', except that of its objective unity, could require me, the subject, to apperceive it as a unity?

Let us assume for a moment that relations are objectively given, and we shall see that such a view will dispose of all the difficulties, that it is compatible with everything that is certain and not merely hypothetical in the theory of Lipps, and, finally, that it is not a hypothesis at all but a mere description of self-evident fact. Let us see, to begin with, to what extent the doctrine of the givenness of relations is compatible with Lipps's theory. Take the concrete example given earlier in this chapter. Suppose I perceive a white and a black square of the chess-board as external to one another. Lipps is no doubt right in saying that the squares must be perceived in a special way if we are to see them as outside one another; this, however, in no way proves that the special way of perceiving *creates* the relation of externality: the complex method of apperception is merely a subjective means necessary for contemplating a trans-subjective element of reality. The only difference between perceiving a black colour or a musical tone, &c., and detecting the relation of ex-

ternality is that the subjective means of perception (seeing, hearing) used in the first case are simpler than those used in the second, for in the latter case we must apprehend both members of the relation, and concentrate our attention not on those members themselves but on the relation between them.¹ The seeing and hearing do not create the black colour or the musical tone, any more than this complex mode of perception *creates* the relation of externality ; it is only necessary in order that we may *contemplate* (perceive) *the structure* of the object itself. And, indeed, the relation of externality as it comes before our consciousness bears the mark of the actual presence of the trans-subjective reality quite as much as does the colour, the hardness, or the weight of a thing, and may therefore be said to be 'perceived' in the same sense as other elements of the external world. It is only if we artificially direct our attention upon the subjective acts of apprehending which condition such perception that we can be mistaken about the objective character of relations. For a psychologist like Lipps such artificial direction of attention is habitual, and it is not surprising that he should have fallen into the mistake of treating relations as subjective. The erroneousness of all subjectivist theories of relations has been fully demonstrated in Brunswig's able work, *Das Vergleichen und die Relations-erkenntniss*. Brunswig clearly shows—mainly with

¹ See, e.g., A. Brunswig's *Das Vergleichen und die Relations-erkenntniss*, pp. 79 ff., on the perception of relations of difference and similarity.

reference to the relations of comparison, 'longer', 'heavier', 'alike', 'similar', &c.—that the subjective mental processes serve merely as a scaffolding for the act of contemplation directed upon the relations themselves, and that relations are objective elements which can be *perceived*.

It is obvious, of course, that relations are different from contents of *sense*-perception such as red, bitter, &c. Relations are not sensuous; there is something in them that testifies to their spiritual character, and the perception of them is therefore a non-sensuous act; it cannot be ascribed to the eye, or the ear, or the touch of the hand. It requires a capacity for spiritual vision.¹ The admission that something spiritual forms part of every single thing without exception, e. g. of every material process, will strike many people as strange. 'A thinker spoiled by sensualism', says Brunswig, 'feels uneasy at the admission of the objectivity of relations. What are these entities that cannot be grasped by the hand and observed sensuously? Objectively real relations produce upon him the impression of ghosts.'² It is apparently on this ground that Lipps and many other philosophers regard relations as subjective. Observing that relations are ideal and can only be the product of spirit³ or reason, they imagine it must necessarily be the knowing subject's reason. In truth, however, this need not be the case. If relations are the product of spirit, their presence in objects indi-

¹ See Brunswig, pp. 41, 43, 57, 185.

² Brunswig, p. 185.

³ Lipps, *ibid.*, p. 105.

cates that spirituality permeates the whole world, including material nature, and that, however mysterious this may seem, the problem can only be solved by going forward into the infinite expanse of the world instead of retreating into the tiny corner of one's own self and persisting, in the face of all evidence, in regarding relations as subjective.

If the problem is to be solved satisfactorily, an explanation must be found of the extreme changeability and multiplicity of relations, and also of the profound interconnectedness of the world which the objectivity of relations demands. There are several difficulties in the way. Once the idea of the subjectivity of relations is given up and they are no longer referred to the organizing activity of the conscious subject's mind, it has to be admitted that there are system and organization, and therefore all kinds of relations, in the very nature of the object. But in that case the objects we are most familiar with—things in space and time—acquire a particularly enigmatic character. The admission that relations form part of their nature appears to lead to hopeless contradictions. Let us consider once more the fall of a stone. It is a process that happens in time and is therefore characterized by all sorts of temporal relations. The fall during the first second and during the fifth stand to one another in the relation of *before* and *after*. This order, this relation, brings the two moments together : this is how the being of the first second is related to the being of the fifth second. Now the 'togetherness' characteristic of

the relation does not mean simultaneity, for that would involve a direct contradiction—simultaneity of successiveness. Temporal relations must be conceived of as the non-temporal conditions of time. In a similar way the spatial relations between any two objects *A* and *B*—relations such as ‘outside of’, ‘within’, ‘above’, ‘below’, and even ‘far from’ one another—imply that *A* and *B* are given together, bound up into a single whole, and we are compelled, therefore, to recognize the non-spatial character of spatial relations. Other relations, those of possession, equality, causality, &c., are also non-spatial and non-temporal. It is true that in most cases we connect relations with a definite time and place; the relation of inherence that subsists between whiteness and the sheet of paper seems to change its position in space when the sheet of paper is moved and to disappear when it is burnt. But of course such connexion with space and time is merely *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. If a wise man stumbles and falls, this does not mean that wisdom falls—and much the same thing may be said with reference to relations.

If temporal sequence be, as such, non-temporal, and spatial interconnectedness, as such, non-spatial, it may well be asked, what is it then that possesses the characteristics of extension and duration? Extension and duration belong to concrete things and events—for instance, to the stone and its fall—while relations are the non-spatial and non-temporal elements in a concrete whole.

This view of relations is the result of direct obser-

vation ; it is simply a description of relations, and may form part of various philosophical systems, though of course it will most readily be adopted by thinkers who take the world to be an organic whole. Let us imagine a number of material particles situated, as they needs must be, outside one another in space. In spite of their being external to each other, they can, in accordance with the laws of physics and chemistry, exist only as related to, and mutually determined by, one another, and this inter-relation cannot be reduced merely to a succession of acts by means of which energy is transmitted from one particle to another in space. In other words, in addition to spatial multiplicity the material world possesses another aspect—the super-spatial aspect of unity, binding together into one single whole elements that are removed from one another in space. It is a mistake to imagine, as is done, e. g. by some supporters of vitalism, that such a connecting principle is to be found in *psychical* life. The addition to the material particles of psychical processes of pleasure and pain, like and dislike, will not result in any organic wholeness nor explain the simplest kind of *interaction* such as a push. Mental life, as itself taking place in time, requires a connecting principle in order to form a systematic whole in which the past and the future subsist in relation to each other. Such a principle must be super-temporal, for otherwise it could not determine *together* that which refers to *different* moments of time.

The nature of the higher principles which con-

dition the organic character of the world will be discussed later, but even at this stage it is clear that they work through the instrumentality of relations which are non-spatial and non-temporal. Following the terminology of Plato, who was the first to discover the realm of Ideas, I propose to call all being which rises above the disruptedness of time and space *ideal*. Relations fall under this category and must be said, therefore, to belong to the realm of ideal being. But of course they have only *abstract* ideal being. Relations are not independent; they cannot exist on their own account, apart from the elements they relate. They are merely the expression and not the primal source of the organized character of the real world, and they furnish no explanation of its origin. Nor can the multiplicity of the real world be, as such, the source of its own unity. The admission, then, of the trans-subjectivity of relations, so far from helping us to solve the riddle of the world-structure, has made it more difficult: we now have to find some third principle which transcends both real and abstract ideal being—some agent in virtue of whose activity the multiplicity of the real world exists in the form of an organic unity. Subjectivistic theories of relations find such an agent in the person of the subject, and this is precisely what constitutes their chief attraction. For indeed, unity, which appears so enigmatic when ascribed to the material world, becomes self-evident and does not seem to stand in need of any further explanation, if the object be regarded as *an idea of the subject's*. Whatever may be

the number of branches on the huge oak before me, however they may be situated in relation to one another in space, it seems obvious that they form one single object of my contemplation in which top and bottom, background and foreground, constitute one whole. In the same way, we are not in the least surprised by the complex event of the fall of a stone appearing as a unity in my mind when observed or remembered. One of the greatest thinkers of all ages, Plotinus, maintains that every plant, every animal, the earth, and so on, participate in contemplation (θεωρία), and that each of these entities is a θεωρημα; they are all 'thoughts' (νοήσεις), 'concepts' (λόγοι).¹

Such an interpretation of things, events, and of the whole system of nature solves many problems, but several reservations are necessary if we are to avoid further difficulties. Why does the super-temporal and super-spatial unity of the object become self-evident when we regard it as a θεωρημα, an object of contemplation? It is certainly not because in doing so we take it to be a *mental* event happening in a conscious subject's mind: mental life, since it is itself in time, affords no explanation of the super-temporal relations it contains. We are driven to the conclusion that apparently the super-temporal and super-spatial unity of an object conceived of as a θεωρημα is explained by the mere reference to the existence of a contemplating subject—and this is due to the fact that the subject is a *super-spatial* and *super-tem-*

¹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, iii. 8. 8.

poral being, capable of directing his cognitive *acts* (the acts of attending, comparing, remembering, &c.) upon any object of the outer or the inner world, and unaffected by the disruptedness of space and time.¹

Let us imagine a group of extended things *a, b, c, d, e, f* (e. g. the branches of a tree) and the subject *S*₁. The thing *c*, being extended, stands in various spatial relations to the things *a, b, d, e, f*: it is nearer to some of them, further from others, and so on. The subject *S*₁, however, not being extended, and therefore standing neither far nor near, neither to the left nor to the right of these things, can direct his act of contemplation upon all six of them *in exactly the same way*, so that *a* and *f*, in spite of being separated from one another in space, will be gathered together for the subject's contemplation. Similarly, the knowing subject can perceive changes taking place in time, only because he himself is super-temporal. Indeed, in order to perceive a process of change, such as a train in motion, it is necessary to contemplate at one and the same time both the present and the immediately preceding, the already past, state of the object. And this can only be done if the knowing subject stands outside the time-process, so that it is a matter of indifference to him what particular place in time the elements of the event before him occupy ;

¹ As to the acts of knowing (the subjective side of knowledge) being directed upon the object and the content of knowledge (the objective side of knowledge), see my *Vvedenie v filosofiu*, Part I, *Vvedenie v Teoriu Znaniya*. (*Introduction to Philosophy*, Part I, *Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*), p. 248.

the self is not separated from them either by a second or by a month or by a year, and can, if needed, direct its act of contemplation upon any one of them. Moreover it directs one *single* act of contemplation upon a more or less long section of the process of change and is aware of it as of one actually present durational whole.

Owing to its super-temporal character the self is capable of contemplating not only the events which immediately precede the present, but also any events of the past. Contemplation of the past is memory. Through the act of remembering—as can be seen even from the analysis of perception—the past, the remembered object as such, remains in the subject's consciousness or enters it afresh ; this is the reason why the act of remembering has a cognitive value. Suppose I visit an aerodrome and watch the aviator *X* as he alights from his machine and walks across the field with a quick, energetic step. The next time I observe the same thing in the case of the aviator *Y* ; the third time I am shown different planes by the aviator *Z*, and am struck by a peculiar expression of strength, confidence, and firmness in his face and in all his movements. When I recall all these observations I form an idea of a special type of energy that I have observed in the aviators I have seen. This idea is based upon memories which can only have value if they are the intellectual intuition of those very facts which I had once perceived on the occasion of the stimulation of my sense-organs. The difference between perception and memory lies in

the *act* of perceiving and the *act* of remembering, and not in the object upon which these acts are directed.

It cannot of course be denied that the perceived object and the remembered object confront our mind in a different way ; the difference, however, is merely in the fullness of contemplation. This may be due to the different relation in which the remembered and the perceived object stand to the subject's body, and also to their different significance for the subject's life, especially from the biological point of view. It is worth noting that when the object of thought is *ideal*, such, e. g., as relations or ideas of mathematics, the difference between perception and memory completely disappears. If I come to know some theorem for the first time, and then think of it a second, a third time, and so on, I have its meaning before me in precisely the same way as the first time, or perhaps even more clearly, so that the process of turning to it repeatedly cannot be called remembering. All that falls within the scope of memory is the repeated mental contemplation of the past concrete circumstances of my first acquaintance with the theorem, but not the repeated contemplation of the mathematical idea itself. This is due to the fact that ideas are non-temporal, and therefore, in ceasing to be present to our consciousness, they do not recede into the realm of the past, and there is no reason why, at their reappearance in consciousness, they should have descended to the level of mere memory contents.

Unless memory be interpreted as the intellectual

contemplation of the past as such, no explanation can be furnished of the cognitive value of the contents of memory. For indeed if this interpretation be rejected it will have to be supposed that the event *A* perceived by me yesterday has for ever sunk into the abyss of the past, and that my memory of it to-day is an entirely new event *B* which is happening in my mental life *now*. If the event *A* has finally transcended my consciousness, it occupies the position of the Kantian thing-in-itself : to maintain that in and through the present memory image *B* we cognize the past event *A* involves the admission of the possibility of transcendent knowledge. An epistemologist defending such a position would have to contend that, in the case of true memories, the memory image is at best a good copy of the original, somewhat after the manner in which Locke regarded the idea of extension as similar to the real extension.

It is particularly difficult on such a view to explain the remembrance of material processes : since the memory image is of necessity regarded as a mental event, it can be said to ' resemble ' the remembered object only if the existence of the material object be denied, and material processes be understood as a particular variety of psychical events. In short, we are faced with all the difficulties that beset transcendental theories of knowledge, and are due to separating the content of our idea of the object from the object itself ; the validity of memory is thus bound to be undermined. We are involved in a hopeless

contradiction. The past is taken to be transcendent in relation to consciousness, and at the same time it is said to resemble the memory image ; but in order to be compared with the image it must be immanent in consciousness. And if memories cannot be shown to be of epistemological value, science can have no validity, since science is based upon contents of memory no less than upon contents of perception, and indeed perception itself necessarily involves memory.

The validity of science can only be vindicated by the aid of an immanent theory of memory—a theory, i. e. according to which the past, in and through the act of remembering, becomes once more immanent in the subject's consciousness. The past does not thereby become the present : the only thing that is present is the act of consciousness directed upon the past. In order to bring about this curious correlation of the present event (the act of remembering) with the past (the remembered object), thus throwing as it were a bridge over the gulf of time, the knowing subject, that is, the self, must be a super-temporal entity.

Let us consider more closely what is meant by the super-temporal character of the subject. Being super-temporal and super-spatial, the subject belongs to the realm of *ideal* being, just as relations do ; but he is certainly not a relation. Though a super-temporal entity, the subject is capable of performing *acts* in time, for instance, the cognitive acts of attending, discriminating, remembering, directed

now upon one, now upon another object of knowledge.

In addition to cognitive acts, there are other activities—emotions, feelings, and actions—inseparably connected with the subject of consciousness. All these processes are so bound up with the subject, with the super-temporal self, that they may be called his *manifestations* in time. The profound difference between an ideal entity such as the subject, and an ideal entity such as a relation will at once become obvious if we compare the whole consisting of the subject and his manifestations with a whole consisting of some relation and its *relata*, for instance, the unity of the several shades of a maple leaf beginning to turn an autumn yellow. The relation of unity is undoubtedly an entirely *passive* and *dependent* element of the whole in which it is found ; it is neither the cause nor a part of the cause of the *relata* (of the tints of the leaf). The subject, on the contrary, is not passive, he is the most important source (the most important part of the cause) of his manifestations in time, their cause *par excellence* ; and, being the mainspring of the temporal acts, he cannot possibly be regarded as merely an abstract element in the temporal process. The subject taken together with his manifestations is both an ideal and a real entity, i. e. a comparatively independent being, and even when regarded apart from his manifestations in time is still a being (an ideal being), and not an abstract element. Relations belong to the realm of abstract ideal being, and the subject, in view of what

has been said, must be said to be a concrete ideal entity. In so far as this concrete ideal entity is an active source of temporal processes, it has power, and, in so far as its manifestations are its properties, it may also be called by the old philosophical term *substance*, or—to make it more concrete—by the term *substantial agent*.

This view of the subject is important both for metaphysics and for the theory of knowledge. For indeed it is only if the subject be a concrete individual being that we may, for epistemological purposes, draw a sharp line of demarcation between the *subjective* and the *objective* aspects of knowledge, distinguishing the individual mental act of knowing on the one hand and the content and object of knowledge on the other.¹ Similarly it is only if the subject be conceived as a super-temporal and super-spatial agent (substance) that we can account for his being able to embrace in a *single glance* the complex content of an object.

In this way the unity of knowledge finds explanation, but it does not as yet appear how unity comes to be present in the trans-subjective content of the object. According to the Intuitionist theory, the subject by his cognitive acts does not create the object, but merely contemplates it. The unity of the acts of knowledge, the fact that they can overcome the divisions of the object in time, space, &c., introduces no change whatever into the content of the object. The circumstance that relations are

¹ See my *Vvedenie v filosofiu*, Part I, p. 248.

present in the external spatial and temporal object and, being super-spatial and super-temporal, give it an organic structure, is in no way due to the knowing subject : it is there for his contemplation, but is not created by that contemplation. How, then, did the object come to possess this organic unity in spite of having a multitude of parts in time and space ? The answer we have given to the problem of the unity of knowledge will help us to deal with this question also : both in the case of *knowledge* of an object and in the case of its *coming to be*, multiplicity is overcome by a super-temporal substance. Let us suppose that the series a, b, c, d, e, f is the product of the activity of the substance S_2 (distinct from the knowing subject S_1) ; a and f , situated at different points of space and moments of time, cannot be connected by means of the intermediary links b, c, d, e , which themselves occupy different portions of space and time, and are, as such, incapable of transcending their own limits and combining the multiplicity of their co-members into one. If, however, the origination of the series is due to the substantival agent S_1 , then in creating f after a , and in a different place, S_2 produces not a scattered manifold, but a manifold, each member of which is co-related with each of the other members. Relations brought about by this fact of co-relatedness—e. g. the distance of the members from, or their proximity to, one another, are themselves, of course, in no sense extended, but the whole in which they are present has the form of extendedness. Not spatial and temporal

relations alone, but also typically organic relations, such as interaction, become intelligible once we realize the significance of substance as a source of unity.

It must not be imagined that the substantival agent creates *first* a multitude of disconnected elements *a, b, c; d, e, f*, and then correlates them to one another, synthesizing them after the manner of Kant's understanding. If that were the case, spatial and temporal processes would not be continuous, they would be like bits of mosaic arranged in a certain external order. Such *external* ordering would only be necessary if *a, b, c . . .* were given to the substantival agent from without, and he had merely to systematize them. The result would be a lifeless inorganic aggregate of elements essentially indifferent to one another. In truth, however, events in space and time have an entirely different character: they are continuous, and each new member of a series, instead of being added from outside to those already existing, grows out of them without any break or interval. This is possible because the substantival agent generates not merely the order but also the actual content of the series *a, b, c, d, e, f*; order and content are in this case inseparable. Order is not an addition to the content, but is simply the character of the substantival agent's activity, stamped upon the content of his creative work.

Instances of the creative work of a substance giving rise to unities interpenetrated throughout by relations can be found without going beyond the realm

of the human self. The subject or self is a substance which not only knows but lives, i. e. creates new realities. Let us take the higher creative activities of the subject, for example, the musical work of a composer. A piece of music is a complex whole in which a multitude of parts is not a chaos but forms an organic unity ; all its elements are in harmony with, and exist for, one another, and this is only possible because it is the work of a being who transcends the multiplicity of time and space. These lofty creative efforts may serve as an analogy to interpret the activity of all possible substances that create any kind of spatial and temporal reality : a drop of rain, a crystal, an organic cell, &c. Each of these things is indeed a *θεώρημα* as Plotinus maintained ; but, of course, in using this word we must get rid of the idea that we have before us a product of the cognitive theoretical activity, and remember that we are concerned with the practical, life-creating activity. And since this activity is analogous to the activity of the spirit, we experience a thrill of awe and joy when we become convinced of the trans-subjective reality of relations ; this conviction necessarily leads to the admission that the world as a whole, including material nature, is the work of spirit or of beings that are akin to spirit.

In modern times philosophers have tended to deny the reality of ideal being of any kind, and therefore the reality of substances ; of late, however, the position has changed. The adherents of the transcendental-logical school in epistemology, in their struggle

with psychologism, have brought about a revival of Platonism, and at the same time the conception of substance has come to the front once more. So far, however, these philosophers have admitted only the reality of abstract ideal being, e. g., the reality of laws, relations, &c., regarding substance as an element of unity in events, as the law of change, &c., and not as a being or an agent. Yet none of the theories which put substances into the same category with relations are valid, for they render relations inexplicable. We have seen that relations presuppose the existence of a certain basis other than themselves, and that such a basis is to be found in substance regarded as a *concretely* ideal entity.

Plato realized the insufficiency of abstract ideal being, and in order to explain how abstract ideas come to have significance for the concrete things of sense, he had to have recourse to the doctrine of the Demiurgos, that is, to a *concretely ideal* being. This aspect of the question is fully worked out in the later Greek philosophy, and especially in the system of Plotinus, who maintains that the supreme source of creative activity in the world is Spirit, unquestionably meaning by it a concretely ideal Being.

The meaning of substance may be made clearer by comparing our theory with that of Bergson. One cannot help agreeing with Bergson that the temporal process is an infinite creative *change*, a continuous flux, and not the sum-total of momentary positions of rest. Extremely valuable, too, is Bergson's contention that this process is an *historical* system, in

which the whole past influences the present and the future, not through its effects but immediately, so that the process grows in volume like an avalanche. It is impossible, however, to agree with Bergson's view of substance. Fearing to do damage to his favourite conception of change, of which he has given such a masterly exposition, he completely banishes from the contents of the real world the super-temporal ideal being discovered by Plato, and denies the existence of substances. 'There are changes', says Bergson, 'but there are no changing things; change does not need a support. There are movements, but it is not necessary that there should be permanent objects that move: movement does not imply a moving body.'¹

But the question is whether the flux of creative change can exist without having substance as its basis. Let us make an ideal scission in the stream $a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h \dots$ at the point between e and f .² That which immediately precedes the scission cannot contain a sufficient ground for all the infinite stream of further changes, since such ground, according to Bergson himself, is to be found in the whole past of the stream. But how can the past a, b be actually present together with e in creating $f, g, h \dots$? Bergson would have to say that the past a, b actually

¹ H. Bergson, *La Perception du Changement*, p. 24.

² That such *mental* operations are possible and legitimate, and do not in any way distort the nature of reality, is shown in my pamphlet *Intuitivnaya filosofia Bergsona* (*The Intuitive Philosophy of Bergson*), 2nd ed., p. 106.

continue to exist even when the stream has changed into *c, d, e, &c.* But in that case, instead of being the image of change, the stream becomes obstructed with fixed, immovable streaks of the past. This is precisely the impression conveyed, e.g. by the following statement of Bergson :

‘ Attention to life that were sufficiently intense and sufficiently free from all practical interest would thus embrace in an indivisible present the whole past history of a conscious individual—not of course as though it were simultaneous but as something which was both continually present and continually moving. Of this nature, I repeat, is a melody which is perceived as an indivisible whole and constitutes, throughout, one perpetual present, although this perpetuity has nothing in common with immutability, or this indivisibility with instantaneousness. It is a case of an enduring present.’¹

The past must certainly exist in the present, as Bergson has admirably demonstrated, but this is only compatible with the constant flux of change if that flux be the creative expression of a super-temporal substance. The ground for the future *f, g, h* will then be contained in the substance and in the process *a, b, c, d, e* already realized by it ; this *a, b, c, d, e* has receded into the past and does not really exist any more, but since the substance ‘ has it in view ’ while creating *f, g, h*, the past influences the future *ideally*, doing so immediately, and not merely through its effects. We can now with Bergson regard the stream *a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h* as an unceasing flux, a continuous

¹ Bergson, *La Perception du Changement*, p. 30.

change in which everything retains its significance for the future, though nothing is preserved as an existent.

To bring out still more clearly the results hitherto obtained let us compare our conclusions with the subjectivist theories of relations. These theories may be reduced to the following main assertions : (1) relations are created by the subject, (2) the subject is (sometimes unconsciously) taken to be a super-temporal and super-spatial entity, (3) the subject creates relations in and through his acts of knowledge, (4) relations are subjective mental contents of consciousness. Of these four positions only the second one agrees with our view, and all the others must be rejected, with due reservations, of course, about the first point—with regard, namely, to the non-cognitive creative activities of the subject.

The Intuitionist theory stands in a different relation towards transcendental logical idealism. Thinkers of that school (1) admit the trans-subjectivity of relations, and therefore acknowledge the reality of abstract ideal being, but (2) they ascribe a merely logical significance to relations (a significance for knowledge only), and (3) they deny that relations are created by a substance as a concrete ideal entity. Intuitionism agrees with transcendental idealism in the first point but not in the other two. It combines the epistemologically valuable aspect of this doctrine with the metaphysically valuable aspect of those subjectivist theories which admit the reality of substance.

IV

THE PLURALITY OF SUBSTANCES

DOES a number of distinct substances or one substance only form the ultimate ground of the world ? In so far as relations embrace the whole world and give it the character of one single system, they presuppose a unity in the formation of the world and consequently one single substance. On the other hand, in addition to the aspect of wholeness the world has an aspect of unresolved fragmentariness, which implies a plurality of substantival agents standing to one another in the relation of irreconcilable opposition. We will consider this aspect of the world first, and begin by drawing a distinction between the various kinds of opposition.

The world is complex ; it contains a number of aspects which are distinguishable from one another because each of them is something determinate and different from all the other aspects of the world. Take any *a* or *b* or *c* (yellowness, blueness, hardness, a point, justice, &c.). Each of them is a ' this ' determined by its peculiar content (*a*'ity or *b*'ity or *c*'ity) which excludes all the rest of the world : yellowness, considered as such, is not blueness, not hardness, not a point, &c. This mutual exclusiveness of all the world's contents, this relation of opposition between them, has a super-temporal and super-spatial character : yellowness and blueness are

negatively correlated to one another independently of time and space. I propose to call such opposition *ideal*. It should be observed that such opposition does not by any means imply resistance, limitation, or destruction of one kind of being by another. Opposites of this kind, so far from interfering with each other's being, may actually coexist at the same place, at the same time, in one and the same thing : the same portion of space may be filled with a blue light and the smell of mignonette, the same thing may be yellow and hard, the human soul may be simultaneously possessed by sadness and reverence, and so on. So that ideal opposition, considered in its metaphysical significance, contributes to the richness, the complexity, and the diversity of the world, and may be called individualizing opposition. It is of enormous importance for our cognitive activity. Every *a*, in so far as its *a*'ity ideally excludes all the rest of the world from its content, has a strictly determinate character, and the fact that every object in the world is subject to the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle is simply the expression of this determinateness ; and, since these laws are very important for logic,¹ it would be quite right to designate the ideal opposition by the term logical. (It should be remembered that there are two kinds of logical opposition—contradictory and contrary. There is contradictory opposition between *a* and

¹ That the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle are the expressions of the determinateness of being or reality, is discussed in my *Handbuch der Logik*, §§ 30, 31.

non-a, meaning by *non-a* any object in the world other than *a*. There is contrary opposition between *a* and any *b, c, d*, selected from the rest of the world.)

In future I shall often refer to ideal opposition as logical, but shall also speak of it as individualizing opposition in order to bring out its metaphysical importance.

Let us now consider another kind of opposition. It frequently happens that two elements of the world do not merely differ, but are mutually exclusive and prevent one another from existing. Such, for instance, is the action of two powers, one of which brings point *A* near to point *B*, and another draws it away ; such is the influence of conflicting motives, some of which incline *X* to friendship with *Y*, while others arouse hostility. I propose to call such opposition *conflicting*. Since it exists between events and things of the spatial and temporal world it may be called *real*, but it rests upon an ideal basis, i. e. upon non-spatial and non-temporal forms, such as negative and positive quality, which also have the character of conflicting opposition in so far as they come to be the forms of the real world. Conflicting opposition has, then, two aspects—the real and the ideal.

The presence of conflicting opposition in the world, so far from increasing its richness and fullness, diminishes the number of possible combinations and expressions of life. Conflicting opposites paralyse each other, and all the events connected with them become incompatible with each other even though in themselves they may not be mutually ex-

clusive. The most obvious instances of this may be found in the realm of our mental life. Thus, for instance, it is impossible at one and the same time to admire the moonlit sea and to read Plato's *Phaedo*—not because the two activities are conflicting as such, but because certain *means* for carrying them out are mutually exclusive (e.g., the different positions of the eyes). Certain activities cannot be combined even at successive periods of time. Thus after hard rowing a violinist cannot play a sonata of Beethoven with his usual perfection. In the domain of the psychical life a whole complex range of activities and experiences may entirely drop out under the influence of conflicting opposition. Thus, if *X* hates *Y* he shuts himself up in his presence, spiritually dies, so to speak, or at any rate ceases to give expression to his mental life in all its fullness, either from fear of malicious criticism, or so as not to allow his enemy to enjoy the gifts of his spirit, and so on. Since, then, conflicting opposition leads to a limitation of life, its presence means that the world contains a kingdom of enmity; and in so far as it is absent the world forms, or may form, a kingdom of harmony. The nature of conflicting opposition will be examined in detail later on; meanwhile we will inquire into its possibility and the immediate conditions of its existence.

Conflicting opposition is only possible where there is a multitude of independent agents, that is, a plurality of substances. These agents can not be absolutely separated from one another, they must possess an aspect of unity; otherwise they could not

even come into conflict, and would form separate worlds incommensurable with each other. Even in the material world the processes of struggle, consisting in the action and reaction of *repelling* forces, are only possible so long as a number of material particles are interconnected by the force of *attraction* and, therefore, form a single material system, comparatively simple bodies forming part of the more complex ones, and so on. In a similar way, a human being, to a certain extent an independent agent, forms part of some social group—e. g. the State ; all social groups form part of humanity, &c. However much individuals may struggle against one another, they are still capable, as citizens of the same State, of uniting in one common feeling and impulse, and of doing their utmost to help each other in attaining a common purpose.

Leibniz's doctrine that substances ' have no windows or doors ', that is, that they are not in immediate communication with one another, must therefore be decidedly rejected, as well as any kind of atomism, such as that of Democritus, which splits up the world into a number of individual entities completely separate from one another. The characteristics of substances which render their union possible will be discussed in one of the subsequent chapters ; at present it has only been established that union between substances exists as a fact.

Most frequently a group of agents achieves unity through partial subordination to some higher substantial agent. The most familiar instance of this is the partial subordination of individual human

minds to a social whole. These partial systems are subordinated to wider systems, and so on, until the all-embracing system of the universe is reached. The relations of systems must not, however, be imagined in too elementary a fashion, after the manner of a hierarchy that can be represented as a pyramid, since one and the same being may in one respect belong to one system, and in another respect to a different one. Thus, for instance, a Bavarian who is a Roman Catholic is a member both of the German Empire and of the Catholic Church.

But however multifarious these relations may be, there is no doubt that all partial world systems are subordinate to one supreme universal whole. All events that happen in the world take place within the same whole of time and space ; they all stand in some relation to one another, and therefore form one system ; in other words, disconnected and hostile to each other as the elements of the world may be, yet they all have one centre and are, partly at any rate, subordinated to one Supreme substantial agent, realizing all their activities in accordance with the forms characteristic of that agent. However chaotic the world in certain respects may be, in other respects it exhibits connectedness, rationality, *logos*. We shall not at present consider the strange and contradictory characteristics of the world in which we live, but will ask instead whether the all-embracing world substance is the limit beyond which we cannot go, or whether there is a principle which transcends the world.

V

THE ABSOLUTE

THE problem of the Absolute is the most difficult problem in philosophy. An organic conception of the world provides a clue to the solution of it, but the subject is so complicated and opens up so many perspectives that it is easy to go astray and, starting on a road which seems quite straightforward, to end in a hopeless cul-de-sac. To avoid this, let us return to the questions we have already dealt with and formulate a position which has not as yet been definitely stated.

We have had before us concrete examples of the relation of a point to a line, of a line to a surface, of a surface to three-dimensioned space, &c.¹ In that series each new stage is a more complex whole, different in kind from the preceding one and higher than it. It gives rise to the lower (e. g. on a line there is an infinite number of points, on a surface an infinite number of lines, &c.), but cannot be obtained from the lower by a process of addition. It is often possible to add together things of the same kind, but the product—if obtained by summation alone—is always homogeneous with its elements, and differs from them in quantity only. So that, when we wish to know how *D* has originated (not *this D*, but *D* as

¹ Chap. i.

such—not this surface, but surface in general), and when from the very meaning of the question we have to turn, not to other small *D*'s, but to some heterogeneous element *X*, this *X* must not be sought for among *E*'s (e. g. among lines) which belong to a lower grade than *D* and may be derived from *D*; however much we may pile on the entities that are lower than *D*, the result will only be a bigger *E*, but not a heterogeneous and comparatively higher entity *D*. In order to find the source of *D* (e. g. of surface) we must turn to a heterogeneous principle *C* (e. g. a geometrical body) which is higher than *D*, and by comparison with which *D* appears as something more elementary.

The view expressed here may be compared with the familiar philosophical contention, declared by Descartes to be an axiom, that 'the cause must contain at least as much reality as the effect', and that 'it cannot be less perfect than the effect'.¹ This statement certainly does express a tendency to an organic way of understanding the world, but Descartes, influenced by a wrong conception of the structure of judgement and inference, was inclined to understand the relation between the higher principle and the elements derived from it as a relation of partial *identity*, while in truth this need not be the case: the derivative being may be generated in such a way as to possess at least some elements entirely different from its ground.

In the preceding chapter we had an instance of the

¹ Descartes' *Meditations*, iii.

lower type of reality proceeding from the higher, without its being in the least possible to reduce the relation between these two types of reality to identity : I mean the relation between the realm of temporal processes and that of substantial agents. The super-temporal ideal substances are the source of temporal events which are of a lower type and differ sharply from them.

Let us now apply the results hitherto obtained to the solution of the fundamental philosophical problem before us. We have seen in the preceding chapter that there is in the world a multitude of particular systems, particular wholes, subordinated to corresponding substantial agents ; every such partial whole is to a certain extent subordinated to a more complex whole ; passing from this more complex whole to one still more complex, and so on and so on, we shall arrive at last at a world system which has for its basis the one supreme substance. Is this the end, or must we go still further and admit a principle which transcends the world ?

If there were no such principle, it would follow that the world system as a whole, or at any rate the supreme substance at the basis of it, was the *Absolute*—in other words, that it was an independent and primordial source of activity, existing entirely through itself, and not deriving its being from anything external to itself. This, however, cannot be the case. The supreme substance is not the ultimate ground of the world, because other substances are not originated by it ; so far as their existence is concerned,

they are just as ultimate and independent as it is, and it is only in their manifestations, in their activities, that they are partially subordinated to the supreme substance.

The relation between the supreme substance and other substances is somewhat similar to the relation between the community and the individual: the community does not create the individual, but some of the individual's activities have a social character, i. e. they are subordinated to the demands of the social whole. Similarly, the world as a whole is a unity of many substantival agents, distinct from one another in their origin, and so independent in relation to one another that they are capable of struggle and hostility. If the supreme substance were the Absolute, the same would have to be said about every other substance, and the existence of many absolutes would have to be admitted. This, however, is impossible, since a number of absolutes—that is, a number of self-originated essences—would not stand in any relation to each other (according to our theory of relations), and could not, therefore, form a single cosmic system.

Where, then, are we to seek for the Absolute? The world is a unity of many substances. Perhaps the *unity* is the Absolute? But this unity is merely an abstract idea, real only within the system of the whole, conditioned by, and conditioning, it; it cannot be the Absolute.

Those who obstinately refuse to pass beyond the limits of the world have no alternative but to main-

tain that the world system has no ultimate ground either in the abstract unity or in the original plurality of elements, but exists from the first as a *single manifold*. This solution, however, is impossible. It must be borne in mind that the unity meant in this connexion is an *abstract* ideal unity of many substances independent of one another. If such a system were wholly self-subsistent, it would have to be admitted that all its elements were from the first endowed with a capacity for being self-organized into a system ; in other words, that each substantial element of the world system was an independent, primordial entity conditioning the cosmic system, and at the same time something dependent, relative, conditioned by the cosmic system.

This contradictory result shows that the problem cannot be solved in any such way. It must be recognized that at the basis of all systems, at the basis of the world, which, in each of its kingdoms, is a unity of the manifold, there lies a Principle which is the source of the world's plurality and of its original unification (which is not yet at this stage abstract in character), a Principle which does not contain any plurality in itself, and cannot, therefore, be described as a system but stands above all systems. Briefly, wherever there is system, there must be something beyond system. Only such a Principle is in all respects independent, and it alone can be designated by the term Absolute. A consistent working out of an organic view of the world leads to the recognition of a super-organic principle.

We must now consider the Absolute in itself and in its significance for the world.

What is it in itself? Is it Will? is it good, rational, &c.? It is sufficient to formulate any such answer to see at once that it is false. No collection of positive definitions can express the nature of the Absolute as such, for that would imply that it was a unity of the manifold, which is impossible. A single positive definition—Will or Reason—is no better, in the first place because, though one word only is used, its meaning contains as before a unity of a manifold, and secondly because, even if we could succeed in finding some apparently simple definition such as 'blue' or 'green', our purpose would not be attained: this kind of simplicity belongs to what is most finite and limited, and is found only in relation to many other things, that is, within a complex system of interdependent and mutually determined elements.

A definite characteristic *a* involves subordination to the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, and is only possible within a system of entities standing to one another in the relation of mutual logical (or individualizing) opposition, and therefore of ideal interdependence which gives rise to limited, finite existence. The Absolute, being wholly self-contained and transcending all systems, stands above the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle; the law of contradiction is not violated in the Absolute but simply does not apply to it, for the Absolute is not a 'this' on a level with

other ' thises ' ; it is a principle free from all limitations, from any finitude.¹

In speaking about the Absolute as such we can only characterize it by negative definitions and arrive at what is known as ' the negative theology ' (θεολογία ἀποφατική) : the Absolute is not will, is not reason, is not many, is not simple, &c.

Even the term One, as Plotinus pointed out, can be applied to it in the negative sense only, i. e. as indicating that it contains (no plurality :

' The name One expresses no more than negation of the manifold. An attempt to carry out the name of " One " in a positive manner would only result in a greater obscuration of the name and the object, than if we abstained from considering the name of " One " as the proper name of the first Principle. The object of the employment of this name is to induce the mind that seeks the first Principle first to give heed to that which expresses the greatest simplicity, and consequently to reject this name which has been proposed as only the best possible. Indeed this name is not adequate to designate this nature.'²

These negations do not by any means (reduce the Absolute to nothing : they only refer to such characteristics of it as are limited and fall short of the full-

¹ The contention that ' absolute being ' must transcend ' the laws of determinateness, i. e. the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle ' is admirably worked out in S. L. Frank's book, *Predmet Znaniya (The Object of Knowledge)*. Concerning the possibility of such being, see also my book *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, chap. viii.

² Plotinus, *Enneads*, v. 5. 6 ; also *Enneads*, vi. 9. 5. Quoted from Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie's translation.

ness of being,) so that in truth they are *negations of all negativity*.)

The objection may be raised that in giving utterance to these negative definitions we take the Absolute to be distinct from the various 'thises' contained in the world, and distinction is a category of being which is subject to the laws of identity and contradiction.) This objection is not, however, convincing.) Many philosophers who have considered the idea of the Absolute (or, rather, of God), and its relation to the world, have come to the conclusion that new and special categories are necessary for dealing with the problem. At present we are concerned with the category of difference, which characterizes the Absolute in a negative sense only, as not belonging to the realm of the mutually determined limited 'thises'. In his book, *The Object of Knowledge*, S. L. Frank aptly describes this category by the words 'metalogical dissimilarity'.¹

The fact that no limited, positive definition of the Absolute is possible does not prevent this exalted principle from being an object of contemplation. It is precisely the immediate contemplation of it which enables us to know that it is different from all the elements of the world. But if we want to give a positive designation to the object of our contemplation, we must have recourse to a proper name. Hitherto mankind has not yet succeeded in finding for the Absolute a proper name that would satisfy every one.

¹ *Predmet Znaniya*, p. 237, n.

The human mind is so accustomed to dealing exclusively with objects to which a number of positive, though limited, definitions may be applied, that it cannot rest satisfied with 'negative theology', which seems to belittle the dignity of the Absolute. Every negative determination appears to us to suggest poverty, privation, descent into a realm lower than that which is denied. The assertion that the Absolute has no reason is taken to mean that it is blind and senseless; the denial of a personal character seems to reduce it to the level of a thing. In truth, however, these negations should be understood as a demand to rise to the higher sphere of the superpersonal—not of the impersonal, of the super-rational—not of the irrational, and so on. Our inability to attain this point of view is a sign of the weakness of the human understanding—an excusable weakness, if we take into account the characteristics of human nature and human relations. Fortunately, however, there is a point of view which enables us to speak of the Absolute in positive terms and work out a whole complex system of positive theology. Christian religious thought is accustomed to understand by such a system the doctrine of God as a Person or a Trinity of Persons, almighty, omniscient, &c. Surprising as it may seem at first sight, negative theology does not by any means compel us to renounce such doctrines of positive theology. Negative theology is concerned with (the Absolute as such; but in so far as (there exists something) other (than the Absolute,) namely (the world, and in so far as the

Absolute enters into relations with the world and has meaning for it, it may, being super-personal, descend into the realm of personal being, (of will, reason, &c. The theology which considers the Absolute from this point of view may be called *relative* theology, though, of course, the relations with which it is concerned are such that the Absolute (does not lose its selfcontainedness, nor does it become (dependent upon the world ; it would not be an Absolute if it did.

Let us consider some of these relations. In the first place, it is obvious that the Absolute is the *ground* of the world. We were first led to the idea of the Absolute by the consideration that the world cannot exist independently, since it is a unity of the manifold.

What precisely is the relation between the world and the Absolute ? In what does it resemble and how does it differ from the relations that subsist within the world ? It occurs to us at once that it is a relation of cause and effect. In the causal relation, however, the effect is never anything completely new as compared with the cause : there is always a *partial* identity between it and the cause (thus, e. g. in the case of chemical changes, the quantity of matter remains the same). Here, however, the consequence is completely different from its ground : not a single particle of the cause forms part of the effect, since the Absolute contains no parts and cannot be broken up. If causation be *relative creation*, the way in which the world springs from the Absolute as its

ground is *absolute creation*—creation in the highest and exact sense of the term. In creating the world, the Absolute does not make use of any pre-existing material : not merely the form, but also the original content of the world has been wholly created by it. The religious metaphysic of Christianity gives expression to precisely this characteristic of *absolute creation* by the dogma of (the creation of the world out of nothing.) The ironical objection that ‘ out of nothing nothing comes ’ (*ex nihilo nihil fit*), convincing as it appears at first sight, in no way touches this dogma.) It is true that nothing (cannot of itself pass into something,) but the Christian philosophy, so far from beginning with nothing, begins with the Absolute, which possesses (the creative power of putting something) in the place of nothing.)

In contradistinction to causation, this creation does not take place *in time* ; its results are the super-temporal, concretely ideal substances which form the system of the world. Is that world one of harmony or of hostility ? The question is not meaningless, in spite of the fact that we find hostility and conflict everywhere around us. It may be that conflicting possibilities are, in the first instance, created within the world by the independent activity of substances, and that the Absolute which creates substances does not itself implant hostility anywhere. Did the creatures come out of the hands of the Creator pure and capable of harmony, or have they in their very origin been divided against one another and stained with malice and dissension ? Such is the formidable

question that confronts every thinking being. Confidence in the power of the good, serenity in our struggle with the evil in ourselves and in the world, the value of life, and 'acceptance of the world' or 'rebellion' ¹ against it and the Absolute, depend upon our answer to this question.

The line of argument we have so far been following gives us apparently the right to hope that the answer will be such as to reconcile us with life. We have discovered the Absolute in our search for the ultimate condition of the systematic character, the organic structure, the *unity* of the world which consists of *many* substances. The systematic aspects of the world contain no conflicting opposition; they are the expression of the world's harmony. Moreover, they are so necessary to the existence of the cosmos that the very hostility and disruption within it are only possible on condition that at least a minimum of harmony, unity, and organic structure is preserved.

At this point, however, we are assailed by another doubt. What if the world, as created by the Absolute, contains only so much unity and order as is necessary for the luxuriant development of malice, hostility, and complicated mutual torture, which is always on the increase and becomes more and more refined? Perhaps we are bound together by a common chain, after the manner of Scandinavian warriors (*Bältenspännare*), who used before fighting a duel to tie themselves with a belt to their antagonist,

¹ Dostoevsky's phrase (translator's note).

in order to make sure that the struggle should end in death. Perhaps we have been put into the same cage like scorpions and poisonous spiders which invariably begin to devour each other. In that case the world must have been created by Satan.

There is something morally monstrous about entertaining such a thought ; it can gain possession only of men who have been crushed by life and lost all strength in the struggle. Those who have preserved healthy instincts will stifle these absurd suppositions at the very beginning and go boldly forward with faith in the power of the good. Philosophy, however, has no right to follow the guidance of mere instincts.) It is bound to consider such doubts carefully and resolve them with the aid of theoretical arguments. Our first impulse is to turn to ethics, and indeed this philosophical discipline supplies powerful remedies for (struggling against the poison that undermines life.) But this is not sufficient ; every important question can and must be solved from different points of view in each of the essential branches of philosophy. At present our concern is with metaphysics, not with ethics, and we can only bring to bear upon the question before us cold theoretical considerations as to the structure of reality as a whole.

Let us suppose that from the very beginning, in the very act of creation, the world has been split up into a multitude of *conflicting* substances, and contains unity only in so far as it is subordinated to one common form. Such form is merely an abstract

unity ; it is the form of the activity of the supreme substance, homogeneous with the forms of activity of the lower substances and realized with their help. But we have now taken away from the supreme substance the function of creating this abstract unity, and transferred it to the Absolute. The Absolute will thus prove to be the Creator not only of all substances, but also of the abstract ideal unity of their activities. This will bring the Absolute and the world much closer in their very essence ; let us see whether this is a gain to either side and, what is more important, whether each can still retain its peculiar nature. The Supreme world-substance, as distinct from the Absolute, no longer exists : the Absolute has taken its function upon itself. At the same time, the Absolute has become similar to substances : it carries out one of their activities, it introduces order into the activity of them all in such a way that there arises one common *abstract* and ideal form of the world. What is there left, then, for the world itself, for the substances that form part of it ? Obviously, the *content* of the substances' activities. If, however, the primordial form is merely an abstract and ideal unity, the content of the substances' activity must have been already predetermined as mutually conflicting, as capable of forming a unity of an abstract kind only. In that case, in other words, the Absolute creates not only the substances but also the character of their activity. Strictly speaking, substances as independent entities, free to enter upon this or that course of activity, will in that

case no longer exist, and we shall be left with various centres of activity of the Absolute itself. We began by losing the Supreme world-substance, and now we have lost other substances too. The idea of substance has been merged in that of the Absolute. We are left with nothing but the Absolute, which is at the same time the only world-substance. Such a doctrine has the character of pantheism, and has been worked out in modern times by Eduard von Hartmann. In such a system the world is not free from the power of the Absolute, nor is the Absolute free from the world.¹ Strictly speaking, there is, on that view, neither the world nor the Absolute, but only some strange complex monster which tears itself to pieces in the struggle of its own parts against one another. Every human self which perceives clearly that it is not the Absolute, and that it is free and is more than a mere bundle of the activities of the Absolute, is a living argument against such a system.

The position, then, is this : since conflicting opposition is a fact, we have to admit the existence both of a multitude of independent agents, and of an organic connexion between them which binds them into one cosmos. This unity of the cosmos compels us to recognize a super-cosmic principle, the Absolute, the source of a plurality of substances which form a unity more intimate than the abstract unity of the world, and nevertheless remain free in their activity. Freedom will be discussed in the next

¹ The necessity for such freedom is discussed in Yevgeny Trubetskoy's book on the philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov.

chapter, and meanwhile we will consider what must be the nature of the unity in question. (Unity exists because there is an Absolute, but it is not created by the Absolute, for the Absolute leaves the substances free and allows them to act independently.¹) The only way in which we can conceive the possibility of this primordial cosmic unity is this : the Absolute is the creator of a multitude of substances which, being free, may, of their own free will, by their own initiative, devote their powers to living in their own creative source, the Absolute, or, to use religious terminology, 'to living in God') This gives rise to a cosmic kingdom characterized by the highest unity, and by perfect harmony : all its members, living the life of their one centre, live not only in and for it, but also in and for each other. This is not an abstract, but a concrete ideal unity. This kingdom of harmony is the true kingdom of God. It is true that in the world we unquestionably find a kingdom of enmity, but in a certain sense, which will be discussed later, it is a secondary and derivative phenomenon and certainly not the original result of creation. The kingdom of enmity is the lower sphere of the world, for it contains aspects incompatible with the creative work of the Absolute.

There remains one last question : since the lower sphere of the world has arisen of its own accord, as something alien to the Absolute, may not the Absolute have taken up towards it an attitude of hostile

¹ This question is discussed in my book *Svoboda Voli (Freedom of Will)*, publ. 1927.

isolation ? Such an attitude, were it possible, would be a stain of evil upon the Absolute, but fortunately it is impossible ; mutual hostility requires that two entities should stand to one another in the relation of conflicting opposition, and this can only happen when both entities belong to the sphere of finite, limited being, which is incompatible with the idea of the Absolute.

Apart from these considerations, living religious experience obviously disproves the ridiculous notion of a hostile Absolute. (A soul that is thirsting for the Being which transcends the world feels Its benign presence so near that it is free from any doubts concerning It.) Only those who deliberately turn away from It fail to find It.) It is so near to the world that it is always possible for the members of the kingdom of enmity to live in and for It, and consequently a way is open for renewing and re-creating the kingdom of harmony. Those who perceive the significance of the super-cosmic principle for the world in this respect know that it is the condition of the possibility of everything good in the world, but not of anything evil. (Those who contemplate the Creator of the world in this way cease to designate Him by the cold abstract term Absolute, and call Him God.)

On the basis of such contemplation, i.e. of religious experience, we may characterize God *positively* as Good. It must not be thought, however, that this is a positive definition of the nature of God as such, i.e. of God as the Absolute. Like all positive definitions of the Absolute, it has meaning only *in*

relation to the world.) In the words of Plotinus, 'The One is good not in regard to itself but in regard to the lower that is capable of partaking in it'. In itself 'it is the beyond-Good' (τὸ ὑπεράγαθον).¹

In itself He stands above good, not in the sense of being indifferent to it, but of transcending it. Other positive determinations which we ascribe to God—Reason, Will, Providence, &c.—may also be only applicable to Him in so far as we consider Him, (not in Himself,) but in relation to (the world created by Him.) A whole complicated system of theology may be built up out of such positive determinations; as has already been said, it may be aptly described as *relative theology*. When we come to examine in greater detail the structure and development of the world, we shall have opportunities for making several contributions to the subject.

We established the existence of a super-cosmic principle by investigating the structure of the world as a whole, and showing the necessity of advancing from it to a higher principle, the Absolute. According to the Intuitive theory, every step of this argument (as indeed every step of all arguments, without exception) is based upon an intellectual (non-sensuous) contemplation of the object thought about, so that, finally, the person who has really followed the process of proof will actually contemplate the Absolute. Since this kind of proof leads the mind to the contemplation of the Absolute through a series of *intermediate* links, it does not, externally, in any way

¹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, vi. 9. 6.

differ from the proofs of the existence of God usually given by the rationalists.) (Speaking generally, Intuitionism does not reject such proofs, but offers a different interpretation of them.)¹

In addition to such mediate proofs there must be, according to the Intuitive theory, a far simpler way of becoming convinced of the existence of God—the way of immediate contemplation, which does not require for its starting-point any preliminary reflections about the world, its structure, and so on. And indeed, such immediate contemplation does occur in the religious experience of those people for whom the statement ‘God exists’ has a meaning so obvious, that to support it by any mediate reasoning, seems to them as superfluous as it is superfluous, under the direct rays of the southern sun, (to prove to people endowed with sight that everything around them is bathed in sunlight.) To those who are capable of such direct contemplation of God, the denial of His existence seems absurd, insane, or even morally reprehensible.

It is curious that this apparently most irrational way of vindicating the truth of God’s existence has an analogy among the rationalistic proofs of the existence of God : it is essentially akin to the most typical of them, the so-called ontological argument. The point of resemblance between intuitive know-

¹ The difference between transcendental rationalism and immanent rationalism is discussed in my *Vvedenie v filosofiu* (*Introduction to Philosophy*), Part I, pp. 107–28, and also in *Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, chap. 2.

ledge of God and the ontological argument for His existence is that, in both cases, the only thing required of the knowing subject is to concentrate attention upon the Supreme object of thought whose existence has to be proved. Unfortunately, the force of the ontological argument has been undermined by the fact that some of those who have made use of it thought, or at any rate appeared to think, that the subject of the judgement 'God exists' was the idea of God as a subjective mental presentation in the human mind. Needless to say, the opponents of the ontological argument (Kant, for instance) always put that interpretation upon it, and therefore easily dispose of it.¹ So understood, the argument becomes merely an indirect rational argument based on the consideration that a denial of the existence of God leads to a contradiction in thought.² As a matter of fact, however, the thinkers who advanced the ontological argument not infrequently meant that the subject of the judgement 'God exists' is a notion, the content of which is God Himself, immanent in our consciousness. This intuitive form of the ontological argument is sometimes found in thinkers with a general leaning towards Intuitionism, such as Spinoza,³ and is sometimes based on the

¹ Hegel observes that such criticism is unfair, for in (thinking of God it is impossible to separate essence from (existence. (*Wissenschaft der Logik*, Coll. Works, v. iii (2nd ed.), p. 32; also *Encyklopädie der philosoph. Wiss.*, vi, p. 363.)

² See my *Vvedenie v filosofiu* (*Introduction to Philosophy*), Part I, pp. 112-15.

³ See S. L. Frank's article, *Uchenie Spinozi ob atributakh*

assumption that God is the only being that can be immediately contemplated ; this seems to be the meaning of some of Descartes's statements in this connexion. If the ontological argument be understood in this sense, the part of it which points to the inevitable contradiction involved in a denial of God's existence becomes of secondary importance, and merely serves to emphasize the essential, positive part of the argument—the self-evidence of the presence of God in consciousness.

The intuitive argument has most force when it is developed on the basis of an Intuitive theory of knowledge. This is done, for instance, by Solovyov ; he does not place the evidence of God's existence in a special category. In order to establish the existence of a tree or a mountain, immediate contemplation is just as necessary as it is for the knowledge of the existence of God. The difference between these two acts of contemplation is simply that the first is partly sensuous in character while the second is wholly non-sensuous.

(God, however, is not the only object of non-sensuous contemplation.) My knowledge of the existence of my own self, knowledge of a mathematical idea, &c., are also non-sensuous.

The circumstance that not all men observe God's existence is an argument neither against that existence nor against the possibility of contemplating it.

(*Spinoza's doctrine of attributes*), *Voprosi filosofii*, 1913. There is an interesting appendix on the ontological argument and its history in S. L. Frank's book, *Predmet Znaniya* (*The Object of Knowledge*).

As Schelling shrewdly remarks, perhaps a still greater number of people are incapable of contemplating mathematical ideas, but this by no means proves that the theories of mathematics are a product of imagination. Even sensuously contemplated objects often fail to enter the field of our consciousness, and in such cases we often entertain an unjust suspicion that our sharper-eyed neighbour claims reality for his own fancies. 'Look at the lovely purple tints of this shadow', says a painter, and the answer he gets is, 'Oh, you painters always see what is not there'.

Contemplation of an object requires, in addition to the presence of the object, certain psychological (and in the case of man, also physiological) conditions in the subject. The most important of these conditions is attention springing from an interest in the object, i.e. conditioned by a definite direction of the subject's will. This is the reason why God is only seen by those who long with all their heart to see Him. It may be, however, that in the majority of cases the desire ripens only in those who deserve consolation, help, or reward.

The circumstances which thus help to give rise to the knowledge of God are always regarded as (proofs of the *subjectivity*) of the *idea* of God. In reality, however, the genesis of knowledge does not in any way militate against its validity. One of the merits of modern epistemology is to have shown that the truth of knowledge does not depend upon the conditions under which that knowledge may have arisen.¹

¹ See my *Vvedenie*, Part I, pp. 29-37.

VI

THE KINGDOM OF HARMONY OR THE KINGDOM OF THE SPIRIT

THE world of harmony is a perfect creation of God, consisting of a number of beings, each of which lives in its own way in and for God, living also in and for each other, in virtue of their unity of purpose. It is the true Kingdom of God. Plurality in this kingdom is conditioned only by the ideal distinctions between its members, i.e. by individualizing opposition without any conflicting opposition and consequently without hostility of one being to another. There is no selfish isolation there, no mutual exclusion. Each part of this kingdom exists for the whole, and the whole exists for each part. Moreover, owing to a complete interpenetration of all by all, the distinction between part and whole disappears : every part is a whole. The principles of organic structure are realized in the completest way possible. It is a wholly perfect organism.

Such harmonious being seems so distant from us, so unlike the kingdom of hostility in which we live, that contemplation of it seems impossible, and its description, however general, sounds like an empty collection of words. In truth, however, the kingdom of harmony is nearer to us than we think, but under the influence of false theories and one-sided con-

centration of attention upon other aspects of the universe we imagine it to be completely alien to us. Let us try to approach it in the following way. Our world of hostility is bound to contain, as we have seen, an aspect of harmony ; if we concentrate upon it, it will help us to understand the characteristics of the world of harmony. Let us take some science, such as logic, which studies only the harmonious aspects of the world, and picture to ourselves how we feel when we have mastered it after long and continuous study. When a student going in for an examination in logic tries to call up in his mind what he remembers of the subject, he generally finds that his memory is a perfect blank. Alarmed by this apparently complete lack of knowledge, he endeavours hard to recall something, and succeeds at last in unearthing a few fragments of various theories—the doctrine of the syllogism, the laws of thought, &c. When, after many years of working at the subject, he becomes a specialist in it, his state of mind will be totally different : at the question, ‘ What is logic ? ’ the whole system of logic will arise before his mental vision as a single whole ; the theories of judgement, of the syllogism, of the part played by the logical laws of thought, &c., will harmoniously combine, mutually penetrate and complete one another, forming one indivisible, well-balanced organic whole.

Experiences of super-temporal unity and harmony are found also in aesthetic contemplation, and especially in the creative work of an artist. The artistic conception appears before the poet’s mental vision as

one super-temporal whole, directing the long process of subsequent acts in time by means of which a beautiful temporal whole is created. A completed work of art, also, contains such a super-temporal unity, which is evident to its creator. This is what Mozart says of the process of his own creative work :

‘ The conception grows wider and wider and I enlarge and explain it : the piece is almost ready in my mind even when it is a long one, so that later I take it in at one glance, like a beautiful picture or a handsome man, and hear it in my imagination not consecutively, as it has to be expressed, but as it were all together, as a whole. It is a perfect feast ! The whole invention and elaboration seem to occur in delightful, profound sleep, but best of all is this survey of everything at once.’

Every one of us is capable, if only in a small degree, of experiencing such moments of aesthetic contemplation. What is striking about them is the infinite fullness of the contemplated content, and the capacity of the contemplating mind for embracing this infinity as a single whole. At those moments we live with the greatest possible intensity, and approach the ideal realization of life.

When we examine such ideal wholes as, e.g., a system of science, it is not difficult to understand and to find in them the qualities Plotinus ascribes to the intelligible world.

‘ Here below (in the sensuous world),’ says Plotinus, ‘ doubtless, no one part could be begotten by any other, for each part has its own individual existence. On the contrary, in the intelligible world, every part is born from the whole, and is simultaneously the whole and a part ;

wherever is a part, the whole reveals itself. The fabled Lynceus, whose glance penetrated to the very bowels of the earth, is only the symbol of the celestial life.¹

Let us imagine now that the parts of the ideal whole, instead of being abstract ideas, poor in content, such as the law of contradiction, are infinite beings standing to one another in the same relations of deep interpenetration as subsist between ideal entities in the system of a science. An amazing world will then rise up before us. 'In it', in the words of Plotinus, 'every being contains within itself the entire intelligible world, and also beholds it entire in any particular being. All things there are located everywhere. Everything there is all, and all is each thing; infinite splendour radiates around.'²

The unity of the intelligible world is not a functional unity of abstract ideas but a community of beings that live a perfectly infinite life. Plotinus, following the classical traditions, calls it friendship, but it would be more correct to call it love.³

One cannot be weary of the life in such a world, for there is nothing one-sided in it. In the words of Plotinus, insatiableness is characteristic of that world only in the sense that satisfaction of desire does not involve contempt for that which has satisfied it⁴—so pure and infinite is every aspect of the life in it. Such a world is living wisdom itself, *Sophia*.⁵ It is difficult for us to understand the organic wholeness

¹ *Enn.* v. 8. 4. Quoted from K. S. Guthrie's translation.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* vi. 7. 14.

⁴ *Ibid.* v. 8. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*

of that being, because we are in the habit of thinking mistakenly that sciences are 'groups of demonstrations and propositions, which is not true even of our science'.¹ What is meant here is Wisdom 'which is not a sequence of demonstrations, as the whole of it forms a unity; it is not a plurality reduced to unity but a unity which is resolved into a plurality'.²

The most difficult thing for us to understand is the super-temporal character of that world. We imagine that an absence of temporal process is lifeless stillness. To get rid of this illusion we must learn to distinguish two ways of denying finite positive determinations: negations which lead to a realm lower than that which is denied, and those which, on the contrary, lead to a higher one. Something has been already said about this in the chapter on God. (The Absolute does not will; this means, however, not that it has no will, but that it is above the limited activity connected with desiring, setting before oneself an aim, and attaining it.) The Absolute is not personal, but it is not therefore impersonal—it is super-personal; and so on.)

The matter will become still clearer if we select an instance that does not take us beyond the limits of the world in which we live. By denying two-dimensional extension, I can either descend to the lower realm of linear extension or ascend to the higher realm of three-dimensional space; two-dimensional extension is subordinate to three-dimensional, and it is possible to pass from the latter to the former by

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid. v. 8. 5.

impoverishing our conception of space and reducing its content.

Let us now return to the super-temporal. If we imagine the stoppage of a temporal process, i.e. if we fix the content of some moment of time and prolong it indefinitely, we shall get lifeless stillness, something like the state of our mind when we are tired or depressed. Super-temporal being is quite the opposite of this. Imagine such a quickening and complication of the temporal process that, e.g., experiences which normally take ten years would be realized in the course of one second; this would involve a change in the relations between events, and a profound alteration of the very content of our mental life. Indeed, if we fix attention on the aspect of time emphasized by Bergson, namely, its wholeness, the mutual interpenetration of past, present, and future, it will become clear that the life of a being who lives through ten years in the course of a second is more complete: the whole content of those ten years exists for him as one whole, in the same way in which the content of a second does for us. Following this line of reflection, we may at last arrive at the idea of a new kind of existence, as different from temporal existence as a surface is different from a line. (Such existence cannot come about through a mere addition of temporal series, any more than a surface can be obtained by a summation of straight lines: it is infinitely richer than temporal being, just as a surface is infinitely more complex than a straight line.) The nature of such existence cannot be defined either

as temporal rest or as temporal activity, for it does not contain the negative features of either one or the other : there is in it no slackening of life, characteristic of temporal rest, and no transition from one state to another in the sense of having lost one and not yet possessing the next. On the other hand, it combines the valuable positive aspects both of rest and of activity : it has the calm—the blissful satisfaction—of rest, and the fullness of existence characteristic of activity ; it is an activity which does not involve losing and seeking, emptiness and privation.

Plotinus designated this highest form of being by the term *Noûs*. Following the great Greek philosopher we shall call it Spirit.¹

According to Plotinus, life of the Spirit is wholly super-temporal ; it contains no change of any kind, and therefore nothing that is reminiscent of a temporal process. And indeed the kind of temporal process with which we are most familiar from observation of our own mental (psychical) life or material nature is impossible in the kingdom of the Spirit. Every temporal process as we know it is a series of changes taking place in two directions : fresh links are added to the chain and old ones are lost, annulled, retaining only a fragmentary significance in so far as they become contents of memory. Change of this kind indicates the presence of con-

¹ The word *Noûs*, in the sense in which Plotinus uses it, should be translated Spirit and not Reason, in order to emphasize that what is meant is not abstract ideal being, such as a complex combination of logical principles, but a concretely-ideal, living being of the highest type.

flicting opposition, of mutual exclusiveness, and is therefore only possible in the kingdom of hostility and not in the kingdom of the Spirit. It has never yet been proved, however, that every change, and therefore every temporal process, must be of this type. Philosophers often refer to the possibility of a different, more perfect time. In Russian philosophical literature such a higher kind of time is excellently delineated in A. S. Alexeyev's book, *Thought and Reality*. Alexeyev illustrates his theory by the following instance, which, of course, does no more than indicate his meaning without giving an adequate expression to it.

‘ A bouquet of freshly cut flowers stands on my table. I know perfectly well, both theoretically and by direct observation, that the flowers are constantly changing. Yesterday they were not quite open, to-day they are much more open. Speaking theoretically, we ought to say that the bouquet of yesterday no longer exists : it has fallen, together with yesterday, into an irretrievable past. As a matter of fact, however, the case is different. We do not recall the bouquet of yesterday, for the simple reason that the bouquet is for us a thing not of the past but of the present. The theoretically represented bouquet of yesterday has disappeared, but the actual bouquet of our experience is still on the table, and the fact that it looks better than before gives us no ground whatever for reconstruing its past and regarding it as something we have lost. But if the flowers go on standing for a few days more, they will one morning become a mere content of memory, and we shall say that they had been beautiful. Looked at theoretically, this seems inconsistent. The flowers were changing continually, and yet this change did not make the bouquet

a thing of the past up to the moment when it began to fade. It was only when the flowers, while still retaining their essential nature, had faded, that they created for us their own past. It follows from this, that the past is due not to change as such, but only to a certain kind of change. From the instance we have taken we can easily see what precise changes lead, in a temporal process, to the formation of a past. A change may consist (1) in the growth and development of a certain reality, and (2) in its decrease and destruction. It can be schematically represented as an increase or decrease in the number of the letters of the alphabet. The combination of the first three letters, *a, b, c*, may alter in three ways; (1) it may be enriched by the addition of the succeeding letters, *d, e, f, &c.*, without losing a single letter which is already there, (2) it may lose one letter after another without being enriched by any new ones, and (3) the combination of three letters may, so to speak, move all along the alphabet, losing preceding members and gaining fresh ones.¹

Our mental life follows almost entirely the pattern of the third scheme. There may, however, exist a being whose activity will take the form of the first scheme, so that the temporal process will consist for it of present and future, without any past.

‘ If the addition of *d* ’, says S. A. Alexeyev, ‘ does not in any way disturb the unity of the former states *a, b, c*, if it is really an addition which brings no loss of any kind, there is no reason to regard *a, b, c* as a thing of the past. For a mathematician, of course, *a, b, c, d* is something entirely different from *a, b, c*, and the change from *a, b, c* to *a, b, c, d* means the disappearance of the former. But

¹ S. A. Alexeyev *Mysl i Deistvitelnost (Thought and Reality)*, p. 307.

life is different from mathematics ; it estimates events from the point of view of quality as well as of quantity, especially from the point of view of the unity which always finds expression in a combination of qualities. And if, with the change in the qualities and quantities, the unity expressed by them, instead of being destroyed, is expressed still more fully, we have no consciousness of any past whatever.' ¹

Such changes may be called *positive*, in order to emphasize the fact that they contain nothing but additions connected with the negation of the negative (negation of incompleteness), and do not imply any loss. Time of this type may also be called a positive time. The kingdom of the Spirit both may and must contain such positive changes connected with the highest form of the temporal process. The Spirit as a super-temporal essence does not contain the whole fullness of being—if it did, it would be the Absolute. The kingdom of the Spirit is, then, confronted with the task of acquiring greater and greater fullness of being, and it can only do so by drawing nearer and nearer to its goal in an infinite temporal process of change. Even this process possesses, however, the fundamental characteristics of the kingdom of the Spirit, and is essentially different from the temporal process as it is found in the kingdom of hostility. In the first place, the activity of the Spirit is highly organic in character, as is, indeed, the whole kingdom of Spirit. This means that (1) each member of the kingdom exists for the whole ; (2) the

¹ S. A. Alexeyev *Mysl i Deistvitelnost (Thought and Reality)*, p. 308.

whole exists for each of the parts ; and (3) each part is a whole. It follows that no activities of the Spirit in the temporal process are merely a *means* : every moment of the life of the Spirit has absolute value on its own account : each of them may be greeted by Faust's words, ' Tarry awhile, thou art so beautiful ! ' Each of them, in virtue of its absolute value, for ever preserves its freshness and power—but this does not mean that the life of the Spirit is delayed by it and stands still ; it flows on in a wider stream than before. Thus in the kingdom of the Spirit there is change but no annihilation, there is precedence and sequence, but there is no falling back into the realm of the past, into the Hades of pale, bodiless shadows.

The question now remains whether the products of the Spirit's activity may be spatial. Undoubtedly the members of the kingdom of the spirit are capable, in addition to creating life within themselves, of creating also something external to themselves. The external products of their activity cannot, of course, be super-temporal essences (like the creations of the Absolute) : they can only be limited, co-existing, processes, the totality of which does not remain disconnected, but forms a system included in one single form of space.

At first glance this seems incompatible with the nature of the Spirit, because the extended world that we are familiar with consists of a number of elements which are mutually repellent and impenetrable, standing towards each other in a relation of conflict

and disruption inadmissible in the kingdom of the Spirit. In truth, however, these characteristics belong not to space as such, but to the type of space which exists in the realm of hostility, and especially to the content with which that space is filled.) (It is filled with matter, the most essential characteristic of which is mutual impenetrability of its parts. This typical product of the relation of conflicting opposition is so poor in content that it can only find realization in space of the lowest type, i.e. in space with a limited number of dimensions.) But there is no reason why products of a different kind of activity should not form part of the kingdom of the Spirit. True, the spatial world resulting therefrom would resemble our space even less than the temporal process in the kingdom of the Spirit resembles our time. In the first place, contents which fill that space are mutually penetrable, like light and fragrance which can fill one and the same portion of space, and secondly, every part of the world in any direction whatsoever is contiguous with any other part. This implies that the space which is characteristic of the kingdom of the Spirit has an infinite number of dimensions. Such a space is a limiting notion and bears but little resemblance to the three-dimensional space which is infinitely remote from that limit, and is the arena of human activity. In that space, e.g., the movement of *B* in the direction of *C* does not involve a withdrawal from *A*, for in every position *B* retains some kind of contiguity with *A*.

For what purpose does the kingdom of the Spirit

exist ? This question is meaningless if asked from the point of view of the Absolute, if, that is, the object of it is to inquire into the purpose of the Absolute in creating the world. It would imply that the Absolute can propose an aim to itself, whereas in truth it is above any determinations of that sort. But the question may be asked from the point of view of the kingdom of the Spirit itself, and then the answer is easy : the meaning of that kingdom and the justification of its existence lie in its perfection, in the fact that its life is perfect goodness and beauty.

The merit of realizing such a beautiful life belongs to the kingdom of the Spirit, whose members realize it of their own free will, on their own initiative. (Since we are not at present concerned with ethics, we need not work out the contention that goodness and beauty are only possible where (there is freedom.) The kingdom of the Spirit is said here to be free because this conclusion naturally follows from the metaphysical theories that have already been established with regard to its structure) It remains to show exactly how the conclusion has been reached, and to remove certain misconceptions that prevent the recognition of the reality of this freedom.

In the first place, it is obvious that freedom belongs to the members of the kingdom of the Spirit, at any rate in the *negative* sense of the absence of any external constraint. Within the kingdom, each member unquestionably has such freedom in relation to other members. This is clear from the fact that there is no mutual exclusiveness : the different

members are ideally distinct from, but do not conflict with, one another. If there were compulsion it would mean that the members not only differed from, but were incompatible with, one another, i.e. that they moved in mutually impenetrable spheres, giving rise to a state diametrically opposite to what has been described as the kingdom of the Spirit. The absence of disruption in that kingdom shows that all its members live as one being, and therefore enjoy both negative and positive freedom: the powers of one are voluntarily and completely devoted to the good of all, and vice versa, so that it is possible for each being to do creative work without any limitation, opposition, orders, requests, demands or entreaties, inevitable wherever there is disruption, i.e. wherever there are beings possessed of an impenetrable selfhood.¹

But beyond the kingdom of the Spirit (there is the Absolute, whose relation to the world is that of creator to creature. Is not the kingdom of the Spirit subordinated to its Maker far more completely than the things of this world are ever subordinated to each other in the series of cause and effect? Strictly speaking, this question has already been asked, and answered in the negative. If the world were not free in relation to the Absolute, it would mean either that the world as distinct from the Absolute did not exist and was related to it, for instance, as the manifestation of a substance is related to that substance, or that the world was distinct from the Absolute,

¹ See my *Svoboda Voli* (*Freedom of Will*).

stood to it in the relation of conflicting opposition and was in subjection to it. We have seen that both these alternatives are impossible. (The world, it is true, cannot be self-originated, it can only exist in virtue of a creative act of the Absolute ; but this creation brings into existence a multitude of beings forming a concrete unity, i.e. a unity of all the different lives in a free and voluntary union with the Absolute (were it otherwise, the relation would be an abstract idea only).

There is one more difficulty to be disposed of. If God is not the architect but the creator of the kingdom of Spirit, the whole content of that kingdom is apparently completely determined by Him, and cannot be free in relation to Him. (When an architect builds an edifice, the building material is not created by him, and so the edifice is, to a large extent, independent of him.) But how can there be any independence when we have the Absolute creator on the one hand and the creatures on the other ?

In order to dispose of this difficulty we must distinguish between the substances created by the Absolute and the life of these substances. The substance itself as a super-temporal agent is, of course, entirely created by the Absolute, but its manifestations—i.e. its vital activity—are its own creation, introducing into the world something wholly new, something different from that which has been called into life by the Absolute. It has already been shown that activity cannot spring up in the substance under compulsion from the Absolute in the form of con-

flicting opposition. Those, therefore, who still wish to maintain that the life of a substance depends upon the Absolute must fall back on a different, perhaps the worst possible, form of dependence, which involves no struggle whatever and consists in this: there are cases in which a thing, dependent upon certain causes, receives from them a nature which predetermines that the behaviour of that thing shall follow the direction indicated by those causes. *Operari sequitur esse* (the action conforms to the being, i.e. to the nature of the agent), and if the *esse* of a thing depends upon the causes that created it, that thing's activities are in the last resort conditioned not by itself but by those causes.

Let us take some instances of *operari sequitur esse* and it will then be clear in what sense it involves a restriction of freedom. When, for instance, mechanical energy is transformed into heat, the quantity of energy in the effect remains the same as it was in the cause; similarly, whatever chemical reactions a number of interacting elements may undergo, their amount remains the same; a machine works in accordance with a strictly definite plan which depends upon the correlation of its wheels, levers, &c., intended for the purpose which the engineer who made it had in mind. In all these instances the action does depend upon the *esse* and its freedom is restricted, but this happens only in so far as the effect and the cause contain an identical element—the amount of energy, the quantity of matter, the engineer's purpose, &c. This identical element,

however, is not itself active ; it is transmitted as something lifeless and unchanged throughout the action from beginning to end ; it may therefore be said that the dependence of action upon the nature of a thing limits freedom only in so far as the action is not entirely creative, in so far as there is an inactive element in the action. (If an activity were wholly devoid of creative character, it would be wholly identical with its cause ;) in other words, there would be no effect at all.) In truth, however, an effect is never wholly identical with its cause, and the reason that we distinguish it from the cause is that it does contain something (new, something creatively realized ; in so far as that element is present, the dictum *operari sequitur esse* ceases to mean a limitation of freedom, and the agent proves not to be bound by its own nature in the exercise of its activity.) The product of creative activity, having a new nature as compared with its cause, is in its turn capable of introducing into the world perfectly new effects on its own account.

The more creative an activity is, the greater freedom it implies both in the creator and in the product of his activity. This fact is familiar to us in the realm of the highest works of the human spirit, e. g. in the spheres of artistic creation, of moral achievement, social organization, &c. A work of art, e. g., lives outside its creator's mind with such intensity, and bears such unexpected fruit, that he himself is amazed at his own work. This happens even in the case of causal action, i. e. in the realm of

relative creation. But the kingdom of the Spirit is a product of absolute creation ; the whole of it has been creatively called forth by the Absolute from non-being into being, and therefore it has a nature totally different from that of the Absolute, and is free from the Absolute to the greatest possible degree.

It has already been said that in relation to one another the members of the kingdom of the Spirit have the greatest possible amount of freedom. In the kingdom of hostility, where reality is broken up into conflicting opposites, the products of activity are the result of relative creativeness directed upon unyielding, resisting material. A sculptor who makes a beautiful statue out of marble does not create the material of the statue, but uses it as he finds it, little adapted as it is to his creative thought. A work of art, therefore, proves to be composed of heterogeneous and not wholly suitable materials, and is, to that extent, inert and lifeless. Even such products of human activity as require less material embodiment, e. g. poetic images expressed in words and dwelling in the imagination of the poet and his readers, still contain a few inorganic and therefore lifeless elements. { The poet does not create the whole of his image ; in building it up he makes use, to a certain extent, of various memory contents which in themselves are as little adapted to one another and to his artistic conception as the materials used by the architect for building a temple } So that, although the highest products of human creative effort do, in their turn, exercise a creative effect in human history,

there is a lifeless element in them.) In the kingdom of the Spirit there is no such lifeless residuum, because it is wholly created by the Absolute, and the members of that kingdom are given the chance of preserving this wholeness in their independent life as well. If the members of this kingdom realize a *concrete* unity, that is, if they live in God and, in doing so, live in each other, a lofty creative conception of one member meets with complete and living response on the part of all the others, and the result which they bring about together proves to be plastic in every direction, imbued with life down to its very depths. Thus the kingdom of the Spirit is seen to be capable of the highest possible degree of creativeness, and at the same time to exhibit a full measure of freedom.

(Since the activity of each member of the kingdom of the Spirit is free, he may either follow the direction of complete and voluntary devotion to all, forming the kingdom of God that remains in inseparable unity with the Absolute, or the direction of wilful, exclusive affirmation of his own selfhood, seeking to become the Absolute and to subdue everything to himself.) Unable to subordinate to himself God and the kingdom of God, such a member falls away from them, becomes isolated and, in that isolation, poor in creative power; his manifestations, therefore, can give rise only to an imperfect world, to the kingdom of hostility in which we live. In the next chapter we will consider the characteristics of that realm, incidentally bringing out some fresh points with re-

gard to the kingdom of the Spirit, but now a few words must be said about the relation of God to the kingdom of the Spirit and to the world in general.

God is the Creator of the world, and in particular of the kingdom of the Spirit. But His connexion with the world cannot be limited to creation alone. The realm of the Spirit is the kingdom of God because all the members of it live in and for God. Their life is a temporal creative process of bringing about an infinite fullness of being, and it can only be a life in God if God Himself, standing at the head of His kingdom, begins and carries on such a creative temporal process, allowing His creatures to participate in it and manifesting Himself to them as a living God. In this way God enters into the world so intimately that the connexion between Him and the kingdom of the Spirit may be said to be similar to that which holds between its members. God truly is the beneficent ruler of the kingdom of the Spirit.

In the complex activity of God directed upon the world, religious thought detects three different aspects, corresponding to which it distinguishes in God Three Persons : God the Father, God the Son (the Divine Logos), and God the Holy Spirit.¹

In so far as God participates in the process of cosmic life and performs acts in time He may be called a substance in relation to these manifestations

¹ The significance which can be ascribed to each of the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity is discussed, e. g., in P. Florensky's book, *Stolp i utverzhdenie istini* (*The Pillar and Foundation of Truth*), pp. 109-42.

of Him. This might lead us to think that we ought not to reject all positive determinations of the Absolute, since apparently we may say that the Absolute is at any rate a substance. Such a conclusion, however, would be erroneous. There is a profound difference between God as the Absolute, i. e. God in Himself, and substances that exist in the world. Substances enter the temporal process inevitably ; apart from it they could not realize the aim and meaning of their existence ; while God as the Absolute has no need of any temporal process whatever. It is only as Creator of the world, only in relation to the world and for its, not for His own, sake that He performs acts in time and manifests Himself as substance. The statement ' God is a substance ', like other positive statements about God, belongs to the domain of relative theology. In Himself, as the Absolute, God is above substance, but in relation to the world He is a substance. Moreover, though in Himself He is neither a substance nor a person (or, rather, just because He is super-personal), He can manifest Himself in relation to the world not as One but as Three Persons.

VII

THE KINGDOM OF ENMITY, OR THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL REALM

I. *The ontological content of the kingdom of enmity.*

EVERY member of the kingdom of the Spirit is infinitely rich in content, and is capable of participating in the life of the whole kingdom, which is inexhaustibly full in all respects, owing to its close contact with the Absolute. But a member who exclusively affirms his own selfhood wants more than this : he wants not only to take part in the infinite fullness of life but to have it determined by himself alone. This leads to a result diametrically opposite to the end in view. Instead of becoming the centre of the whole kingdom of the Spirit such a member finds himself outside it altogether. Instead of the infinite universal life of all the members of the spiritual kingdom, he has to be content with such life as can be created by his own powers, which, though infinite, are infinite not in all directions but in one definite direction only. Such a life is comparatively poor in content, it does not satisfy the aim which the member who has broken away from the kingdom of the Spirit has set before himself, and therefore not a single expression of it gives him complete satisfaction : each is cancelled as soon as it appears, dies away and is replaced by a new one. Hence there arises a series of changes not wholly positive, as in the kingdom of

the Spirit, but positively-negative, forming a temporal process which involves *death*, that is, the disappearance of the contents of experience into the abyss of the past.

‘A thing becomes temporal’, says Schelling, ‘when it fails to be in appearance or in reality that which it might be according to its essence or idea.’¹ It is impossible not to agree with him, with the reservation, however, that this is true not of time as such but only of the lowest type of it, which may be called positive-negative time in contradistinction to the positive time characteristic of the kingdom of the Spirit. The essential difference between these two forms of time consists in the circumstance that one of them contains the phenomenon of death and the other is free from it. The basis of the distinction, as we have already said, is contained in the difference of purpose which members of the kingdom of the Spirit and of the kingdom of enmity put before themselves; the former attain communion with the Absolute and participate in the fullness of its life *successively*—each step of their activity answers to their purpose and results in something new and different from what already is, uniting itself to the already existent in a new respect, so that in the kingdom of the Spirit there is no contradiction and no cancellation of anything positive; to a certain *a* there is added in another direction *b*, and so on. Every member of the realm of hostility, on the other hand,

¹ Schelling, *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, Coll. Works, Section I, vol. ii, p. 188.

seeks to become the Absolute, and wants by his own resources to create an absolute fullness of life. All the actions intended for this purpose fail to attain it, and indeed take him further away from the Absolute, so that a member of the realm of hostility is always dissatisfied with what he does, and is compelled to enter wholly or partly upon new activities, contrary to the old, yet belonging to the subject in one and the same respect ; but two opposite activities in one and the same direction can only coexist in the same subject if the original activity is cancelled and transferred to the domain of the past, i. e. if it meets with death. Logical opposites conflicting with one another in one and the same respect result not in richness and variety of life but in self-destruction. The realm of hostility, then, is characterized by the lower type of time—the positively-negative time—in which forward movement and preservation of life are only possible at the cost of death.

The essential source of death in this realm is self-condemnation, the impossibility of being consistent in one's conduct, and hence the inevitability of partial self-negation.¹

¹ The term *death* is used here in the wide sense of the transition of any aspect of life into the realm of the past (thus the disappearance of sensuous love of *X* for *Y* is one of the instances of death). By death in the narrow sense it is usual to mean a radical change in the life of a being possessing a physical organism—a change apparently connected with the destruction of the organism. The difference between this kind of death and other kinds of it included in the wider meaning of the term is mainly quantitative and not qualitative.

The second source of death is the presence of conflicting opposition. The struggle of the members of the kingdom of enmity against each other introduces profound distortion into their lives, and death is often the only way to get rid of this in order to continue life worthily. The reason for the existence of conflicting oppositions, and the form of being to which they give rise, will be discussed later.

Finally, in the third place, death, i. e. the falling away of an experience into the domain of the past, often proves to be an *indirect* consequence of conflicting opposition. We have already considered one instance of this. Two such conditions, e. g., as the contemplation of a moonlit sea and the reading of Plato's *Phaedo* are incompatible, not because they exclude one another as such, but only because the powers of a being who lives in the kingdom of enmity are limited, and the means for carrying out these two activities directly exclude one another in some respects (e. g. the different positions of the eyes). In all cases, death proves to be not a complete annihilation of life but, on the contrary, the only way of preserving and continuing it in the abnormal conditions of the kingdom of enmity. Positively-negative time destroys all that hinders our further progress, all our failures, falsities, and imperfections.

The ultimate source of all the imperfections in the kingdom of enmity is the false purpose it sets before itself—the purpose of becoming the Absolute. This results in its falling away from the Absolute and the kingdom of the Spirit, but not in the creation of con-

flicting opposition : the hostility of a being to the Absolute and to the kingdom of the Spirit does not call forth a responsive hostility in them, so that there can be no struggle of any kind. A being hostile to the Absolute and to the kingdom of the Spirit is powerless in relation to them and cannot change, distort, or limit anything in them ; it can only express its hostility by refusing to take part in their life and withdrawing from loving communion with them. Like everything that belongs to the domain of the Spirit, such a being is infinitely rich in content, but, because it has broken away from the Absolute, its content loses both the one universal centre and its own inner harmony. This exclusive self-affirmation of a dissentient being directed against the Absolute and the kingdom of the Spirit is accompanied by exclusive self-affirmation of an infinite multitude of its own parts against one another. Thus there arises a complicated realm consisting of a plurality of entities struggling one against the other, since each of them vies with its neighbour in trying to become the Absolute. Such mutual struggle gives rise for the first time to conflicting opposition, which brings about a peculiar form of being, characteristic of the kingdom of enmity—namely, simultaneous externality of particles that are mutually exclusive, i. e. impenetrable to one another ; in other words, mutual struggle gives rise to the existence of matter. The struggling entities are brought into a state of the most extreme isolation possible, expressing itself in phenomena that are the very opposite of what takes

place in the kingdom of the Spirit—that is, in processes of repulsion which create extended bodies impenetrable to one another.

The realm of hostility, however, does not consist of material processes alone. At the root of these processes lie super-temporal substances, which remain super-temporal even after they have broken away from the kingdom of the Spirit. Their activity ceases to be spiritually creative and becomes quite elementary in character—as in the mechanical acts of material repulsion—but it is not limited to physical processes. The breaking away from the kingdom of the Spirit is the result not only of exclusive self-affirmation, but of a longing for absolute fullness of life for oneself ; in so far as substantival agents manifest exclusive self-affirmation in relation to one another, they give rise to the most extreme form of disruption—the physical process of repulsion ; but in so far as a substantival agent desires absolute fullness of life, he can only achieve his purpose by uniting round himself at least several other substances—e. g. by building up an organism, or possessing property, or by dominating other beings, &c. All these activities involve at any rate partial overcoming of the material disruption, and contain therefore a non-material side, although they are not spiritual.

¹ Vladimir Solovyov in his *Chtenia o Bogotchelovchestve* (*Lectures on God in man*), writes : ‘ every animal, every insect, every blade of grass separates itself in its own being from everything else, seeks to be all for itself, swallowing up or repulsing everything else ; and it is this that gives rise to external, material existence.’

They may be said to stand midway between the life of the Spirit and material processes, and may be called mental or psychical. In contradistinction to spiritual activities they are always carried out by some entity for its own sake ; they invariably contain something that is out of harmony with the rest of the world, and therefore in one way or another hinder some other life. Not being adapted for the attainment of absolute fullness of life, they never completely satisfy the agent and are subject to cancellation, to a descent into the domain of the past, i. e. they take place not in positive but in positive-negative time.

Another sharp distinction between psychical and spiritual activities consists in the fact that the former are inseparably connected with material processes. Although in themselves mental activities are immaterial and even succeed in partially overcoming material exclusiveness, yet, as essentially selfish and out of harmony with the rest of the world, they lead, owing to their very meaning and content, to bitter mutual exclusion which taxes the form of the physical process of repulsion and brings about material impenetrability. Thus the satisfaction of hunger, thirst, &c., necessary for the preservation of the bodily organism, does to a certain extent overcome material disruptedness, but on the other hand it requires that all matters harmful to the organism should be kept away from it, and involves a struggle with other living beings for the possession of material goods ; the struggle may take the form either of

actual repulsion of other beings or of a threat to repel them. The same character attaches to sexual love and to all sorts of desires connected with the accumulation of property. Even such passions as love of power, &c., which seem capable of completely transcending the domain of material processes, are in truth inextricably bound up with them. Each of these passions has for its purpose the exclusive possession of some good, and the exclusiveness inevitably assumes the form of a material process. A good¹ which admits of exclusive possession must necessarily contain a material aspect, and therefore the mental process directed upon it must be connected with material processes. And if a good does not, as such, involve exclusive possession, the subject who strives after that good may himself introduce in some way or other the element of exclusiveness. This may happen, for instance, with regard to the discovery of truth, if a scientist wants to be the first to discover it ; strictly speaking, this means that the good for him is not the discovery of truth as such, but the distinction of being the first to proclaim it. This kind of good presupposes the existence, and necessitates the continuance, of a struggle which results in material separateness. Thus an ambitious scientist, director of a laboratory, afraid of the rivalry of his gifted pupil who may forestall him in some new line of investigation, may, under some pretext, forbid the young man to work in the labora-

¹ The word ' good ' is used simply to indicate the object of striving.

tory; such prohibition is not a physical act of repulsion, but the young scientist knows very well that if he disobeys, the skilfully organized forces of the state and society will be brought into play and result in the appearance of agents who will palpably demonstrate on his person the law of the impenetrability of material bodies.

Mental activity, combining with material processes, gives them *meaning* by directing them to the purpose of making the individual's life more complex, or, in other words, it *animates* them. In view of this, it may be said that mental processes and material processes connected with them form a whole which has a psychical and a physical aspect. The mental aspect is the inner life of a substantial agent who lives in the kingdom of enmity, and the physical aspect is his external activity. The inner life takes place in time, and the external activity is realized in time and in space.

Every substance in the kingdom of enmity, in so far as it manifests psychical activity, may be called in relation to the corresponding material processes a *soul*, and those material processes may be called its *body*.

The body which is immediately conditioned by the activity of the soul cannot possibly be taken away from it. Death means the separation of the soul not from its immediate body but from the bodies of other substances which during its lifetime were particularly closely connected with it. The doctrine that (such a body is preserved even after death has, it will

be remembered, been worked out by Leibniz, who set great value upon it, and expounded it scores of times in various writings and letters, discussing it in detail in order to dispose of various doubts and misunderstandings (e. g. he explains why this body is invisible, why it cannot burn, why it is preserved when an arm or a leg has been amputated, &c.). There can be no psychical life apart from the bodily ; is the reverse position true, i. e. is a material process always accompanied by a psychical one ?) It must be borne in mind that psychical activity is truly *inward*, its connexion with the outer material process consisting simply in the fact that its exclusive character leads to, or results from, physical exclusion of one being by another. (Quite apart from this external connexion, psychical states are experiences, the content of which has a value for the subject.) Inward life is only possible when not all the subject's powers are spent in the external processes of attraction and repulsion, and where substances have become more or less reunited (of this more will be said later) and have partially overcome their material disruption, so that their activities have grown richer in content and in creative force. But if we take the extreme degree of isolation and hostile separateness, we shall find substances so poor in creative power that their activity will be confined to external processes of attraction and repulsion. True, even these external processes require an inward activity—namely, the direction of the agent's energy upon the external world ; it is necessary for interaction between two

substances that they should have each other's states 'in view': thus, the substantival agent *A* must have *B*'s states in view, i. e. he must be conscious of them (though he need not *know* them). But according to the Intuitionist theory, the object of consciousness is, in that case, the actual state of the entity *B*, so that all that there is left for *A* is the activity 'of having it in view'. Although such a state is an inward process, it has as such no value whatever for the subject, and cannot therefore be called psychical; such inward processes might be designated *psychoid*. Not a single material process—repulsion, movement, &c.—can then be said to be purely material: every such process is either psycho-material or at any rate psychoido-material.

In addition to repulsion, attraction, and the movements that result from them, there exist also the states of warmth, cold, light, &c., but since these also belong to the class of processes that occupy space, they, like movements, are the manifestations of substances' external activity. It may be said, then, that there exist substantival agents which express themselves solely in external processes and have no psychical life; they compose the realm of so-called inanimate matter. Even these lowest kind of entities, however, are capable, by combining and uniting with one another, of increasing their creative powers and of rising to the level of animate matter, so that even such material substances are potentially *souls*.

Having enumerated the ontological components

of the realm of hostility, we may drop this opprobrious name and describe it as the psycho-physical world.

II. *The organic aspect of psycho-physical processes.
The abstract and the concrete Logos.*

If matter is the result of disruption, if it is the result of the activity of agents which exclusively affirm their own being, it might appear that its structure would be best accounted for by a theory of the most extreme atomism. In truth, however, this is not the case. The description we have so far given of matter involves a theory of *dynamic* atomism which is only possible within a system of organic philosophy. We must now consider in greater detail the organic aspects of the material world. Each substantial agent in that world has once belonged to the kingdom of the Spirit, and is therefore an entity capable of forming in some respect a whole in the life of that kingdom ; even the selfhood of each entity ¹ is thus nothing other than an individual aspect of the super-individual. The inseparable union of these two contradictory definitions in the nature of an individual substance (i. e. of a primary essence) is the result of divine creation, and can therefore never be lost. This characteristic of substance is expressed in its life by the fact that no substance can ever be satisfied

¹ In what follows I shall frequently use the term being or entity to designate a substance or a group of substances subordinate to some one substance, and therefore, temporarily at least, manifesting itself in some respects as one.

with its limited selfhood. Each substance strives towards infinity, and although in its condition of separateness it can only succeed in living for itself, it seeks, at any rate, to make that life absolutely full and infinite, and tries to attain that fullness by subduing all the other entities to itself. The possibility of such attempts presupposes a connexion with other beings, and that connexion does as a matter of fact exist and can never be lost, since all entities, having once been members of the kingdom of God, have one and the same super-individual aspect. This aspect makes itself felt in every manifestation of a substance, even in the most selfish one. Thus the attempt on the part of some substances to subordinate others leads, when resisted, to processes of repulsion and to mutual impenetrability; these phenomena are not mere alternations of action and reaction, but are of the nature of *interaction*,¹ i. e. of a simultaneous inter-determination of the states of two substances. Such inter-determination of two substances *A* and *B* is only possible if they are not completely separated from each other, and if the states of *A* exist not for it only, but also for *B*.

Suppose that substance *A* is in the state a_1 and substance *B* in the state a_2 ; if the state a_1 , through the mere fact of existing in the substance *A*, exists also for *B*, and if *mutatis mutandis* the same may be said of a_2 , interaction between *A* and *B* becomes possible: it will consist in the fact of *A*, on the ground of states a_1 and a_2 , helping to produce state

¹ See chap. i.

b_1 in B , while B , on the ground of the same states a_1 and a_2 , will help to produce state b_2 in A .

But how can state a_1 , belonging to the substance A , exist from the very first for the substance B as well? This is possible because of the *co-ordination* of all substances with each other, i. e. because of the relation which renders consciousness possible and enables each entity to transcend the limits of its own individuality, in the sense that the entity B can be conscious of the state of another substance, a_1 . There is thus realized, at any rate, the theoretical interpenetration of different beings by one another, which makes it possible for them to act upon each other. This theoretical interpenetration is a remnant of the higher unity that characterizes the kingdom of the Spirit. The co-ordination of the entity A with the entity B —necessary, though not sufficient, for consciousness, i. e. for ‘insight’ by one entity into the very depths of another’s being—cannot be brought about by one of these entities or by any third being wholly distinct from them; it implies that all entities, in addition to their selfhood, preserve one and the same super-individual aspect.

The presence of unity in the material world finds expression not only in the form of co-ordination, which conditions the possibility of mutual repulsion, but also in a more positive kind of interaction. Since each entity strives to preserve its connexion with the others, even if it be in order to subdue them to itself, there must exist mutual attraction as well as mutual repulsion between them. The repulsion creates a

more or less limited sphere of impenetrability, but in the end it is balanced by attraction which prevents material particles from infinitely receding from each other in space. Attraction is also a form of interaction, and it, too, is conditioned by the co-ordination of all entities with each other.

The co-ordination of substances indicates that the world is a unity, and the presence of the positive, as well as of the negative, kind of interaction—i. e. the presence of attraction as well as of repulsion—gives the material world the character of a single system. All the activities of attraction and repulsion expressing themselves as movement take place in one all-embracing space and are subject to homogeneous spatial relations. Space has the character of a unity each part of which exists in the whole, is determined by other parts, and in its turn determines them. Similarly, every spatial relation between material processes can only subsist within the system of other, perfectly definite, relations of space: if a material particle *A* is at a distance of two feet in a certain direction from *B*, it follows that it is at such and such a distance and in such and such a direction from the material particles *C*, *D*, &c. Each of these relations is, of course, an abstract idea; each entity carries out its own activities—at any rate the most immediate of them—in an order conformable to these ideas; therefore each entity is the bearer of ideal principles. These forms of order are always identical with themselves, however different the circumstances under which they find realization may

be : the difference lies only in the way in which they are applied and in the content which is subordinate to them. Abstract ideas, then, constitute the super-individual aspect of substances, the aspect in which they coincide even when they struggle against one another. This super-individual aspect of substantial agents is extremely complicated : it includes spatial and temporal relations, ideas that form the subject-matter of mathematics, and also the relations of possession, interaction, &c. The presence of such forms is the condition of order and system of any kind, of everything that gives to the multitude of entities and events the character of a cosmos instead of a chaos, of rationality (both theoretical and practical) instead of hopeless nonsense. On this ground it may be said that the totality of these forms may be designated by the term *Logos*, and of each substantial agent it may be said that he is a bearer of *Logos*. It is necessary to make the reservation that in the psycho-physical realm we find only abstract *Logos*. It cannot be otherwise, for the only unity possible in the kingdom of enmity is an abstract and not a concrete unity.

Since the individual entities composing the world have a super-individual aspect which is not merely homogeneous but numerically identical, they may be said to be of one substance with each other.¹ In the

¹ The distinction between being of 'the same substance' and of 'like substance', and the radical difference in the spirit of philosophical systems, according as they are based upon one or other of these principles, is discussed in P. Florensky's remark-

realm of hostility, however, consubstantiality expresses itself in an abstract form only, as abstract reason, and not as living wisdom, Sophia.

Abstract ideas of reason are not in themselves active. Even when an abstract idea has significance for the world as a whole, that significance can only find expression through a substantival agent—a concretely ideal being. All substances are such concrete agents, but since in the psycho-physical world they are in a state of discord, they can manifest their systematic activity to a very limited extent, viz. only within the confines of their individual actions, so that the cosmic order—the order of the psycho-physical world as a whole—cannot be explained by reference to them. Thus, for instance, the spatial relation of the stratum of impenetrability α of the entity A to all other strata of impenetrability β, γ , &c., of entities B, C , &c., is a cosmic determination containing a number of relations, each of which, in its abstract form, is inherent in every entity, but in its actual realization transcends them, if only because, being common to them all, it cannot be established by any one of them. The activity of psycho-physical entities can, then, only conform to the one cosmic order because of some higher, all-embracing substantival agent which, from the point of view of the whole system of these entities, is the supreme world-substance.

To which realm of the world does this agent
able book *Stolp i utverzhdenie istini* (*The Pillar and Foundation of Truth*, pp. 79–94).

belong ? It cannot be a member of the kingdom of hostility, since it is the source of universal unity and not of disruption. But beyond the kingdom of hostility the world contains nothing but the kingdom of God or of the Spirit, so that the only alternative is to suppose that the agent, owing to whom the psycho-physical world remains a cosmos instead of becoming a chaos, is the Spirit. Hostility, indeed, subsists between the fallen members of the kingdom of the Spirit, but it meets with no response from the Spirit ; in other words, the Spirit while living in its own sphere continues to be present in the rebellious world, carrying on, so far as is possible under conditions that prevail in the kingdom of hostility, its own good and perfect activity. However low a being may sink, spending itself in base or petty actions, it is preserved in the depths of the Spirit, which awaits its regeneration—just as in the heart of Solveig, ‘ in her faith, hope, and love ’, Peer Gynt was always preserved as ‘ one and whole, with the mark of God on his brow ’.

This does not mean that the kingdom of the Spirit forcibly invades the psycho-physical world and imposes its own forms upon it, depriving it of freedom and independence. If this were the case, the Spirit would be winning the fallen entities back to the good, to reason and purpose, against their will. Such action would be of the nature of magic, but goodness and rationality magically imposed from without would have no value whatever, and would transform the fallen part of the world into a meaningless

automaton. But no such violent means are required for preserving the world's unity. Even an egoistic and self-assertive entity strives for absolute fullness of life, and therefore preserves in itself the aspect of unity with the rest of the world. This aspect of unity is the super-individual side of every being, containing what we have called the abstract Logos. That Logos is an aspect of the kingdom of the Spirit abiding in the midst of the realm of hostility and making its activities possible. The kingdom of the Spirit—a concrete and not an abstract unity—is living Reason, Sophia, the concrete Logos. A being that pursues selfish ends bases its activity upon the abstract Logos only, which is but one aspect of the concrete Logos. In virtue of the abstract Logos the individual actions of every entity contain an order which, with the help of the World Substance (the Spirit), forms a part of the cosmic order.

The all-pervading significance that Spirit in its aspect of World Substance has for the world may suggest that it should be called the World Soul. This may seem to be required by a consistent working out of the system : the numerous entities in the kingdom of hostility form particular systems subordinated to higher substantival agents (e. g. the entities that form the human organism are subordinate to the human self, human entities are subordinate to social wholes, and so on), which eventually culminate in the World Soul. In truth, however, it would be a mistake to call the supreme guardian of the cosmic unity a soul, and the world its body. Although a soul does keep

the body together, it is at the same time the cause of the body being material; in other words, its activity always preserves a more or less exclusive character, hostile to some other beings in the world. Spirit, on the contrary, is free from such exclusiveness and cannot, therefore, have a material body. As the World Substance, it ensures order and unity in the world, but it is not connected with the lower realm of that world by the intimate relation of inter-determination which subsists between a soul and a material body. It is true, of course, that the Spirit plays a part analogous to that ascribed to the World Soul in other philosophical systems, but its significance for the world is so different from that possessed by souls generally that it would be a mistake to adopt such a terminology. Consistency with the ideas of organic philosophy demands that the analysis of the kingdom of hostility should lead up to the discovery of a different principle, which would effect the transition to a higher world. That principle is the Spirit in its aspect of World Substance. It has no material body, since a material body can only exist in contraposition to some other material body (in the acts of repulsion), but outside the world-whole there is no body which it could oppose to itself. Material bodies can only exist within the world, that is, only in relation to one another. The totality of material bodies, having nothing outside itself in relation to which it can express itself by repulsion and impenetrability, is not a material body, and cannot therefore reduce the Spirit which stands at the head of it to

the level of a Soul. We can say that the whole world is subject to the Spirit (to the Kingdom of God) as a body, but as an immaterial body, i.e. in that aspect of itself in which matter ceases to be material. The Spirit stands above the world, which may be said to be the body *spiritualized*, and not merely *animated* by it. The activities of the Spirit combined with those of the self-asserting entities give rise to the system of the psycho-physical world with its strikingly dual and, as it were, contradictory character.

Each entity in that realm strives towards world-unity for the sake of an egoistical, personal fullness of life, while the World Substance sustains the world-unity for the sake of preserving the possibility of good and of the regeneration of these entities and their return to the life of the Spirit. The abstract Logos is inherent in every entity as its own subjective reason and nature, but at the same time it is universal Reason, thanks to which the individual system of each entity's actions is included within that iron framework of the cosmic system which seems to constrain the individual, to be alien to him and to contradict his personal desires. What, then, is the abstract Logos for each entity taken separately? Is it subjective or trans-subjective? Neither one nor the other: it is super-individual, and for this reason, when realized in a system that is lacking in the concrete unity of love, it may appear to the individual now as something that is his own or akin to him and now as alien, as imposed upon him from without and leading to results that are repugnant to

him. It is found to be a form that may be filled with any content : with the egoistic self-assertion of a bully or with the heroic self-sacrifice of those who serve the good and lead the world back to the concrete unity of the kingdom of God. The cosmic system provides the means for predatory activity of every kind, but sooner or later such activity, in virtue of its own laws, inevitably meets with obstacles ; instead of absolute fullness of life it leads to a life that is limited, instead of absolute freedom it leads to constraint, instead of complete personal satisfaction to a greater or lesser degree of pain. Hence there arises a constant change of activities, a search for new ways which can lead to a real increase in fullness of life only when the entities renounce, to some extent at any rate, their exclusive self-assertion and, ceasing to struggle against at least some of the other entities, combine their powers for concerted effort. This leads, even within the psycho-physical kingdom, to such intimate connexion and interpenetration between several entities that they act as though they were one. Thus, e. g., in a human being every complex psychical state containing both ' my ' states and those ' given to me ' is a combination of that person's activity with the activities of entities subordinate to him, e. g. of the cells of his body.¹ Such a combination of several beings' psychical ac-

¹ This interpretation of our mental life is worked out in my book, *Osnovniya ucheniya psikhologii s tochki zreniya Voluntarisma* (*The Fundamental Doctrines of Psychology from the Point of View of Voluntarism*).

tivities can, of course, only be explained on the basis of an intuitional theory of consciousness. This unity of mental activities is remotely similar to the complete interpenetration we find in the inner life of the members of the Kingdom of the Spirit.

External, i. e. material, expressions of a group of entities may involve a complete merging of several activities into one. Imagine, e.g., two entities which do not repel one another at all, and together exercise their power of repulsion in relation to other entities. Then repulsions will proceed from the same point in space and be completely merged into one, so that a physicist or a student of chemistry investigating these material processes alone will not be able to decide whether he has before him one substance (one atom) or several. And yet the fact that activities proceed from one point of space does not prove that the substantival agents have been merged into one, since they are not spatial and are not situated at the point where their force is manifested. When two substances repel one another, the centres at which their force is exhibited are two different points in space, but this does not mean that the substances have receded from one another : the interval of space is merely a relation between their activities. And vice versa, when two substances cease to repel one another so that the centres at which their force is manifested, coincide, this does not mean that the substances coincide : it only means that their forces have received new directions, identical with and not contrary to one another.

Two substances may combine some, but not all, of their activities. They may, for instance, act together upon a third substance and separately affect a fourth.

Unions and combinations increase the creative power of substances, and give rise to new forms of being and of vital activity which greatly enrich the psycho-physical world. Thus the chemical reactions of fusion leading to a profound change in the qualities of matter are probably due ultimately to the partial merging of several entities. A particularly striking example of the heightening of creative powers by means of union is the act of sexual love which leads to the conception of a new organism. But of course all these instances of the heightening of psycho-physical vital activity bear only a remote resemblance to the mighty creative force possessed by the kingdom of the Spirit in virtue of the pure and perfect love of its members for one another.

The doctrine of the merging of material processes leads to the rejection of several inorganic atomic theories of matter. Nowhere in the material world do we find ultimate elements of matter—atoms—that are wholly indivisible and for ever incapable of merging into one another. Material processes, as well as centres of material forces, are always relative : what constitutes one centre of activity in relation to a given environment may with a change in this environment split up into two or more centres.

Thus the essential attribute of matter, impenetra-

bility, proves to be relative. An impenetrable particle of matter does not as such and in every environment have any definite shape, as Democritus, for instance, supposed it to have. Being the result of the force of repulsion, it can only exist in relation to an opposing force of repulsion and within the limits determined by the correlation of these two forces ; but if two particles of matter cease to repel each other and start acting from the same centre, their mutual exclusiveness completely disappears, and they prove to be penetrable by each other.

It may be said, then, that from the point of view of dynamic atomism, the material world contains neither absolute fullness nor absolute vacuum : every portion of space in the material world may be full in relation to some agents and *at the same time* be empty in relation to others. Dynamic atomism thus differs sharply from corpuscular theories, which for the most part deny the existence of a vacuum and maintain that space is filled throughout. It differs, too, from the atomism of Democritus, who, although admitting that space may be empty as well as filled, understands both emptiness and fullness as something absolute.

The spatial shape of a thing (of a material particle or group of particles) conditioned by impenetrability exists only in relation to environment. This is so simple and obvious that it would hardly be disputed by any one in our day, and so, without dwelling upon it, we will pass to a far more remarkable aspect of spatial shapes. Let us take, as an instance, the sur-

face of a table. If it is seen from above it has a rectangular shape ; if looked at from the corner it is a parallelogram with two acute and two obtuse angles ; and so on to infinity. This multiplicity of spatial shapes of one and the same object is generally taken to be subjective in character. According to Empiricists such as Locke, for instance, the surface of the table has one shape in reality, but the subjective images of it in perception are many and various, and depend upon the position of the percipient. In truth, however, we have absolutely no reason for choosing one shape out of all the rest and regarding it alone as trans-subjective, while dismissing all the others as mere subjective images. For indeed it is not only in relation to the percipient's eye, but also in relation to other material bodies, that the surface of the table assumes different shapes and produces different effects with the change in the relative position. It is a rectangle not only for the eye that looks at it from above but also for the ceiling, for it is as a rectangle that it reflects rays of light on to the ceiling. But for the front of the book-case that stands facing the corner of the table its surface is no longer a rectangle, and the rays that it reflects on to the bookcase correspond to a different shape, and so on. All these special shapes belong to the surface of the table, and consequently that surface may be said to have an infinite number of aspects ; it is, as I call it, a *many-faced* object.

We give preference to one of the shapes—probably to the one which is related to our sense of touch (in

the present case this would be the rectangular shape), and regard it alone as objectively real, but this is sheer prejudice : in truth, all shapes are equally trans-subjective. At first such an assertion seems absurd and self-contradictory. When, however, it is clearly grasped that the ' many-facedness ' belongs to the object not in one and the same respect, but in respect of the object's different relations to its environment, it will have to be granted that there is nothing self-contradictory in the idea, and that, however much it may revolutionize our habitual ways of thinking about the world, it cannot be dismissed as logically inconsistent. Speaking generally, our mind is so used to the impoverished world of our conventional presentations that when there is suddenly revealed to us the infinite wealth of content possessed by every object and the presence in it of an enormous number of qualities opposed to one another, we imagine that the law of contradiction has been violated. In reality, however, it simply means that we do not rightly understand that law, or have a wrong idea of the way in which the opposing qualities are combined in the object.

The organic structure of the world—the fact that an object does not exist as such but only as part of the cosmic system—finds a particularly striking expression in the relative many-facedness of things. For indeed spatial many-sidedness is only possible in so far as the spatial shape of a thing is conditioned not by its independent activity but by its inclusion in the activity of the supreme World Substance—the

Spirit—which makes it possible for every object to be correlated with every other. This accounts also for the mysterious fact, referred to in chapter iii, that with the least change in the point of view an object appears to us to stand in different relations, and yet this multifariousness of relations is not subjectively conditioned by the observing mind's acts of apperception, as Lipps supposes it to be, but lies in the object itself.

In order to realize how deep are the changes in the being of one and the same object which are brought about by a change in its relations, let us consider the question of the number of a material object's dimensions. Owing to the weakening of their creative powers in the kingdom of enmity, substances are capable of material manifestations that have but a limited number of spatial dimensions. There is no reason, however, why material objects should necessarily be three-dimensional; they may have any finite number of dimensions, corresponding to the level of creative power reached by the substance that conditions them. Thus in one and the same cosmic space there are to be found things that are three-dimensional, four-dimensional, and so on. Since that which fills space is conditioned by the forces of repulsion and attraction, it can only have a form that is relative. In other words, a material object cannot be three-dimensional as such: it is three-dimensional only when it is in the relation of interaction (repulsion) to another, also three-dimensional, object; so that, for instance, a thing four-dimensional in

relation to other four-dimensional things will prove to have three dimensions in interaction with three-dimensional things.

Physicists themselves sometimes come to the conclusion that spatial forms are relative. According to Byk's hypothesis, for instance, the space within the atom has a negative curvature. Discussing dynamic theories of matter, according to which the attraction between the centres of forces is in inverse ratio to the squares of distance, and the repulsion is in inverse ratio to the cubes of distance, Professor Glagolev explains the difference by supposing that attraction takes place in three-dimensional and repulsion in four-dimensional space.¹

If the extension of the principle of relativity worked out by modern scientists (Minkovsky, Einstein, and others) prove to be correct, it will have to be admitted that the *temporal* form of events is as relative as the spatial, so that one and the same group of events has a different temporal order in relation to different parts of the environment.

The above-described features of material processes clearly indicate their organic character. But in addition to material processes the psycho-physical world contains also mental lives with peculiar characteristics of their own, and it has to be shown that these, too, require an organic theory of the world for their explanation. I do not propose to deal with the sub-

¹ S. Glagolev, 'Attempts at the mathematical solution of philosophic problems', in *Bogoslovsky Viestnik* for July-August 1916, p. 466 and following.

ject now, but will refer the reader to my book, *The Fundamental Theories of Psychology from the Point of View of Voluntarism*,¹ and especially to the last chapter of it (‘ Character ’), in which the general structure of our mental life is depicted as an organic unity. It remains, then, only to consider the relation between the mental and the material processes in order to show that not even in this respect can the psychophysical world be divided into two perfectly separate portions.

III. *The connexion between the psychical and the physical processes.*

There are many theories about the relation between mental and bodily phenomena—and in recent times a prominent place among them has been occupied by the different varieties of parallelism, according to which there is no interaction between mind and body. We will not go into the exposition and criticism of these theories. The conception of consciousness involved in the intuitionist theory of knowledge, that lies at the basis of the metaphysical views expounded in the present work, reveals new possibilities in dealing with the question now before us. This conception of consciousness disposes of certain problems which other theories of knowledge rendered insoluble, thus giving rise to such highly artificial theories as parallelism.

Before discussing the connexion between psychical

¹ Published in Russian in 1904 and translated into German.

and material processes we must consider the nature of the causal tie.

For the purposes of logic and methodology, e. g. for the theory of inductive reasoning, it is sufficient to know that a cause is the totality of the conditions in the presence of which a certain new event necessarily happens. But a metaphysician cannot rest content with this conception of causality ; it is incumbent upon him to explain what part is played by the various links in the complex chain of causal dependence.

The appearance of a new event is a change, a partial creation, the birth of a new aspect of the world in time. The change cannot be brought about by the preceding temporal events alone. Events can only have significance for the future or form any kind of system through a super-temporal principle—a substance.

A temporal event as such is doomed to sink for ever into the abyss of the past and to remain impotent and sterile. Only by means of a substance can it participate in eternal life : thanks to memory, characteristic of super-temporal beings, an event does not fall into the bottomless pit of the past at once, but is retained for a time in the sphere of the present ; in the same way, by means of memory possessed by substances, events that have already receded into the realm of the past sometimes acquire significance for the present, if only as pale contents of memory ; and finally, thanks also to memory, it is vouchsafed to events that have absolute value and perfection to pre-

serve for ever the freshness of the present (as happens in the Kingdom of the Spirit).

Events, then, as such are impotent ; there is efficient power only where there are substances ; events acquire influence solely as states or contents of the consciousness of substances. It must not be imagined, however, that substances alone are active, while events exist passively as their states, or that substances create new events on the occasion of those that have occurred already. This would imply that there was a gulf between events and substances, and that events were something alien and external to the substantial agent, instead of being his own states, his manifestations in time ; besides, in that case, no change could ever be continuous, and even a rectilinear motion, the growth of one and the same feeling, &c., would have to be regarded as a discrete process made up of a series of jerks. There is no break between a super-temporal substance and events in time : the temporal process is the life of the substance ; activity belongs not to the substance regarded in abstraction from life, but to the substance as actually existing at a definite moment of time. The states of a substance, then, not only change through additions made to them by the substance but themselves take an active part in their own alteration : they move forward, to a certain extent transforming themselves, at any rate when the process is continuous. A cause, then, as the originating ground of an event contains two aspects : a super-temporal agent and its temporal active state.

This, however, is not all. The activity of a substance is carried on not in isolation from the outside world but in connexion with it. The bond between substance *A* and substances *B*, *C*, *D*, &c., is, as we have seen, only possible because the world forms a unity of such a nature that the entity *A* can 'have in view' the states of entities *B*, *C*, *D*, &c., as they really exist, without their becoming its own experiences.¹

In a vast majority of cases the state of entity *B* which *A* has in view affects its activity in a way different from that in which its own experiences affect it. To realize the difference more clearly let us consider our own inner life. My states *actively* share in the creation of my new experiences, while the states of another entity contemplated by me do not as such usually affect my mental life, do not dominate my soul, and only in so far as they correspond to or contradict my interests, passions, and inclinations, do they serve as a stimulus or occasion for this or that expression of my activity. Thus I am glad when I hear a friend's voice in the hall, I throw up my work and go out to meet him ; in this process my friend and his voice are not the force that gives rise to the change in my behaviour, but only the occasion for a special manifestation of my powers, for a new direction of my activity. In the same way

¹ The difference between experiencing something and merely 'having it in view' or observing it as an object of consciousness is discussed in my article, 'The perception of other mental lives' (*Logos*, 1914).

I can carry out other people's requests, desires, and commands, feeling that they serve simply as stimuli for the manifestations of my own activity.

The influence of substances upon one another does not, however, always have this mediate character. In some cases the entity *B* seems as it were to invade the life of *A* and actively to produce changes in it. When a gifted conductor gains the mastery of an orchestra by the power and clearness of his musical perception, partly expressed in the movements of his baton (it is not of course the visual image of the baton that is essential), a number of musicians become merged into the one organism of the orchestra and a musical work is produced by them as harmoniously and whole-heartedly as though it were poured forth from one single soul ; and indeed in such cases one and the same cause—the activity of the conductor—participates in the activity of all the members of the orchestra. Another instance of the same kind is given in my book on *Voluntarism* : ¹

‘ It has probably happened to every preacher, lecturer, and teacher, to experience moments when the audience seems spellbound and becomes as it were one single being, in immediate touch with him ; at such moments the lecturer has a vivid experience of activity, but the results of it are not given in his consciousness ; it seems to work changes outside his own self. On the other hand, at moments when he is out of touch with his audience, all

¹ *Osnovniya ucheniya psikhologii s tochki zreniya Voluntarisma*, 2nd ed., chap. v, pp. 146–52, ‘ Interaction between different selves ’, where I give a number of instances of the immediate causal action of one entity upon others.

his energies are spent upon formulating thoughts and phrases, i. e. upon producing changes in his own consciousness. The audience meanwhile spends its energies in suppressing irrelevant associations of ideas and concentrating attention upon the speaker's words. Such attention and concentration constitute in the mind of each listener the result of "his own" strivings, often at war with other strivings of the same type. But as soon as the audience becomes one with the speaker, the position instantly changes : the ideas of the lecturer begin to develop in the listeners' minds as it were without any effort on their part, and it may happen that some listener, wishing to withdraw his attention from them, will not be able to do so, and will feel compelled to go on listening.'

All cases of suggestion, both in hypnotic sleep and in waking life, probably fall under this head. A man of dominating character, capable of exercising authority, will often give an order in such a tone of voice that even persons who do not owe him obedience will carry out his command as instantly and instinctively as his own hands or feet.

Relations between entities standing on different levels, e. g. between the individual and the state, often assume the form of such unreasoning obedience ; this happens, for instance, in time of war, when many citizens lose all interest in their personal life and, moved by some higher power, are drawn into the struggle for their country. When a man belongs to a group closely knit together and well organized for common work, even his most insignificant actions lose their independent, personal characters and become one with the action of others.

L. Tolstoy has expressed this with great force in his description of a regiment on the march :

‘ They had not yet reached Bagration, but the heavy weighty tread could be heard of the whole mass keeping step. On the left flank, nearest of all to Bagration, marched the captain, a round-faced imposing-looking man, with a foolish and happy expression of face. It was the same infantry officer who had run out of the shanty after Tushin. He was obviously thinking of nothing at that moment, but that he was marching before his commander in fine style. . . . “ Left—left—left,” he seemed to be inwardly repeating at each alternate step. And the wall of soldierly figures, weighed down by their knapsacks and guns, with their faces all grave in different ways, moved by in the same rhythm, as though each of the hundreds of soldiers were repeating mentally at each alternate step, “ Left—left—left ”. A stout major skirted a bush on the road, puffing and shifting his step. A soldier, who had dropped behind, trotted after the company, looking panic-stricken at his own defection. A cannon ball, whizzing through the air, flew over the heads of Prince Bagration and his suite, and in time to the same rhythm, “ Left—left—”, it fell into the column. “ Close the ranks,” rang out the jaunty voice of the captain. The soldiers marched in a half circle round something in the place where the ball had fallen : an old cavalry man, an under-officer, lingered behind near the dead, and, overtaking his line, changed feet with a hop, got into step, and looked angrily about him. “ Left—left—left—” seemed to echo out of the menacing silence and the monotonous sound of the simultaneous tread of the feet on the ground.’¹

In the cases described, one substance is not the occasion for, but an active part of the cause of, the

¹ Leo Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*, Bk. I, Part II, chap. xviii, translated by Constance Garnett.

changes in another substance ; the forces of one merge as it were into the forces of the other, and the first continues its activity through the second. Such immediate influence of one being upon another may be called *magical*.

The doctrine of magical influence logically follows from a metaphysic founded upon an intuitional theory of knowledge. Immediate influence (magic) in the realm of practice corresponds to immediate contemplation (intuition) in the realm of theory. Both kinds of immediacy are possible because all beings in the world form a unity, and at the same time, as substances, are comparatively independent. Intuition and magical causation necessarily imply both unity and independence. If entities were as separate from one another as the atoms of Democritus, their action upon one another would be altogether inexplicable. If they were completely lacking in substantival character, and formed part of the world in the same way in which various mental states form the single stream of a person's mental life, the immediacy of the causal connexion between them would not be in any way surprising, and there would be no point in calling it magical.

It is obvious, of course, that the magical influence of one entity upon another can only be compatible with their substantival character if the consent or the permission of the entity that is influenced be a necessary condition of the influence's taking effect ; the consent may be based upon a low or an exalted community of interests, upon fear, love, &c.

The typical complex case of the origination of an event contains, then, a cause, in the strict sense, and a stimulus ; the cause implies a substantival agent and its active state. Each of these aspects of the causal connexion has a specific significance : if there were no super-temporal agent, there could be no connexion between the present and the future, and no influence of the past—in other words, events could not form one single stream ; if the element of stimulation did not come in, each stream of events would flow quite independently of the rest of the world without any connexion with it ; finally, if the active states of a substance did not form part of the process, not a single portion of it would be continuous.

In modern philosophic literature the assertion is frequently made that the fundamental characteristic of the causal bond is the continuity of the change. It is true that every change is continuous, but it is also true, if all the conditions be taken into account, that in every change there is a break between the conditions and the effects. There is no contradiction in this combination of continuity and discontinuity, for they characterize the process of change in different respects. In the complex whole of change, the aspect of continuity must be sought for in the connexion of the active state of the substance with the action it produces, while the transition from the stimulus to the change is not continuous. The discontinuity of the change may be still greater when the substantival agent manifests his freedom by breaking with his own past and entering upon a new line of activity ;

in that case (if all the conditions be taken into account) only something analogous to continuity, namely the identity of the substantial agent, is preserved.

We must now apply this conception of causality to the problem of the relation between mind and body. Let us ask first whether material processes can affect mental life.

A physical process of attraction or repulsion in space can only exist in relation to another such process, and this relativity of physical processes clearly shows that they cannot be the *cause* (the active part of the conditions) of mental processes. This, however, does not prevent them from widely affecting mental life in the capacity of stimuli. The possibility of such influence becomes explicable on the basis of an intuitional theory of knowledge.

Suppose two people, *A* and *B*, go out for a walk ; a black thunder cloud comes up suddenly and there is lightning ; *A* is frightened and wants to go home, while *B* watches the majestic spectacle with pleasure and wants to go on to the cliff by the river to enjoy the contemplation of the storm more fully.

What exactly does the perception of the thunder cloud and the lightning involve ? We will answer this question in the spirit of Bergson's hypothesis, worked out in his book, *Matter and Memory*.¹

The factors involved in the perception of a trans-subjective object such as a cloud are the perceiving

¹ A popular exposition of it is to be found in my pamphlet *Intuitivnaya filosofia Bergsona* (*The Intuitive Philosophy of Bergson*).

subject, the perceived object, the processes that take place in the space between the object and the subject's body, and the processes within the subject's body. According to the theory that still meets with general acceptance, the emanations that proceed from the object to the subject's body (e. g. the rays of light) produce changes in the subject's nervous system ; these changes, on reaching the brain, cause sensations out of which the image of the object is built up in the subject's mind. It follows that what enters the field of the subject's consciousness and is immediately observed by him is not the object as such, but his own subjective mental states, produced in him by the object.

It is extremely difficult for those who accept this theory to explain how physical processes can be causes of psychological events. E. Du Bois Raymond pronounced this causal connexion to be an eternally insoluble riddle of nature. In truth, however, since the processes of attraction and repulsion can only exist in relation to each other, they cannot possibly give rise to mental processes. The perception of this impossibility is the chief reason why in the second half of the nineteenth century many scientists gave up altogether the theory of interaction between mind and body, and accepted the doctrine of parallelism. This doctrine, however, is so artificial that it can only be adopted as a temporary refuge from the false conception that physical processes are the cause of mental life.

The intuitionist theory of knowledge and of con-

sciousness disposes both of the supposed riddle of Du Bois Raymond and of the artificial doctrine of parallelism. From the intuitional point of view, the object seen by the observer (the cloud) is a fragment of the actual trans-subjective world (the real cloud) entering, as such, the field of the subject's consciousness ; the colour of the cloud is not a mental state of the observer but a trans-subjective quality of the cloud itself. There is no substitution of any mental image for the object, and consequently the mysterious problem of the transformation of physical processes into psychical ones simply does not arise. True, we are faced instead with the problem of explaining the significance of the physical process in the nervous system ; we have seen that this is not of primary importance and is not the cause of the perceived content, but nevertheless it does play a part in the act of perception.

An object of the external world (the cloud and the lightning) from the very first moment exists not only in and for itself, but also in co-ordination with the observer (as has already been said, this connexion of every object with every other conditions the possibility of intuition, and is one of the expressions of that unity of the world which is preserved even in its separation from the kingdom of the Spirit). Being co-ordinated with the subject does not, however, mean being attended to and discriminated by him—or in other words, it does not mean being an object of analytical knowledge. The powers of a being that has severed itself from the kingdom of the Spirit are

limited, and it can concentrate attention and carry on the activity of discriminating and comparing with reference only to a small number of objects, answering to the most urgent needs and interests of the moment. In this selection the most prominent part is played by the body, with its needs and characteristics developed by a long process of evolution. It frequently happens that a thing which in itself would have remained unobserved becomes an object of intense attention because it acts in a certain way upon our body. For instance, in the case we are considering, the light rays thrown off by the cloud and the lightning call forth in the subject's body physiological processes which spread up the optical nerve as far as the cortex and act as stimuli to attract the subject's attention and his discriminating activity to the actual object in the external world (the cloud and lightning) which affected his body. In addition to the stimuli there must exist a *cause* for the subject's attention being fixed upon the object ; in cases like the one we are considering, it is to be found in the instinct of self-preservation. The discriminated content—the cloud and lightning—is the occasion for *A*, moved by the instinct of self-preservation, to make up his mind to go home, and for *B*, influenced by aesthetic motives, to decide to go on to the river bank.

This theory of the influence of the physical processes upon the mental is similar to that called by Busse ' the theory of double causes ' (*Doppelursachen-theorie*),¹ at any rate in so far as it insists on the

¹ Busse, *Geist und Körper*, p. 428.

necessary presence of *two* factors, the physical and the mental. Its great advantage is that it does not come into any kind of conflict with the law of the conservation of energy. If a physical process influences mental life merely as a stimulus of which there is knowledge or awareness, its own nature is not in the least affected thereby. The cloud continues to move as before, whether it has or has not been for any one an object of contemplation or an incitement to fear. Even the physiological process set up in the optical nerve by the light rays thrown off by the cloud may go on developing in the nervous system independently of whether it has, or has not, awakened the subject's attention. (If, of course, mental life can affect the physical, the awakening of attention may influence the further development of the nervous process in the cortex, but this would be a case of a new influence affecting the physiological process, and not a change in that process in so far as it was a stimulus for the mental event.) In this respect the theory here expounded is similar to what Busse calls 'the theory of double effects' (*Doppel-effecttheorie*),¹ at any rate in the sense that the physical process is found to produce *two effects* at once—the physical and the mental (it should be borne in mind, however, that it is the cause of the material effect only, and is merely the 'occasion' of the mental one).

Taken as a whole, our theory may be said to combine the 'theory of double causes' with the 'theory of double effects'. In his article, 'The law of the

¹ Busse, *Geist und Körper*, p. 428.

conservation of energy and the hypothesis of interaction', Becher maintains that an attempt to combine these two theories is made by Stumpf; ¹ but of course Stumpf's view is entirely different from the one worked out here. The intuitionist doctrine of consciousness enables us to regard the physical process as merely the *stimulus* for a change in the mental one, and disposes of the problem of the origin of sensations by asserting that sensuous qualities are trans-subjective properties of the physical object.

So far we have been considering the influence upon mental life of physical processes outside and within the human body (the cloud, the lightning, the physiological process in the nerve centres). The human body, however, is not made up of physical processes alone. Each cell of our body, though subordinate to the organism as a whole, is itself a small and, in certain respects, an independent organism with physical and mental processes of its own distinct from the states of that higher entity which each of us means when he says 'I'—'I decided', 'I want', 'I am glad', &c. Psychological states conditioned by the vital activity of the bodily cells no doubt influence the psychological activity of our self. In the first place, just like the physical processes, they may act as stimuli for changes in our conduct; this is what happens, for instance, when to the normal moderate sensation of hunger, thirst, &c., there is added 'my' striving to satisfy these needs of the body. But this is not the only kind of influence: the lower psychological life

¹ See *Zeitschr. für Psychologie*, 46, 1907.

that goes on in the cells of our body may sometimes violently invade the domain of our self and influence our conduct not as a stimulus merely, but as an active cause, i. e. 'magically'. We find this in some instances of the realization of fixed ideas ; such is the state of the drunkard vainly struggling with his vice and at last succumbing to it ; such generally is the state of people who are in the power of their own body.¹ The problem as to the influence of the mental life upon the physical processes presents greater difficulties. Physical processes in the human body are conditioned by the activity of the bodily cells and, speaking generally, of all the lower substances subordinate to that higher entity which is the self of the human being in question. The activity of that self is not entirely mental (non-spatial) in character. Like all the other members of the psychophysical realm the human self does not live in harmony with the world as a whole, but stands in the relation of conflicting opposition to a multitude of other entities ; this opposition necessarily manifests itself in the most elementary form—in the physical processes of repulsion and of filling space and making it impenetrable, on the one hand, and in the processes of attraction, on the other. So that it is necessary to distinguish two aspects of the physical processes within the human body : one immediately

¹ This significance of the body for the life of the self, and the strivings and actions 'forced upon us', are discussed in my book on Voluntarism (*Osnovniya Ucheniya*, 2nd ed., especially pp. 10-16, 147-50, 158-62, 215, and following pages).

conditioned by the activity of the central substance itself, and the other conditioned by the activities of substances subordinate to it. To make this clearer, let us recall a similar doctrine of Leibniz. According to him, we must distinguish in the human organism the central monad and the lower monads. The human body is a conglomeration of the lower monads, but even taken apart from them the central monad has a body which necessarily belongs, and is not externally added, to it. Each monad, indeed, is a two-sided, actively-passive being, and the passive aspect of the monad is, according to Leibniz, the corporeality inherent in the monad itself.

The mental life of the self exerts causal influence mainly upon that part of the body which stands nearest to it, namely upon the physical processes of attraction and repulsion conditioned by the activity of the 'I' itself; wherever there is mental life, the processes of attraction and repulsion take place in accordance with the strivings or desires and with the general trend of the mental life as a whole, which causes the forces of attraction or repulsion to be increased in some respects and slackened in others. Such causal influence of mental life upon physical processes need in no way contradict the law of the conservation of energy. All that it is necessary to suppose is that by increasing its physical activity in one respect the substance correspondingly decreases its activity in other respects.

To assert that conations can be the cause of changes in the processes of attraction and repulsion

means to adopt the standpoint of *hylozoism*, at any rate with regard to animate matter. Hylozoism does not meet with acceptance in modern philosophy, partly because its contention that changes in a body's movements may be due to inward causes contradicts the law of inertia. In the form, however, in which the theory has just been stated it does not conflict with the law of inertia. Bearing in mind what has already been said about the conditions of interaction, we must conceive of the mentally caused changes in the rest or movement of a body in the following manner : suppose that the substantial agent *A* feels a growing desire to repel the substantial agent *B* ; this state of *A* exists for the agent *B* as well, in virtue of the co-ordination of substances, and serves as a stimulus to increase *B*'s striving to repel *A*. It is only after this that the *real* increase of repulsion between *A* and *B*, and a change in their relative position, takes place ; thus the change of *A*'s position in space takes place under the influence of *B*'s force, which is *external* in relation to *A*, and the law of inertia is not violated.

The mental life may also affect the physical processes in another way—not as a cause, but as a stimulus for change in the physical process. Thus, for instance, the mental states of the self, entering the consciousness of the lower entities that compose the human body, may serve as a stimulus for a change in their physical activity. This is, apparently, what happens in the case of movements so admirably described by James in his *Psychology* under the name of

‘ideo-motor acts’; in my book on Voluntarism they are referred to as ‘psycho-reflex acts’. These include all actions which necessarily imply ‘my’ mental states, but in the realization of which my will does not take part. Thus sometimes at a social gathering a man wants to tell a story, and then decides that it would be inappropriate, but in a few minutes notices that his tongue has betrayed him and has begun speaking.¹

Such actions are carried out by our body on its own account; the self is only indirectly concerned in originating them: our mental states are the stimulus for the bodily acts and not the active cause of them. This is why I call such actions psycho-reflex.

The third way in which psychical life may affect physical processes consists in the mental states of the self causing changes in the activity of entities which compose the body by affecting them immediately, ‘magically’ as I call it.

Instances of this kind of action have been given with reference to the relations of one human being to another, and of superhuman agents, such as the community, to the individual. The connexion between the human self and the entities that compose the human body is similar to the connexion between the community and the individual, and we may expect to find in both cases frequent instances of immediate causal action of the higher upon the lower. ‘The most immediate magic’, says Hegel in his *Philosophy of the Spirit*, ‘is that which the individual

¹ *Osnovniya ucheniya*, pp. 23, 148, and following.

spirit manifests in relation to his own body, transforming it into an obedient and submissive instrument of his will.¹ In so far as there is this immediate action, the soul is present in every particle of the organism and gives it a character of complete wholeness and unity.

The view that physical processes can be subordinate to psychical necessarily involves the doctrine that one and the same substantial agent is the source of both kinds of phenomena. It may therefore be called a monistic theory of interdetermination between psychical and physical events.² This theory demands that the laws of physics should be stated with the reservation (or, at any rate, should be understood to imply the reservation) of their being valid only on condition that psychical processes do not intervene. The intervention of the psychical factor may result in the physico-chemical processes developing in ways which have so far been characteristic only of animal and vegetable organisms. This does not mean, of course, that psychical activity can cancel physical laws ; it only means that, in proportion as we discover the influence of mental life upon physical, we have to formulate physical laws less generally than hitherto, that is, with a greater number of reservations. These reservations will be essentially the same in kind as those introduced by scientists into the formulation of every law. Thus, the state-

¹ Hegel, *Encyklopädie*, iii, § 405.

² It cannot be called a theory of interaction, because physical processes do not causally affect psychical ones.

ment that 'natrium decomposes water and engenders hydrogen' cannot be taken in the sense that every contact of Na and H₂O leads under any circumstances to the violent reaction of the decomposition of water; such a reaction, e. g., would not take place if the temperature were too low.

If the direction of material processes changes under the influence of an entity's strivings and purposes, it means that under the influence of the mental factor matter acquires a high degree of plasticity. Even the most general laws of material being, such, e. g., as the law of entropy, may prove to be inapplicable to animate matter; it may be that life is an ectropic process.¹

It is possible, indeed, to conceive of conditions under which a separate particle of matter, or even material nature as a whole, must completely disappear. Imagine an entity attaining such a degree of spiritual development that it realizes the uselessness of the selfish strivings of the kingdom of enmity and renounces every kind of disharmonious manifestation in relation to all other beings. Such an entity would have no occasion to engage in the elementary processes of attraction and repulsion which create an impenetrable, i. e. a material body. With the cessation of these processes the material body of that entity would disappear; it would acquire a new *transfigured* body, not material in character, and enter the highest realm of being, the kingdom of the Spirit.

¹ See my book *L'intuition, la matière et la vie*.

If matter were not plastic, if its laws were an insurmountable obstacle to the activity of animate beings, the highest purposes of life—for instance, the realization of moral ideals demanding mastery over matter—would be impossible ; the life of a being such as man would be completely valueless and limited ; the body would be his eternal sepulchre ($\sigma\omega\mu\alpha = \sigma\eta\mu\alpha$).

A conclusion that is of particular importance for the moral life may be drawn from all that has been said about the influence of beings upon one another. The agents that influence the trend of events in the world may be arranged in a descending series in order of value : God, Spirit, soul, matter. In this series causal influences work only from above downwards. Each agent may be the cause of changes on its own level of being or on lower ones, but never on a higher. The lower type of being cannot intrude itself into the higher realm as an active cause, and can only affect it as a stimulus. Thus, a physical process may be a stimulus for changes in the life of the soul and the Spirit, mental life may be a stimulus for change in the activities of the Spirit, and so on.

VIII

CAUSALITY AND PURPOSE

THE reason why there is a cosmic process is that beings created by the Absolute—the substances—being limited, seek to attain to complete fullness of life through their own creative efforts, through their own activity, the form of which is a process in time. Hence it follows that every change in the world is accomplished for the sake of realizing a purpose ; at the same time every change takes place in consequence of some cause. What, then, is the relation between purpose and causality ?

Before dealing with this question, we must consider the contention that causality is incompatible with purpose and that there is a contradiction in treating one and the same process both causally and teleologically.

There certainly exists one widely accepted interpretation of causality which is incompatible with purpose : namely, the *mechanistic* view of causality.¹ Analysis will show which features of it contradict the conception of the teleological bond, and will enable

¹ I use the word ' mechanistic ' instead of ' mechanical ' in order to indicate that I am not concerned with the conception of causality used in mechanics, which is a special science and not concerned with the philosophic aspect of the matter, but have in mind causality as treated in philosophical and psychological theories (such as associationism) which may be called mechanistic.

us to see whether these features are due to a misunderstanding and may therefore be dispensed with.

In the first place, the mechanistic conception of causality implies that the conditions of a new event are contained among the *preceding* states of the world which are falling into the abyss of the past. An example of this is the push which sets a body in motion.

Secondly, causality is regarded as an irresistible compulsion from without, exercised by one thing upon another. As an example we may take again the push setting a body in motion.

Thirdly, the mechanistic conception of causality presupposes that the cause acts without any knowledge of effect and without any plan, so that the elements of the effect are not adapted either to each other or to the past or the future. The change takes place, so to speak, at random, 'come what may'.

From all this it follows, in the fourth place, that the products of this mechanistic causality constitute an inorganic whole and, fifthly, that they do not admit of any valuation from the point of view of goodness, perfection, &c.; *they are what they are*, the conception of 'ought' does not apply to them, and any attempt at valuation means bringing in something wholly alien to them.

Let us consider now the conception of the teleological bond between processes in a form in which it most sharply contradicts the mechanistic idea of causality.

In the first place, a new event is conditioned not

only by the preceding events but also by the future, namely, by the purpose for the sake of which the change is produced. Thus, e. g., the structure of the eye is partly conditioned by the purpose of having an organ of vision.

Secondly, changes take place in accordance with a plan, i. e. they form a unity of events adapted to each other and corresponding to the unity of the future for the sake of which they are realized.

Thirdly, wherever events are determined teleologically there is no irresistible compulsion from without. Whatever may be happening in his environment, the being who sets a purpose before himself is acting for the realization of this purpose, so that external events serve merely as stimuli for his activity ; or, if they become the cause of his action, they do so with his consent.

From all this it follows, fourthly, that a teleological system of events forms an organic whole, and, fifthly, that apparently it is perfect, at any rate in relation to purposes which fall within its limits—i. e. the changes in it are such that the purposes are realized.

We will now return to the mechanistic conception of causality in order to free it from elements of error and see whether it will in that case approximate to the idea of teleological connexion.

To begin with, a wholly external, and on that account irresistible, compulsion is a fiction never to be met with. Even the phenomena of push and pressure are not of this nature, and yet they are re-

garded as the best instances of 'mechanistic' causality.

A body at rest is set in motion by a push in so far only as the push can take effect in consequence of the *resistance* offered by the body that is being pushed, and the rate of motion depends both on the force of the push and on the mass of the body set in motion. The movement, then, is due not only to factors external to the body but also to inward conditions, inherent in the moving body itself; the transition of a body from rest to motion is not therefore a passive endurance of a push, but an active reaction in response to a change in the environment.

If the change be of the nature of a reaction, the external factor cannot be irresistible, if only because it is not the complete cause of the change. Thus, for instance, according to the conception of material processes worked out in the preceding chapter, the body *A* in a state of rest may escape a push from *B* which is moving towards it, and avoid the necessity of leaving its state of rest: the substantial agent at the basis of *A*'s material processes may not manifest its power of repulsion in relation to *B*, and then the push will not take place at all: the body *A* will be penetrable for the body *B*, and may be said to have become immaterial in relation to it.

Making use of the terminology of the preceding chapter, we may say that the external factor is only a stimulus, while the active cause is contained in the inward condition.

Having once discovered the inward basis of the

change and its predominance over the external factor, it is natural to go further and to suppose that it is in virtue of this inward condition that the change conforms to the essence of the reacting entity and is, indeed, produced for the sake of that essence. The very conception of *reaction* as a response to the influence of the environment has a teleological flavour about it.

And in fact we have seen that a material process is always of the nature of egoistic self-assertion, which may be regarded as its purpose.

In the case of mental processes their reactive character, their purposiveness, and the presence in them of an inward factor, are still more pronounced. In my book on Voluntarism the whole structure of the mental life is depicted from this point of view, and even processes of memory subject to the law of association are shown to work teleologically in accordance with the individual's strivings.¹

But however much similarity we find between the teleological bond and the various kinds of causality, we are still far from discovering *all* the marks involved in the conception of purposive action. I propose, therefore, to return to this conception in order to free it from certain exaggerations, due in most cases to a one-sided way of looking at the world. The idea of teleology may then undergo such a change that we shall have no difficulty in regarding every event as an element in a purposive relation.

The fact that in the teleological relation between

¹ See *Osnovniya Ucheniya*, pp. 114-28 (2nd ed.).

events the future is the cause of the present may be explained in the following way : the future is not real or active as such, any more than the past is ; with the help of a super-temporal subject the past may become active as a memory, i. e. as a content contemplated by the subject who bridges the abyss of time ; its influence, on account of this, may be called ideal. The influence of the future is analogous to that of the past : it, too, may be called ideal, for it can only find realization through a super-temporal subject in so far as the future becomes the object of his contemplation and striving. The profound difference between the two cases is that contemplation of the future which shapes the subject's activity is imagination and not memory. In exercising imagination the subject manifests his originality and creative power far more than he does in the activity of memory. The future belongs to the realm of the possible and not of the actual, and is the totality of an infinite number of possibilities, comparatively few of which are selected by the active entities and realized. Since this totality of possibilities embraces the whole world or, rather, is greater than the world or actuality, it can exist only in the divine mind. It follows from this that the activity of imagination is far more important than that of memory. In and through the act of remembering, the subject's mental gaze is confronted with a definite, though endless, series of events that have already happened, that have been experienced, or at any rate observed by him ; in and through imagina-

tion he has revealed to him a world of a far higher degree of infinity, only partly similar to what is and has been, and in other respects perfectly new and fresh. Similarity of the future to the past makes contemplation of it easier, and therefore minds that have no originality and possess but little imagination live by the rule of the past, and the new life that they create hardly differs from the old.

Further, the conception of teleological connexion is applicable not only to a series of processes that succeed one another in time, but also to a number of co-existing things or parts of a whole, or even to super-temporal essences. Take as an instance the animal or vegetable organism. What do we mean when we describe its structure as purposive? We must turn for an answer to Kant, who has investigated the question more fully than any one. According to Kant, the purposive character of an organism consists in the fact that its parts exist not only in consequence of one another, but also for the sake of each other as well as for the sake of the whole.

Is this conception of purposiveness applicable to a successive series of temporal processes as well as to an organism? Can the relation between its different links be the same as that between the parts of an organism? There is no doubt that this is possible and is actually the case, at any rate in some of the more perfect instances of purposive activity. Thus a perfect work of art, such as a play, is a whole, the successive parts of which exist in consequence and for the sake of one another as well as of the whole :

the parts of such a whole are not only a means but also an end for one another. In the psycho-physical world, however, such perfect structure is seldom met with even in the case of obviously purposive series of actions. If I want to go to England, and wait in a long queue at the railway booking-office, write a letter to London, order a circular ticket to Scotland, dip my pen in ink, &c., my conduct is a unity in which each link is subservient to the whole, but a great many of them, both in relation to the whole and to one another, are merely *means*, i. e. are devoid of value on their own account. By considering, then, the various kinds of teleological relations and abstracting the characteristics they have in common, we can form the following general conception of a teleological relation : it is a unity each part of which is conditioned by the whole and exists for the sake of that whole. Hence it follows that wherever there is a teleological relation there must be organic structure, and vice versa.

In all the preceding chapters we have been concerned to show that the world as a whole and in every part of it has an organic structure ; and now it appears that in proving this we have at the same time been proving that there is purpose in the world. How does the purposive character of the world express itself in the various cosmic kingdoms ?

The ultimate source of purposiveness is to be found in the creative act of God positing the primary basis of the world, i. e. the totality of super-temporal entities capable of forming a perfect whole, since

each of them is a member of a possible Kingdom of God and each has a special part assigned to it, the fulfilment of which is the realization of the Kingdom of God. Some entities do not accomplish that which they are destined for, break away from the Kingdom of God, and form the lower, imperfect sphere of the world. Certain aspects of the Kingdom of God, then, have not been realized by the powers of the substances that form the world. It must not be imagined, however, that this leads to any imperfection, disorder, or incompleteness in the life of that Kingdom. Its life is a life in God, and, where there is immediate participation in the fullness of the Divine creative activity, every defect can be made good by the power of God. So that the Kingdom of God is in itself altogether free from suffering, and does not need the activity of its fallen members. But the enjoyment of its own bliss does not cause it to withdraw contemptuously from the lower sphere, i.e. from the psycho-physical world created by the activity of its fallen members, or to remain indifferent to it. On the contrary, we have seen that the Kingdom of God stands at the head of the psycho-physical world, prevents it from becoming a hopeless chaos and preserves it as a cosmos ; the highest consolations that beauty, truth, and goodness can give us fall to our lot because of the participation of the higher principle, the Kingdom of God, in our imperfect life.

Participation in our life cannot bring earthly grief and sorrow to the kingdom of the Spirit. The posi-

tion of the members of the kingdom of the Spirit is similar to that of a physician helping his patient—a physician who knows the power of his art and science and has a miraculous insight into God's ways which reveals to him the meaning of human suffering and the certainty of the final conquest of the Good.

In the kingdom of the Spirit, the purposes which any of its members set before themselves agree with the purposes of all the others and of the whole, so that, like all other contents of the Spirit, each of these purposes is a part which contains the whole ; they are perfectly concrete and harmonious conceptions. The entities of the psycho-physical world, being in a state of division and strife, put before themselves purposes which always, in some respect at least, bear the stamp of selfish exclusiveness and do not therefore contain all the fullness of possible content ; in one respect or another they are impoverished, abstracted, divorced from reality. This alone is sufficient to account for the sad effects that have been indicated—the dissatisfaction of an individual entity with its life, the cancellation of former activities, death, positively-negative time. Still more unsatisfactory are the relations of these entities to each other. The narrow ends which each of them pursues have either no relation to those pursued by others or are in direct contradiction to them. For this reason, each entity finds itself at every moment amidst unforeseen consequences and unexpected accidents, and its life inevitably assumes the form not of one harmoniously developing system but of separate

reactions in response to changes in the environment, which cannot be overlooked, because they either threaten the entity's existence, or destroy results already achieved, or provide a favourable opportunity which must be instantly utilized for the sake of further needs, &c.

Life in a world consisting of an infinite number of beings not adapted to one another seems to be the plaything of meaningless chance. It has to be said of such a world that, although each particular reaction in it may be adapted to, or at any rate directed by, a purpose, the correlation between the different currents of events which act as stimuli for these reactions is the work of blind causation. This conception of the world arises naturally if one looks at it from the point of view of the individual entity, and especially from the point of view of the false aims which an entity fallen away from the kingdom of the Spirit sets before itself. It should be noted, however, that on this view blind causality is used to explain the most complex correlations of heterogeneous parts of the universe, widely distant from one another; but correlations are an obviously spiritual aspect of the world and are unlikely to contain blind causality. It is subversive of truth to admit a certain amount of purposiveness in the separate and insignificant fragments of the world, while regarding the great cosmic whole as completely devoid of purpose.

The recognition of purposive correlations between the various entities of the psycho-physical world does not necessarily imply that God is the immediate

source of the possibility of order in the world. It must be borne in mind that the entities of the psychophysical world are not completely isolated from one another, but, by means of partial subordination and combination, form groups which enter into still more complex groups, and so on. An instance of such inclusion of the lower groups in the higher is to be found in the relation of the individual to the State, or in that of the life of mankind to the life of the earth as a whole. The existence of such systems explains the fact referred to by Schopenhauer in his article, *Über die anscheinende Absichtlichkeit im Schicksale des Einzelnen*¹—the fact, namely, that in thinking over his past each individual may observe that many events, which at the moment of happening seemed meaningless and accidental, proved later to have had profound significance and to have been woven into the whole of life as skilfully as the cleverest episodes in a work of fiction. And, indeed, if every man is a member of the social *organism*, it is possible that there is nothing accidental in this or that word in the street catching our ear, that this or that meeting in the railway train is not the result of blind causality, &c. A remarkable instance of such accidental coincidence is to be found in the life of St. Augustine. When he was in a state of the greatest spiritual perplexity and inward conflict with his own past, he heard a child's voice from the house next door repeating in a sing-song voice the words, 'Take it and read, take it and read' (*tolle, lege ; tolle, lege*).

¹ Schopenhauer, *Parerga und Paralipomena*, vol. i.

St. Augustine took up the book of St. Paul's Epistles he had by him, opened it at random and read, 'Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof'. 'I had no wish and no need to read further,' says St. Augustine, 'for as soon as I had read the passage, the meaning of these words shattered my soul: a wonderful light dawned upon me, bringing me calm and peace of mind and driving away the darkness of the doubts that had been assailing me hitherto.'¹ On a wider scale we find the same apparently accidental coincidences in the life of mankind as a whole. Sometimes at one and the same epoch there arise in different countries great movements similar to each other (e. g. the birth of new religions), though they cannot be accounted for by imitation or direct cultural influences. Such outbreaks of similar events in countries far distant from one another may be ultimately due to one and the same cause; for instance, to the age of our planet.

It is, however, only the particular systems of the psycho-physical world that can be accounted for in this way; far-reaching as they may be, they are directed towards limited purposes, and cannot banish blind chance from the world, nor, as has already been shown, can they form one single world. If, ultimately, all particular psycho-physical systems do form part of a single universe, this is due to the fact that they are subordinated to a higher principle—the Spirit. But the Spirit can only be the source of a

¹ St. Augustine's *Confessions*, Bk. VIII, chap. 12.

whole or system, all parts of which lead to the realization of a truly all-embracing, unchangeable, eternal, and absolute purpose. In accordance with the nature of the Spirit, that purpose can be no other than to make the whole structure of the world and every event in it subservient to the development of spirituality in the entities of the psycho-physical realm, and thus educate them for reunion with the Kingdom of God. The inclusion of every event in an all-embracing cosmic bond—resulting, from the point of view of the individual entity, in the most capricious and unexpected combinations—far from being the work of blind accident, contains a most profound meaning and has the character of moral necessity. This gives rise to a world in which ‘ every great cosmic event is adapted to the fate of many thousands of beings, to each in its own way ’ ; ‘ the cross-currents of all human lives in their interconnexion must have as much concord and harmony with each other as the composer gives in a symphony to a number of voices which apparently interrupt one another ’.¹

The Spirit does not forcibly interfere with the lives of psycho-physical entities in order to transform their plurality into a rational unity. It simply confers actual existence upon the cosmic order, the possibility of which is inherent in the original nature of substances, since each of them, far from being a *tabula rasa*, is a perfectly unique essence, capable of occupying one strictly determinate place in the Kingdom of God. This is the reason why, even in the

¹ Schopenhauer, *ibid.*

state of separation from the Kingdom of God, these essences enter into relations of interaction with one another, and, even at the lowest stages of their development, cannot be completely identical.

The original nature of substances is created by God ; it follows that the moral significance of the cosmic order is in the last resort the work of Providence.

The doctrine of the purposive character of the world may give rise to a misunderstanding. It may be pointed out that science, for the most part, is opposed to teleological treatment of events, and works successfully with the conception of purposeless causal connexion, which would be impossible if the world had a purposive structure throughout. In answer to this it must be observed that science can entirely dispense with teleology only when dealing with one particular aspect of the world, namely, with mechanical processes taking place in an inorganic material environment. It is easy to see why this is the case. Inorganic matter is the product of the most extreme disruption of the cosmic system ; entities that create such matter are divided from each other to the greatest possible extent and, in virtue of this, their activity is very simple and monotonous, though it may be of a high degree of intensity : it consists wholly of external actions, so that a mechanical process is limited to acts of attraction and repulsion. The inward aspect which determines the purpose of the process is present here too, but it is confined to exclusive self-affirmation. Since it is

everywhere the same, we need not take it into account in studying mechanical processes and, concentrating upon the external stimuli (push, pressure, &c.) which evoke the same manifestations of that activity, can establish the laws of it. The conception of mechanical causality is, then, the result of abstraction : it is confined to a certain aspect of a complex process which as a whole has a purposive character. The more perfectly the abstraction is made, the more the investigator's mind is freed from the necessity of considering the inner aspect of the process, and the more accustomed he becomes to think of two merely external events, one of which acts as an external stimulus for the occurrence of the other, and both of which, in the relation of interaction, occasion each other's occurrence. The scientist's mind thus begins to lose the very idea of force, activity, generation, and therefore the very idea of causality, and comes to regard as the sole aim of his inquiry the discovery of the laws of uniform sequences or co-existences of events in time.

Such abstraction is useful only when the reactive character of a process is not very prominent, i.e. when the inner side of it is extremely poor and monotonous. In studying, for instance, human psychology it cannot be applied at all, for the same external stimulus produces in different men quite a different reaction, and even the response that one and the same man makes to the same stimulus at different times, and especially at different stages of his development, may undergo a considerable change.

And, indeed, even the life of inorganic matter is subject to a process of evolution, since, however poor in content it may be, it is yet directed to a purpose. The evolution may be very slow and of a very simple kind, yet, in proportion as the scientists discover it, they will have to make a greater number of reservations in formulating the laws of so-called inorganic matter.

It might appear at first sight as though the recognition of the purposive character of material processes necessitated regarding them as psychical events. In truth, however, this is not the case : it is sufficient to admit that they contain the *psychoid* elements already referred to.¹ It must, of course, be recognized at the same time that mental and physical processes, if taken together with their substantival basis, are not separated from each other by an impassable gulf, and are in some respects similar. Both are grounded in the same substances, fallen away from the kingdom of the Spirit and capable of returning to it. Even in their fallen state, their activity preserves a stamp of spirituality in the form of the abstract Logos, and they belong to the same universe in virtue of their partial subordination to the concrete Logos. This is why both material and mental processes are permeated throughout by forms of the Spirit, many of which—for instance the mathematical ideas of number and magnitude, &c., temporal relations, &c., are the same both for matter and for psychical life.

Once it is clearly realized that, for instance, the

¹ See chap. viii.

mathematical basis of material nature is furnished by the activity of the Spirit, and is essentially different from all psychical experiences, it will no longer seem paradoxical to assert that *matter may exist without a soul but is impossible without the Spirit*. A mental process is also impossible without the participation of the Spirit, and, in virtue of this common basis, there is similarity between physical and psychical phenomena.

This similarity is also conditioned by the fact that both mental and material processes are manifestations of the activity of substances. Wherever there is activity there is effort, and effort of such a definite kind that it may be said to be the realization of a striving for a definite purpose. The physical and the mental activity produce very different results, but both are of the nature of effort and striving.

If every activity involving realization of striving (conscious or unconscious ¹) be called Will, the meaning of the terms *will* and *striving* will not be restricted to the field of psychology. Immediate contemplation of mechanical processes, such as gravitation, push, pressure, &c., reveals in them aspects indicated by the words 'striving' and 'effort', and if we are free from preconceived theories we shall make use of these terms not merely in a metaphorical sense in describing material processes. But the presence of effort and striving in material processes does not assimilate them to mental processes to such an extent

¹ Unconscious strivings are discussed in my book on *Voluntarism*, chap. i.

that we should be justified in identifying the two, and adopting the point of view of pan-psychism, or of the orthodox Kantian theory, according to which physical events are psychical processes in the outer sense.

Since all matter is active and purposive in character, so that it is capable of progressing to higher levels of being, it must be recognized that there is no lifeless matter, though there may be inanimate matter. Matter is living because the basis of it is spirit.

IX

LOGICAL, METAPHYSICAL, AND PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES

LOGICAL principles are concerned with the structure of the objective side of judgement and inference. They condition the possibility both of particular truths and of systems of truths which constitute sciences. Logical principles include the law of sufficient reason, according to which every inference and even every judgement consists of a ground and a consequence that follows from it. They also include the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, in virtue of which the judgement as a whole and every element of it have a strictly determinate character ¹.

What is the relation of logical principles to the principles of metaphysics? According to the intuitionist theory, the objective side of judgement is no other than the actual object itself (a fragment of the world that is being known), contemplated in its analysed aspect in and through the activity of discrimination. Hence it follows that the structure of the objective side of judgement is the structure of the known reality itself: every fragment of the world has the character of systematic unity in virtue of the forms of being inherent in it, and if it becomes the

¹ See chap. iv.

object of analytic knowledge, i.e. if it becomes the objective side of judgement or inference in the mind of a subject judging or reasoning about it, those very same forms will give the judgement or inference the character of systematic unity also. All aspects of the world are subject to the law of functional dependence, which means that if there exists a certain *a* there must necessarily exist also a certain *b* ; when, therefore, any part of reality becomes for some mind an object of knowledge, it forms, owing to its very structure, a judgement consisting of two members in the relation of functional dependence—the subject of judgement and the predicate which follows from it ; one and the same form of connexion conditions both the fact that the world is subject to the law of functional dependence and the fact that judgements about the world are subject to the law of sufficient reason. Thus logical and metaphysical principles fundamentally coincide : they are the expression of the same general structure of the world, considered in its different aspects (viz. in its significance for knowledge and for being).

This doctrine of the coincidence of logical and metaphysical laws is not a form of *pan-logism*. It is true that all logical forms have also metaphysical significance, but the converse is not true : many forms of reality, e. g. the spatial and temporal relations, have no logical significance. Besides, it must be remembered that logical significance belongs not to the structure of a thing as such, but only in so far as it enters the field of a discriminating consciousness and

constitutes the objective aspect of judgement. We cannot, therefore, adopt the language of Hegel, who says that 'an organism is an inference', &c., although Hegel is right in holding that the structure of an organism coincides to a certain extent with the structure of an inference. It must be added, however, that the structure of an organism contains in different aspects the forms of judgement, of inference, and of a whole system of knowledge, in a way similar to that in which one and the same magnitude, e. g. the height of the Finsteraarhorn, may, with equal justice, be represented by the figures $2\frac{1}{2}$, 4,275, and 14,062 (in relation to a mile, a metre, and a foot).

We must now consider the relation between the metaphysical and the practical principles, in other words, between the 'is' and the 'ought'.

This problem has meaning only for those systems of philosophy which recognize, by the side of the concrete reality, the presence of such an aspect of the world as unconditional and universally binding obligations and judgements of value. This presupposes, on the one hand, the subsistence of an absolute value which is the norm of conduct and, on the other hand, the existence of beings capable of purposive activity, and endowed with freedom in virtue of which they may either realize the absolute norm in their conduct or deviate from it as much as they choose. The complex relations and obscure metaphysical conceptions that ensue from this supposition can be avoided on the assumption that the world contains only relative values and therefore relative obligations. The idea of

'ought' loses, in that case, its unique character, and the problem of the relation between the 'ought' and the 'is' falls to the ground. A relative norm, indeed, indicates the consequences that follow from this or that line of conduct, thus determining the path which must be followed by the person who desires these consequences. 'If you want good health, be temperate in food and drink'; 'if you want to remain on good terms with people, do not interfere with their legitimate freedom', and so on. Such norms may with some justification be said to express the law that determines the connexion between two physiological or psychological facts, and the consciousness, based upon it, of the connexion between a desire and the means of realizing it. Since the starting-point of such a norm is not a moral obligation but the psychological fact of a particular desire, it is easy to dispose of the binding character of the norm by repudiating the desire upon which it is based. The glutton may answer, 'But I do not want good health—I want to enjoy food and drink to-day, and that is enough for me'. Those who deny the absolute 'ought' can find no answer to this, for they themselves reject the supremacy of the 'ought' over the 'is', maintaining that in the last resort the norm is determined by facts, and not vice versa. The argument could only be continued by a moralist who deduced particular obligations from a higher and an unconditionally binding obligation that could not be disposed of by the glutton's argument, if only because it refers to the desire itself, quite apart from any consequences of it: 'You

ought to strive towards a certain purpose ' (e. g. you ought to desire to be a member of the Kingdom of God).

How is one to prove the supremacy of duty over desire ? If there be such a thing as *unconditional* duty it must be an element of the world *sui generis*, not to be derived from anything else ; the ' ought ' in this sense is essentially superior to existence, and is, therefore, one of the ultimate principles of the world. The best and most natural way of proving the reality of such an aspect of the world is to appeal to immediate consciousness, which clearly testifies to us that there is an unconditionally binding line of conduct (even though we may not be able to express its content in terms of analytic knowledge), and that the very idea of *conduct* has no meaning apart from the idea of *duty*.

Such immediate intuition, however, requires a thoroughgoing analysis of complex contents of consciousness in a manner which is not familiar to most people ; even those who tread firmly in the path of duty generally do it unconsciously, and would not be content with an appeal to immediate self-evidence if they began the study of ethics. It is necessary, therefore, to have recourse to indirect methods of proof as well, such as the argument from the contrary, showing that the rejection of the unconditional ' ought ' is bound to be self-contradictory. Indeed, even those who deny the principle of unconditional duty have to admit that at any rate the consciousness of unconditional duty exists as a fact in some people ; nor can they deny that this consciousness is capable of

affecting some people's conduct in the same way as fear, hope, &c. If it is impossible to deny these facts, what can be the meaning of saying that there is no such thing as unconditional duty? Obviously it can only mean something like this: 'we ought to give up valuing our own and other people's actions from the point of view of absolute duty' (e. g. we have no right to blame the glutton for his conduct, since it is not his fault that nature endowed him with an organism the anatomical structure of which determines his conduct with mechanical necessity). Such a contention is of course absurd, for it contains the recognition of a certain unconditional duty (the duty of abstaining from valuation) and at the same time rejects all absolute duty.¹

The fact that every attempt to deny the absolute 'ought' instantly leads to contradictions shows that moral obligation is one of the all-pervading principles of the world. Thus, at the threshold of ethics, the position is similar to that which we find in trying to establish the claims of epistemology. The sceptic who denies the reality of the subject-matter of epistemology and declares that 'there is no truth', contradicts himself by that very statement: he maintains the truth of the non-existence of any truth.¹

It must not be imagined, however, that the principle of unconditional duty can be simply added to any system of philosophy. The recognition of it

¹ The impossibility of disproving the fact of absolute duty is shown in the ethics of Kant. See, e. g., B. Bauch, *Ethik*, in a collection of essays dedicated to Kuno Fischer.

necessarily implies the recognition of the conditions of its possibility, i. e. of the reality of absolute value, of purposive activity and freedom ; and many philosophical systems could only recognize these at the cost of ceasing to be what they are. Thus, for instance, all inorganic conceptions of the world can admit of relative values only, i. e. of values that have significance solely from the point of view of a certain individual or group of individuals (e. g. the self-preservation of an entity). Consistently worked out, this implies that duty, too, can be relative only.

The organic conception of the world worked out in the present book contains all the conditions that make absolute duty possible—freedom, purposive activity, and absolute value, the last being identified with the Kingdom of the Spirit or the Kingdom of God ; it is only natural, therefore, that the adherents of such a philosophy should be content with the testimony of immediate consciousness with regard to the reality of absolute duty.

We are not at present concerned with ethics. Our purpose is to consider the world as an organic whole, and without further investigating the subject of obligation and value we will ask what is their relation to existence and how they combine to form a cosmic whole.

Values do not constitute a separate realm of their own, distinct from existence. Such existence as the Kingdom of God is perfect goodness and perfect beauty ; every other kind of existence, judged by this

standard, has a greater or lesser degree of goodness and beauty or of evil and ugliness. Everything that forms part of the world may be said to have being when regarded from the point of view of its presence in it, and to have positive or negative value when regarded from the point of view of its significance for itself and for other beings.

A possible value, whether real or fictitious, is the object of desire or of repulsion. The realization of absolute value, i. e. of the Kingdom of God, and also of everything that serves as a means for attaining it, may be, and ought to be, the object of striving for every individual entity.

What is the relation between absolute duty and God? Some thinkers maintain that a moral law is unconditionally binding because it is a commandment of God, and the content of moral obligation is supposed to have absolute value because the conditions of its possibility have been created by God. Other thinkers maintain, on the contrary, that a thing is commanded by God because it is of absolute value, and the conditions of its possibility have been created by God on account of its value. Both these assertions, if taken together, contain some truth, but, taken separately, or in opposition to one another, they both become false and lead to conclusions repellent to our moral sense. It cannot, indeed, be admitted that anything may become the subject of God's commandment and have absolute value conferred upon it, since God can only command that which is absolutely valuable. On the other hand, it

cannot be admitted that God's activity is determined by the idea of absolute value : God is the absolute Creator of all that possesses absolute value, and the supreme condition of the possibility of its realization. Hence it follows that both these definitions, absolute value and the commandment of God, are inseparably interconnected in the sense of organic interdetermination and not of one-sided dependence upon one another.

The substantival agents that constitute the world are free, and two lines of conduct are therefore possible for them : one consists in carrying out that which is unconditionally binding, absolutely valuable and commanded by God, the other in striving after fictitious values. In pursuing the first path they build up the kingdom of the Spirit, in pursuing the second, the psycho-physical world. The relation between the ' is ' and the ' ought ' in these two realms is essentially different. In the kingdom of the Spirit the ' is ' and the ' ought ' coincide : all that ought to be is and all that is ought to be. In the psycho-physical world the two are frequently at variance ; this cannot, however, make the structure of the psycho-physical world utterly opposed to that of the kingdom of the Spirit. There are certain general laws of being which cannot be violated even by free agents, and do not, therefore, belong to the domain of the ' ought ' in the strict sense. They are the necessary forms of all reality—e. g. the law of the determinateness of being, the law of functional dependence, &c. What is the relation between these

general principles of being and the content of the ought (i. e. of that which ought to be) ? If the world is purposive, there is a rational connexion between the laws of being and the absolute values which constitute the content of the unconditional ought. Thus, for instance, the determinateness of being expressing itself in the form of individualizing opposition ¹ is the necessary condition of the richness, variety, and uniqueness of the world, that is, of those features of it without which beauty is unthinkable. The same determinateness of being forms the basis of the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, which are the necessary conditions of truth. Functional dependence of the elements of the world upon each other is one of the expressions of the organic connectedness of the world ; it is essential for the world's being a cosmos and not a chaos, and it is only within a cosmos that goodness, truth, and beauty are possible. Thus the general laws of being are a necessary aspect of absolute values, and are themselves of value, forming an essential part of the world's structure in accordance with a purpose.

A difficulty may arise at this juncture. It has been said above that forms of being which constitute the abstract Logos may be filled with any content, and are the necessary condition of the possibility of evil as well as of good, and it would seem to follow from this that they can, with as much justice, be set on the side of evil as of good. Such a conclusion, however, would be erroneous. Although evil works with the

¹ See chap. iv.

same principles of being as good, it makes use of them for building up a world contrary to their spirit ; thus, on the basis of cosmic interrelatedness it builds up strife and dissension instead of new forms of unity ; it takes advantage of individualizing uniqueness to make the world poorer instead of making it richer and more complex. Good, on the contrary, putting these laws of being at the basis of its activity, uses them as beginnings which must be deepened and fully developed in the direction their meaning implies. It may, therefore, be said that the general laws of being are factors of goodness and beauty ; they conform to the type of that which is morally binding, but are not referred by us to the realm of the ' ought ' because they do not depend upon our will. They mark the lowest limit of perfection below which reality as such cannot sink. They may be said to be the *minimum* of that which ought to be, eternally fixed by God in His creation, and thus removed from the domain of the ' ought '. The fact that evil cannot dispense with these laws merely proves its incapacity to be consistent, its inner weakness and lack of independence. These characteristics of evil are still more clearly seen from the circumstance that, starting with the general laws of being, it is bound for the sake of its own growth and development to fulfil to a certain extent the requirements of the moral law and, in some respects, at any rate, to be harmonious, truthful, faithful, &c. Goodness and beauty can exist in their pure form without any admixture of evil or ugliness, but evil and ugliness can have no reality

without having some element of beauty and goodness in them.

It is clear, then, that the general laws of being are created for the sake of the unconditionally binding, i. e. for the sake of the realization of absolute values—of our building up the kingdom of the Spirit and participating in it. In view of this relation between the laws of being and the 'ought', practical reason may be said to be prior to theoretical reason, and this priority is the token of the final victory of good over evil.

At the close of our discussion of the nature of the logical, metaphysical, and practical principles, one peculiarity of their relation to one another should be noted. Logical principles are merely that part of metaphysical principles which has significance both for the structure of being and for the structure of truth; these principles are, at the same time, the most fundamental practical principles, inviolable because they determine the lowest limit of perfection, beyond which reality cannot sink. The sphere of logical laws is more narrow than that of metaphysical and practical ones and it is not independent, for it contains nothing new in comparison with the principles of metaphysics and ethics.

There is profound significance in this comparatively subordinate character of logical laws: it is the condition of the knowability both of that which is and of that which ought to be. For if the forms and principles of logic were different from the forms and principles of existence and of value, the objective side

of judgement and inference would contain existence and value not as they are in themselves but as transformed by thought, and we should be precluded from an immediate knowledge of them. Knowledge of existence and of value is possible only because logical principles coincide with metaphysical and practical ones. And if logical principles were more complex and varied than the principles of metaphysics and ethics, so that the latter coincided with only a part of the former, the realm of practice in its specific sense of freely performed or violated duty would disappear: everything in the world would acquire the same character of irrevocable necessity that characterizes the logical structure of knowledge. So that if the world can be known as it actually is, and if there is freedom in it, logical forms must be only a part of metaphysical and practical principles.

X

THE FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ORGANIC CONCRETE IDEAL- REALISM

MANY characteristic features of the system of ideal-realism developed in the present work have been already indicated in the preceding chapters. In conclusion I will only point out three more features of it, with reference to the status of the individual in the world whole, to the absolute character of truth, goodness, and beauty, and to the term 'concrete'.

Systems of philosophy may be called individualistic or universalistic according to the status they assign to the individual within the cosmic whole. Extreme universalism ascribes value only to the being of the Absolute or of the world-whole, regarding the existence of the individual as merely a means to the whole and having no independent value, or even treating the individual as something that ought not to exist and that deserves punishment for the very fact of its existence. This seems to be the doctrine, e. g., of Anaximander, who says, 'All things are resolved in accordance with necessity into that from which they have arisen. For they suffer punishment for their impiety and receive retribution from each other at the appointed time.'

Extreme individualism, on the contrary, ascribes independent value to the individual alone : the whole

is only a means to a more comfortable life for the individual, and has, as such, neither existence nor significance. Such a view is generally developed on the basis of an inorganic conception of the world, which denies that the whole comes first in the order of being.

It may be thought that extreme individualism, in contradistinction to extreme universalism, secures the triumph of the individual : it ascribes to him the highest position in the world, pictures him as enjoying the greatest imaginable freedom and independence and at the same time realizing the greatest possible fullness of his being. In the last resort, however, this theory leads to results which are the very opposite of those that the individual hopes for. If the world be split up into entities each of which attaches absolute value solely to its own existence and its own activities, their higher interests will be infinitely narrower than they would have been, had each of them also experienced the existence of all other entities and of the super-individual whole, and were it conscious of them as possessing absolute value.

Further, as already pointed out, the inorganic character of the world (or, rather, the lessening of its organic character) necessarily involves a struggle of conflicting interests, and a restriction of the individual entities' activity in relation to each other, i. e. a limitation of freedom. Therefore, the more an individualistic system insists upon the separateness of individuals, the more it restricts the purpose of life for each of them to self-preservation ; at the same

time, individuals become more and more similar to each other, and, instead of displaying a wealth of content and exhibiting the uniqueness of each particular entity, the world proves to be an assemblage of creatures that are indistinguishably alike.

Further, thinkers who conceive of the world as split up into separate units inevitably reject ideal, i.e. super-spatial and super-temporal, principles, and in consequence of this are precluded from taking personalities to be the ultimate constituents of the world : a personality contains too much unity, inexplicable in a world of disruption. Extreme individualists have to construct the world out of atoms. But though atoms are eternal, they are devoid of any value, and all values, therefore, have to be sought for in the realm of the transitory. And, indeed, consistent thinking cannot stop even at atoms ; an atom, being eternal, has still too much of an ideal character about it. Those who begin by denying ideal principles and by splitting up the world into separate and independent units must end, like Hume, by attempting to build up the world solely out of events that spring up and disappear in time, and are united merely by the relation of temporal sequence and co-existence. Such events, whether taken separately or in groups, do not deserve to be called individual. It may, therefore, be said that in the course of its development extreme individualism inevitably loses the very idea of individuality.

The idea of individuality can be preserved and developed only on the basis of an organic world-

conception, in that form of it which reconciles individualism and universalism by avoiding the extremes of either. This is precisely the theory worked out in the preceding chapters, where it has been shown that the world consists of substantival agents, each of which is unique and irreplaceable, and, while remaining an individual, has a super-individual aspect. Each individual is a possible member of the Kingdom of God, which has the character of complete wholeness, revealing the consubstantiality of all the entities that constitute the world. Even in the state of division that prevails in the psycho-physical world the consubstantiality of entities finds expression in the fact that the abstract Logos is common to all of them, in the possibility of intuition, in their dissatisfaction with the psycho-physical life, and in many other features.

The compresence of individual and super-individual characteristics in one and the same entity must not be imagined to be the result of mere addition, of mere supplementing of individual features by super-individual ones. The individual uniqueness of an entity has itself a super-individual significance ; in virtue of its very existence it is in the whole and the whole is in it, so that individual and super-individual characteristics coincide. As a possible member of the Kingdom of God, each entity has a special destination, a definite function, so that through realizing its own unique nature completely and rightfully it manifests its super-individual significance, which has absolute value.

To understand more clearly how this is possible, let us take once more the example of the connexion between abstract ideas of the highest degree of generality. The ideas of unity and plurality are so interwoven with each other that they can only be thought of together, in the form of a system of unity in plurality ; thinking about each of these ideas separately, in their specific peculiarity, will still be thinking about a system, but from a special point of view.

Such interpenetration of the individual and the universal alone renders possible the infinite diversity of individuals, and secures infinite fullness of being and infinite creative power for each of them.

The reconciliation between individualism and universalism enables us to decide whether the supreme values, such as goodness, truth, and beauty, are absolute or relative. In the preceding chapters emphasis has been laid on the relativity of existence, and it might be thought that this inevitably implies the relativity of truth, goodness, and beauty. But as a matter of fact it is just the opposite : the relativity of existence necessarily involves the absolute character of values. All existence, indeed, is relative in the sense that nothing exists in and for itself but everything is within a cosmic system, as a member of the world-whole. An entity is both individual and, as a member of the whole, super-individual. Hence it follows that it has significance not for itself only but for all other individuals and for the whole system as well : its value is the same from the point of view of the whole

and of each aspect of the whole ; in other words, it is absolute and not relative.

From the point of view of extreme individualism, on the contrary, the existence of each individual has absolute value, and for that very reason all values must be subjective and relative. Rejecting the substantiality and the interpenetration of entities, the extreme individualist supposes that each individual is confined within the limits of his own existence, and even in the perception of the outer world is really observing his own sensations and not the external reality. This necessarily leads to *relativism* in epistemology, to the view, namely, that truth about one and the same object is different for different individuals.

In the same way, in the domain of ethics, extreme individualism which regards the individual as an absolutely independent entity, somewhat resembling one of the atoms of Democritus, naturally arrives at the doctrine of the relativity of the good. The purpose set before himself by Critias, the Athenian oligarch, of realizing his will and power, is a good for Critias ; it may be an evil for his fellow citizens and for the whole Athenian state, but what does Critias care ? They must fend for themselves. Absolutely independent individual entities constituting a world of an inorganic type could not put before themselves one single, super-individual purpose, since in such a world that purpose would be impossible and, indeed, unthinkable. The most that the attempt to transcend the limits of one's individuality

could amount to would be for one individual unselfishly to defend the interests of another. For a true—and not merely imaginary—realization of this attempt, however, it would be necessary to have knowledge of the actual existence of that other ; in other words, it would be necessary to have *absolute* knowledge ; but in a world of the inorganic type only relative knowledge is possible.

Besides, this attempt to renounce egoism and to realize the good would inevitably prove contradictory : in an inorganic world the interests of the different entities would be irreconcilable and doing good to one individual would necessarily mean doing evil to another.

The case is different if the world be an organic whole, so that individuals have no absolute independence but exist within the system of the whole. In such a world truth is *absolute* : knowledge is based upon the co-ordination of every entity with all the elements of the world, and consists in the contemplation of the actual object that is being cognized ; so that the truth about every object is the *same* for all individuals.

The fact that an individual entity has a super-individual aspect implies that goodness, like truth, is absolute. True, and not merely apparent, good is that conduct on the part of each entity in and through which it fulfills its destination as a possible member of the Kingdom of God. If an entity succeeds in being that which it is meant to be, it is good for it and for all other entities in the world ; but if its con-

duct is a source of real evil for its neighbour, it is sure to be only a fictitious good for itself.

The part assigned to each entity within the cosmic whole is perfectly unique and irreplaceable, and cannot be played by any other entity. The absolute nature of the good, therefore, does not by any means consist in the uniformity of its content and in the entities resembling each other like grains of sand. On the contrary, to quote Fichte, who has worked out the problem in question, 'the highest moral act consists in the individual's mastering the special part assigned to him and not desiring to be anything different from what he, and only he, can be and ought to be in accordance with his higher nature, i. e. in accordance with the divine aspect of it'.¹

The greatest triumph of the theory that reconciles individualism and universalism is that, according to it, the most individual is at the same time the most absolutely valuable, valuable for the entity itself, for all the other entities, and for the whole. A system of ethics built upon this basis will not suffer from abstract formalism; it will be a concrete ethics, as is admirably shown by Vysheslavitsev in his remarkable book on Fichte.²

A system of concrete ethics is only possible on the basis of *concrete* ideal-realism, i. e. of a theory which includes in the realm of ideal (spiritual) being not only abstract ideas, rules, laws, &c., but also con-

¹ J. G. Fichte, *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben*, ed. F. Mediens, vol. 5, p. 244.

² Vysheslavitsev, *Etika Fichte (The Ethics of Fichte)*.

cretely-ideal essences—living substances, and the Spirit whose infinite content is not exhausted by abstract ideas.¹

For the first time in history concrete ideal-realism was worked out in the philosophy of Aristotle. It is easy to distort his theory, transforming it into abstract ideal-realism, and perhaps the best way to indicate the difference between these two lines of thought is to contrast the false and the true interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine. According to Aristotle, every particular thing and being in the world is the result of the combination of matter and form. 'Form' is usually taken to mean the definite character of a thing as expressed by the content of an abstract idea—e. g. by the idea of roundness, the idea of such a combination of building materials as is necessary to produce a human dwelling (the idea of a house), &c. Abstraction being made of these definite characteristics of concrete things, matter is conceived of as the *possibility* of any one of these forms or characteristics. Now possibility is one of the most general and contentless abstract ideas ; if we combine these two abstractions—matter as a possibility and form in the abstract—the product of such a combination will bear but little resemblance to real things ; it will be dead and sterile, and there will be no meaning in ascribing to it activity, development, motion. In order to account for the appearance of anything new in such a world, it is necessary to add at every step new abstract forms and qualities, arriv-

¹ See chap. iv.

ing at last at the 'time-indicating' form of a watch, the 'seed-crushing' form of a mill, &c.

The result will be different if, remembering that Aristotle was a naturalist who never lost sight of living reality, we follow him in making abstractions without separating from living reality that which is abstracted from it, but merely mentally emphasizing it for the sake of observing it more carefully against the whole background of real existence. Matter will then be seen to be the particular being itself in so far as it is a force, a potency, an active power—in so far as a being is τὸ δυνάμενον.¹

Matter is, in that case, a dynamic principle, a force. But of course apart from form, i. e. apart from a definite purpose and direction of activity (*definiteness* of purpose and *order* of activity are spiritual principles), force cannot create anything real. This is why the dynamic principle is imaginatively called by the term ὕλη, which indicates its indeterminateness, and the spiritual principle, called form, is placed above it. A real being (οὐσία) is an inseparable unity of force (matter) and form.

In the light of this interpretation, Aristotle's conception of nature begins to acquire a semblance of reality—but still only a semblance. Things understood as forces directed by forms that are of the

¹ In *Metaphysics*, Bk. XI, chap. v, 1071, Aristotle says that there exist two principles, ἐνέργεια and δύναμις; and in explaining, farther on, the meaning of ἐνέργεια, he points out that the second principle (which he had just called by the name δύναμις) is ὕλη.

nature of abstract ideas would stand on the same level as the products of human technical activity ; they would be like machines that carry on a monotonous activity for attaining some one limited purpose, without any progress in growth or perfection. Fortunately, however, Aristotle's philosophy includes under ' forms ' far higher principles than abstract ideas. The soul of a man, of an animal, or a plant, is, according to Aristotle, a form, and so is God. The content of these forms is not anything abstract, expressible by any group of general characteristics : they are concretely-ideal forms. The force directed by such a form is a living being, striving to realize a number of purposes which can only be attained in a process of evolution. These purposes, or rather certain aspects of them, are expressible in the form of abstract ideas, but they do not exhaust the essence of a living being. In a world populated by such beings, abstract and ideal forms have their place, but only as a factor subordinate to the concretely-ideal forms. That this really is Aristotle's conception of the world can be seen from the fact that at the head of all forms he places God, who transcends the world, and the world as a *living whole* strives towards this highest form. In its striving towards this supreme goal the world passes through a number of intermediate grades, assuming higher and higher forms which increase its spirituality more and more. At first, matter (force) assumes the form of the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire. Then, while still preserving these forms, and in addition to

them, it gives birth to the higher forms of plant, animal, man. Thus man, for instance, still consists of the original four elements, but higher spiritual purposes so dominate the whole of his bodily structure that substantiality, earthiness, and other similar qualities are to a great extent overcome, and retreat into the background. Such a theory may with some justification be designated by the name of Monism, for in it all real being is throughout described as an indissoluble union of force and of the spiritual form of its activity.

Owing to the supremacy of the concretely-ideal principles in such a system, every process has an infinitely complex content and significance, not to be exhausted by any number of abstract ideas, and contains the ground for transition to still higher orders of infinity. There is life, there is developing activity bringing about a progressive movement towards a definite, lofty, and attainable purpose.

Abstract idealism presents us with a very different picture of the world. Finding in it only such contents as, on the one hand, red, green, warm, cold, hard, &c., and, on the other, abstract forms such as unity, plurality, uniform sequence in time, &c., it does not admit the presence of any activity in the world and cannot account for the uniqueness of living creatures or include freedom in its conception of nature. The only way of reconciling oneself to the lifeless character of such a world is to believe that it is not the world of real being, but only of phenomena, constructed by the understanding in the know-

ing subject's mind—as is maintained by orthodox Kantians.

If a philosopher recognizes the presence of a dynamic principle in the world, recognizes, that is, the reality of life and its knowability, but entirely subordinates it to an abstract idea, the life that he depicts is terrifying by its formalism, its lack of content, and the unattainableness of its objects. A good instance is to be found in the early doctrines of Fichte expounded in *Wissenschaftslehre* in 1795, when Fichte still held the point of view of abstract idealism, and maintained that the ground of the world was the Absolute Ego and not the Absolute or God. The Absolute Ego is an agent which acts for the sake of infinitely expanding the sphere of its activity, of infinitely overcoming all its passive, i. e. sensuous, states, which appear to it as a world of objects : that is, as the world of not-self. At that stage of his development, Fichte describes ideal conduct entirely in the spirit of Kantian formalism, as striving for the sake of striving, acting for the sake of acting (and not for the sake of a sensuous state to be attained thereby), as obeying the law for the sake of the law.¹ The ideal of complete freedom of the Ego from passive states (i. e. from the world represented as the not-self) cannot be realized, and ideal conduct is therefore an endless progress towards unattainable perfection.

¹ Later on, in 1806, in *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben* (vol. 5, pp. 212-17), Fichte describes this conception of virtue as a form of Stoicism which is free from the misconceptions of daily life but has not yet attained to truth.

The doctrine that ideal perfection does not exist, that it is 'set' before us as an ideal but is nowhere 'given', and can never be realized in life, is characteristic of abstract idealism. And, indeed, if the ideal ultimate ground of the world is not a living being but only a principle, an abstract rule, it cannot of course itself be the realization of perfection; the living beings that are the bearers of this idea are not perfect either, but only strive toward perfection. The world rises to higher and higher levels of being by following an abstract rule, but the abstract character of the rule makes it unthinkable that it should ever lead to a complete embodiment of the ideal. Progress in such a world would be as meaningless and joyless as the life of a rational being who had to perform an endless task of drawing ellipses in such a way that the axis of each subsequent one should be longer by one metre than the axis of the preceding one. The being who strives after the ideal might be compared to a man continually sailing towards a lighthouse that can never be reached because it does not really exist. And, indeed, if there be no realized perfection at the basis of the world, the development of the world will never lead to perfection.

Concrete ideal-realism presents us with a different conception of the world. According to this doctrine the ultimate ground of the world is God, who transcends the world and is more than perfect—a Being that stands above perfection. The proximate ground of the world, and a component part of it, is the Kingdom of God, the kingdom of the Spirit as a realized

ideal. Even the beings that are farthest removed from it may hope to attain it, for that kingdom really exists, and, by the grace of God, its rays lighten, if only to a small extent, each one of us, helping us to endure the sorrows and burdens of the imperfect life which is our self-chosen doom.

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